This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`



Harvard College
Library

FROM THE LIBRARY OF

HERBERT WEIR SMYTH

Class of 1878

Eliot Professor of Greek Literature

GIVEN IN HIS MEMORY
BY HIS FAMILY
1937

Herbert Wm Smyth
May 14th 1886.
from the publishers.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, LEWIS R. PACKARD, AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION

BY

LOUIS DYER

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY.

1886.

Gp 82.274A

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
FROM THE LIBRARY OF
HERBERT WEIR SMYTH
APR. 15, 1941

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1885, by
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.



J. S. CUSHING & Co., PRINTERS, BOSTON.

PREFACE.

THIS edition of the *Apology of Socrates* and the *Crito* is based upon Dr. Christian Cron's eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett's labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett's teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell's valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron's book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most, nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.

The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

LOUIS DYER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
July, 1885.

INTRODUCTION.

THE endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form 1
of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (*ratio*) is the soul of which the body is utterance (*oratio*), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (λόγος) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

The merest glance at the history of philosophy[1] justifies this 2
statement. Greek philosophy first gave signs of life in the cosmogonies and theogonies of early poets who were anything but

[1] The most important facts are to be found: (1) in Plato's writings, (2) in Aristotle's writings, especially in the first book of his Metaphysics. The chief modern books are: (1) Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta. Locos colleg. H. Ritter et L. Preller. Ed. 5. (2) Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie. 2 Theile. (3) Zeller, die Philosophie der Griechen, translated by various hands, and published by Longmans in five volumes, i. and ii. "The Pre-Socratic Philosophy," iii. "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," iv. "Plato and the Older Academy," v. "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics." (4) F. Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums, History of Philosophy from Thales to the present time, Vol. I. "Ancient Philosophy." (5) G. H. Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy. (6) J. F. Ferrier's Lectures. (7) The best book for young students is J. B.

philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it preëminence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man's senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as WATER, Anaximander as τὸ ἄπειρον, the UNLIMITED.[1] Anaximenes called it AIR. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of "spiritual" and "material," or of "matter" and "mind" came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

3 Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that NUMBER was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to

Mayor's Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero. Cambridge, 1881. Pitt Press Series. Special works on Plato are: (1) K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. (2) Steinhart, Einleitung zu Platon's Sämmtlichen Werken, übersetzt von H. Müller, und Platons Leben. (3) Susemihl, die genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie, 2 Theile. (4) The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with *Analyses* and *Introductions*, by B. Jowett.

[1] Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, "everything by turns and nothing long."

the moral world, — to the whole field of human action.[1] But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls.[2] Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother-Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled Περὶ Φύσεως, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh,[3] and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics.

The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the ALL is the ONE, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C.,[4] at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel- 4

[1] Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, *i.e.* odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made κατὰ συστοιχίαν, *under two heads*: —

(A)	(B)
Limited	Unlimited.
Odd	Even.
One	Many.
Right	Left.
Male	Female.

(A)	(B)
Rest	Motion.
Straight	Crooked.
Light	Darkness.
Good	Bad.
Square	Oblong (*Rectangle*).

[2] *Cf. The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV. Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, *Metam.* XV. 165 ff.

[3] Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

[4] To fix this date *cf.* Plato's Theaetetus, p. 183 e, and Parmenides, p. 127 b, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno's is placed at

oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists.[1] Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly[2] that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.[3]

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics.[4] The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

5 Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying

forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

[1] Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time *limited* and *limitless*. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are *limited*. But they are also *limitless;* because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

[2] If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.

[3] Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum collegit recensuit vertit F. G. A. Mullachius. Parisiis, 1860.

[4] *Cf.* the placing of "good" and "bad" on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.

of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living FIRE, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of BECOMING or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things 6
Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, LEWIS R. PACKARD, AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION

BY

LOUIS DYER

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY.

1886.

Gp 82.274A

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
FROM THE LIBRARY OF
HERBERT WEIR SMYTH
APR. 15, 1941

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1885, by
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.



J. S. CUSHING & Co., PRINTERS, BOSTON.

PREFACE.

THIS edition of the *Apology of Socrates* and the *Crito* is based upon Dr. Christian Cron's eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett's labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett's teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell's valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron's book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most, nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.

The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

LOUIS DYER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
July, 1885.

INTRODUCTION.

THE endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form 1
of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (*ratio*) is the soul of which the body is utterance (*oratio*), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (λόγος) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

The merest glance at the history of philosophy[1] justifies this 2
statement. Greek philosophy first gave signs of life in the cosmogonies and theogonies of early poets who were anything but

[1] The most important facts are to be found: (1) in Plato's writings, (2) in Aristotle's writings, especially in the first book of his Metaphysics. The chief modern books are: (1) Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta. Locos colleg. H. Ritter et L. Preller. Ed. 5. (2) Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie. 2 Theile. (3) Zeller, die Philosophie der Griechen, translated by various hands, and published by Longmans in five volumes, i. and ii. "The Pre-Socratic Philosophy," iii. "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," iv. "Plato and the Older Academy," v. "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics." (4) F. Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums, History of Philosophy from Thales to the present time, Vol. I. "Ancient Philosophy." (5) G. H. Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy. (6) J. F. Ferrier's Lectures. (7) The best book for young students is J. B.

philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it preëminence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man's senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as WATER, Anaximander as τὸ ἄπειρον, the UNLIMITED.[1] Anaximenes called it AIR. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of "spiritual" and "material," or of "matter" and "mind" came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

3 Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that NUMBER was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to

Mayor's Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero. Cambridge, 1881. Pitt Press Series. Special works on Plato are: (1) K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. (2) Steinhart, Einleitung zu Platon's Sämmtlichen Werken, übersetzt von H. Müller, und Platons Leben. (3) Susemihl, die genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie, 2 Theile. (4) The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with *Analyses* and *Introductions*, by B. Jowett.

[1] Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, "everything by turns and nothing long."

the moral world, — to the whole field of human action.[1] But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls.[2] Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother-Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled **Περὶ Φύσεως**, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh,[3] and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics.

The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the ALL is the ONE, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C.,[4] at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel- 4

[1] Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, *i.e.* odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made *κατὰ συστοιχίαν, under two heads:* —

(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
Limited .	Unlimited.	Rest . . .	Motion.
Odd . . .	Even.	Straight .	Crooked.
One . . .	Many.	Light . . .	Darkness.
Right . .	Left.	Good . . .	Bad.
Male . . .	Female.	Square . .	Oblong (*Rectangle*).

[2] *Cf. The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV. Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, *Metam.* XV. 165 ff.

[3] Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

[4] To fix this date *cf.* Plato's Theaetetus, p. 183 **c**, and Parmenides, p. 127 **b**, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno's is placed at

oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists.[1] Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly[2] that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.[3]

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics.[4] The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

5 Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying

forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

[1] Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time *limited* and *limitless*. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are *limited*. But they are also *limitless;* because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

[2] If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.

[3] Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum collegit recensuit vertit F. G. A. Mullachius. Parisiis, 1860.

[4] *Cf.* the placing of "good" and "bad" on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.

of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living FIRE, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of BECOMING or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things 6
Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means

for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive 'opining,' while Heraclitus urges that the 'universal' which pervades all things (τὸ ξυνόν = τὸ κοινόν) alone has understanding. This understanding the 'individual' shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the 'universal.' Here is substantial agreement, but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

7 Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work[1] in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτεινός, *the man of darkness*. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus's book, gave this answer: "All that I could fathom was excellent; what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving." Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς οὔνομα gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ ἐθέλει? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

8 Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his *De rerum natura*. Empedocles flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

[1] Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft, I. 3, Berlin, 1808; or, Werke zur Philosophie, II. 1). See the attempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Heraklit von Ephesus, by Dr. P. Schuster, Leipzig, 1873. See also Heraclitii Ephesii reliquae, ed. I. Bywater, London, 1877.

colony of Thurii. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle, that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire, described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth, Aïdoneus; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the beginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (Σφαῖρος), which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this globe ruled Strife (Νεῖκος), who finally invaded it, causing complete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (Φιλίᾳ) reacted from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reaction and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (Κόσμος) with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehension of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradictions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called Καθαρμοί.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can 9
be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad, about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of developing this new system of thought.[1] The Atomists were unwilling to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immovable and unchangeable exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they said (3) A number of ORIGINAL ELEMENTS exists. Instead, however, of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of ATOMS (αἱ ἄτομοι, *sc.* οὐσίαι or ἰδέαι). These indivisible Atoms were in-

[1] For the interesting fragments of his well-written work, *cf.* Mullach's "Democriti Abderitae operum fragmenta," Berol. 1843. Also his work referred to above, p. 4, note 3.

wardly alike in essence, and so small as to be indistinguishable; they differed in shape, arrangement, and position. Their combination means growth; their separation means decay and destruction; the difference in their situation and arrangement is at the bottom of such variety and change as we see in the world. But why, we may ask, should these Atoms combine or separate? Because, says the Atomist, NECESSITY forces them to move. This necessary motion comes, not from any source or cause beyond and above them, but is derived partly from an original rotary motion, a twist which they take at the start, and partly from their constant collision one with another and the consequent reaction. But to move at all they need room to move in. This room is a vacuum which offers no resistance; it is free and empty space or VOID, while the atoms are space compacted and filled full, or FULNESS. Reality consists solely of these Atoms, and hence they are Being, while the Void is Not-being. And yet Not-being in this sense has a relative existence. Therefore the Atomists did not hesitate to say: Being no more is than Not-being. By Atoms not the physical world of the senses only, but also the soul, is explained. The body is the *cabin*, σκῆνος, of the soul, and on this basis an attempt is made to explain mental activity and the life of the soul. Here the shortcomings of the Atomistic explanation of the world show themselves. Still, against the Atomists the point is not well taken that, by necessity, an Atomist must mean chance or what is arbitrary, and all praise is due to the determined logic with which they apply their principle consistently to every detail. Democritus is credited with a number of admirable moral maxims; they express, however, the plain common-sense of a man who means to make the most of life, rather than a matured philosophy of conduct.

10 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born in the seventieth Olympiad, about 500 B.C., and thus his birth preceded that of Empedocles and Democritus; but he must be counted as belonging to a maturer phase of thought.[1] When Anaxagoras said: "Order is introduced

[1] Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 3: *Ἀναξαγόρας ... τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὢν τούτου (Ἐμπεδοκλέους), τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὕστερος, ἀπείρους εἶναί φησι τὰς ἀρχάς.* Of his book *Περὶ Φύσεως* a number of fragments are preserved. Schaubach has

into the All by MIND," there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras's dictum, "The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart." These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements *seeds*, σπέρματα, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, *e.g.* gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively *combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts.* In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ὁμοιομερῆ (ὅμοιος, *like*, and μέρος, *part*); therefore, the whole theory has often been called HOMOIOMERIC. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally MIND intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the

published them: Anaxagorae Clazomenii fragmenta collecta et illustrata, Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put them into his book. See on Apology, p. 26 d.

full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the beginning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first impulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be completely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed, it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men, especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived. He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, and there ended his days.

11 After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Henceforward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a first cause was a vigorous impulse which, arousing and uplifting the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to this time carried on their speculations.[1] Now the time had come when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruction; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

[1] They show no little impatience and disdain of every-day men like ourselves. It matters little to them whether we keep pace with their discussions or fall behind, — every man of them steadily goes on his chosen way. Plato, Sophist, p. 243 a.

results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but SOPHISTIC.[1] This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

[1] Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the Sophists together. Three *negative* statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: *first* the Sophists did not teach free of charge, *second* they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, *third* they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.

these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

12 Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist.[1] When he was born and when he died[2] cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder.[3] Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's ξυνὸς λόγος he maintained that *Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not.*[4] By man he understood man as this or that

[1] See Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 **a, b.**

[2] His birth is variously placed between 490 and 480 B.C. (in 487, 485, or 481), and his death between 420 and 408 B.C.

[3] Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 **c**: *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην, there is not a man of you all whose father I might not be so far as years go.*

[4] The original words as given by Diog. Laert. (ix. 51) are: "*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*" This is sometimes so interpreted as to mean simply that nothing can be measured, *i.e.* known, unless there is some one to measure or know. This might then mean that the right measure of all things would be taken only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (*freely*) from Plato's Theaetetus, p. 161 **c**: "In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no whit wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?"

individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowledge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible perception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini[1] in Sicily appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on 13
an embassy from his native town.[2] His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large numbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him handsomely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old when he died.[3] His philosophical views and method of reasoning were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the following words from his book (περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, *Nature, or* THAT WHICH IS NOT): "*Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.*" But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and 14
Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathematical astronomy,[4] but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best known for his nice discriminations between words of similar meaning, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has preserved one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Heracles.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no 15
fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation. After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all knowl-

[1] This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in calling the town Λεόντιον.

[2] Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 86 does not mention him by name.

[3] The dates given for his birth vary from 496 B.C. (Foss) to 483 B.C. (Frei); for his death, from 384 B.C. to 375 B.C.

[4] See on Apol., p. 18 b.

edge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones, — more profitable and pleasanter ones.

16 This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

17 Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus,[1] was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance.[2] As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all *virtues*, ἀρεταί, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue[3] is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

[1] The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/69 B.C.: probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 B.C. is nearer the truth. *Cf. infra* note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 **d**.

[2] *Cf.* Apol., p. 29 **d** ff., particularly the explanation of **e**, ἐρήσομαι κτέ.

[3] It cannot be denied that even in Socrates' conception of ἀρετή, the old notion so manifest in Homer (*cf.* Doederlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 536) of 'skill' or eleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'

Delphi, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this.[1]

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge 18
as the foundation of righteousness. (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: *What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance?* τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐπαγωγή, *induction*. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the *epagogic* or *inductive method* (τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους), and of *the definition of universals* (τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου, — hence ὅρος = *definitio*).

By the DIALECTIC (διαλεκτική) of Socrates is meant simply his 19
acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

[1] We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man? Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.

'dialectic' became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato's logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates's dialectic is the *controversial art* of certain Sophists (ἀντιλογική), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

20 The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding, — the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man's body is born stronger than his neighbor's, so one man's soul was born more courageous than his neighbor's. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance *in excellence* (πρὸς ἀρετήν) by learning and practice.

21 Such is Socrates's doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of "*Memoirs of Socrates*" (ἀπομνημονεύματα,[1] *commentarii*, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates's position in

[1] It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as *Socraticae chartae*. The poet's allusion, however, is probably more vague.

the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato's ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle's writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates's theory gives no adequate knowledge 22
of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.[1]

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated 23
to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor,[2] but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God's command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns,[3] and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this unterrified obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators[4] and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

[1] When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these are given by Plato alone. *Cf.* 'Socrates,' a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

[2] Apology, p. 23 **c** and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.

[3] Apology, p. 28 **e** and note; also Laches, pp. 181 **a b**, 188 **e**, and Symposium, pp. 219 **e**–221 **c**.

[4] Apology, p. 32 **b** with note

afterwards[1] prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates's freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: **λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν**, *no one shall teach the art of words.* It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist.[2] The second reason is, that the words **λόγων τέχνη**, taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates's characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

[1] Apology, p. 32 c d with note.

[2] In the Clouds, first put on the stage in B.C. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates's peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, Symposium, ch. 5; Plato, Symposium, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.

of God, would take no man's pay. Hence, he naturally preferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasium, a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this desire for coöperation was undoubted, for he declared himself unable alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his homely description of his art as intellectual *midwifery* (μαιευτική) and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned.[1] This idea made him protest against being called any man's teacher, indeed he stoutly denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young 26
men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palaestra or the gymnasium. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen conversing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that he was continually harping upon cobbling, cobblers, carpenters, smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the same thing about the same subject *ad nauseam;* whereas, the Sophists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction. That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

[1] *Cf.* Alcibiades I., p. 431 *c*; Theaetet., p. 149 **a**.

than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (ἐπίδειξις); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only, — his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of *temperance*, σωφροσύνη. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal.[1] The conceit of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this conceit he waged war with his incomparable irony,[2] before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a σοφιστής, *owner of wisdom*, but let every man be a φιλόσοφος, *lover of wisdom*.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations[3] he strove to rouse in
27 others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon,[4] reject. He merely sought to confine it

[1] Hdt. I. 32.

[2] *Cf.* Apology, p. 37 e; Republic, p. 337 a: ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους.

[3] See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.

[4] *Cf.* particularly Mem. I. i. 2 *sqq.*, especially 6–9; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5–7.

to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God, — a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs.[1] Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought,[2] might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may, what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men, — cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral 28
character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his 'staying power' while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidaea.[3] Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until

[1] *Cf.* Apol., pp. 31 **c d**, 40 **a b**; Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1–5. In the Appendix to his edition of the Memorabilia, Breitenbach enters into this whole question. See also Susemihl in Bursian's Jahresbericht I. 5, p. 546, and Zeller II., pp. 69–83 of the third edition. *Cf.* Riddell's Apology, Appendix A, and Cardinal Manning's The Daemon of Socrates, Longmans and Green, 1872.

[2] Schleiermacher proves this in his note on Apology, p. 27 **b**, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use *δαιμόνιον* as an adjective. *Cf.* on Apol., p. 31 **d**.

[3] Sympos., p. 220 **c d**; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.

the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remarkable: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and summer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms.[1] Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the Crito.[2] As for temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable for both.

29 The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trustworthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of Socrates given at the end of the Memorabilia. But all this certainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man's 'taking off.' Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. As far as history has determined them, the facts about this trial are as follows: —

30 In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of threescore years and ten,[3] Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came forward with his accusation. In Plato's Euthyphro Meletus is described as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the poet Meletus,[4] others say he was the poet's son,[5] though 'a chip of the old block,' since the words (Apol. 23 e) ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν

[1] Sympos., p. 220 a b.

[2] Crito, ch. XIV. with note on p. 53 a.

[3] Apol., p. 17 d and *supra*, p. 14, note 1. Ol. 95, 1 = 400/399 B.C.

[4] Aristoph. Frogs, v. 1302.

[5] K. F. Hermann, in his *Disputatio de Socratis accusatoribus*, maintains that there were four different persons named Meletus, (1) the accuser of Socrates, (2) the poet referred to in the Frogs, (3) the Meletus of Apol., p. 32 c d, who obeyed the thirty, and arrested the unoffending Leon of Salamis, (4) the Meletus of Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 36. Frohberger argues against this in the Philol. Anzeiger II. 7.

ἀχθόμενος imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συνήγοροι. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict.[1] Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs.[2] Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, 31
whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were:[3] Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state[4]; accordingly it was technically a γραφή (*public suit*), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας (*a public suit on the count of impiety*).

As to the negative clause of the first count (οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει 32
θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the *law of the land* (νόμος πόλεως) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

[1] Apol., p. 36 a.

[2] Xen. Apol. 29, *sqq.* Probably there is some reference to Anytus's unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1. 38 *sqq.*

[3] Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος (or εἰσφέρων with Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1). ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

[4] See *infra*, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.

[5] Apol., p. 26 d.

observed all its requirements.[5] The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (ἕτερα δὲ καινα δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος) apparently refer to the much mooted δαιμόνιον, — the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. In the light of what has been set forth above, we are forced to conclude that this allegation was pure slander, and it looks like wilful slander.

33 /It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates's dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored./ At all events it is certain that in the accuser's mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates's sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat's heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was *free speech* (παρρησία). A connection, on Socrates's part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourges of the body politic, were for some time

the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge.

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collect- 34
edly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice by Xenophon,[1] which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's Theaetetus does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate[2] (ἄρχων βασιλεύς). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea,[3] though he made it without real hope or serious

[1] "Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view?' 'What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence.'" Xen. Apol., § 3 *sqq.* *Cf.* Mem. iv. 8. 4 *sqq.*, where the story is almost verbally repeated.

[2] Theaetet., p. 210 c d.

[3] Cicero (*De oratore* I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleading. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a *rhetorical exercise* (*declamatio*) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to

desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation,[1] and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country's honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

35 And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of 'guilty,' but by no large majority.[2] In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand,[3] and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι, his accuser having proposed, τιμᾶσθαι, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two.[4] Just as in his plea Socrates had disdained the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority[5] sentenced him to death.

36 The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances[6] delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after

a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, p. 141) and Rauchenstein (Philol. XVI. 1).

[1] "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." Matthew x., v. 19.

[2] Apol., p. 36 a and *ibid.* note on εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 35 d and *infra*, § 73.

[4] § 73.

[5] It is said that the adverse majority was increased by eighty votes which had previously been cast for a verdict of 'not guilty.'

[6] Crito, p. 43 c with note on τὸ πλοῖον. *Cf.* Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2: "He was constrained to live for thirty days after his case was decided because it was the month of the yearly festival and embassy to Delos, and the law prohibited all public executions until the return of the sacred envoys

it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of the authorities, offered him means of escape and also opportunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the 37
master's noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely thirty years of age.[1] Aristo his father and his mother Perictione were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his ancestors on his father's side, and by his mother he was descended from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socrates, having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of Socrates he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and splendid consummation. Before this he had not been unacquainted

from Delos. During this time not one of his familiar friends could detect in his case any change in the manner of his life from what it had always been. And as for his previous career, he certainly always commanded unparalleled admiration for living a cheerful and contented life." The annual festival and embassy to Delos — another festival, also called Δήλια, was celebrated every four years — came in the tenth or eleventh month of the Athenian year (Μουνυχιών or Θαργηλιών), hence the death of Socrates probably occurred in Thargelion (our May and June); the year was 399 B.C.

[1] Various dates are given for Plato's birth. (1) The usually accepted one depends on Athenaeus, and is the archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3 = 430/29 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 B.C., Epameinon's year as archon, and the year of Pericles's death. (3) Zeller follows Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and fixes upon 428/27 B.C. The birthday is said to have been the seventh day of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo. In the year 428/27 B.C. this came on May 26/27, or, as others claim, May 29/30. *Cf.* Steinhart.

with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

38 It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato's earliest writings (*e.g.* the Lysis) were produced during Socrates's life, or all of them after the master's death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato's earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

39 Among the dialogues which he first wrote the PROTAGORAS is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the Protagoras belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (1) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man's virtue is incomplete

and tentative only, — it is a constant struggle; God alone is invariably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the GORGIAS Plato discusses the relation of goodness to 40
pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the Protagoras. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool's paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates 41
was in the mind of the writer of the Gorgias. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The Gorgias contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato's political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato.[1] Plato's earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this

[1] This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.

degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of the great statesman's leadership is not absolutely untenable even when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality.[1] But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother's kin, his uncle Charmides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to endure revealed to his disciple the infamy of the Thirty and their lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them was more than obscured by Socrates's trial and condemnation. He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all active participation in his country's affairs. It would surely be rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life, Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

42 To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Socrates's death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato who, in the Euthyphro, early foreshadows a more abstruse account of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends at Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

[1] The opinion of Pericles expressed by Thucydides (ii. 65) is very favourable. Grote warmly defends the reputation of Pericles against the less favourable comments of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and a certain number of modern writers. Recently Büchsenschütz in his 'Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume' has again accentuated the other side, and Herzberg in turn argues, Jahrbücher für Ph. u. P. 100, 5, in favour of Pericles.

there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato's knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first 43
went to Cyrene, — perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus's school, — and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodorus was the reputed exponent of Protagoras's philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city.[1] The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education[2] is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning.[3] After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Grecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Tarentum. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato's interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his ungovernable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians, — and so it

[1] Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.

[2] Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω.*

[3] It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.

occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta's prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.[1]

44 At the age of forty Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the THEAETETUS serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato's dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is *sensation* (αἴσθησις), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato's writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.[2]

[1] This whole account of Plato's being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

[2] It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato's THEORY OF IDEAS. In the Theaetetus (p. 210 a) Socrates is made to say: "Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) *sensation* (*αἴσθησις*); nor is it (2) *true opinion* (*δόξα ἀληθής*); nor again, (3) true opinion *coupled with definition* (*λόγος προσγιγνόμενος*)." This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato's way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates's definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen

In the SOPHIST, the POLITICUS, and the PARMENIDES, we have 45
works more or less obviously connected with the Theaetetus. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them[1] it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils 46
about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasium close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the PHAEDRUS was 47
written at the beginning of this period,[2] and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (ἀνάμνησις) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from

those original shapes of which things here are poor copies. Dialectic is the means of education and the perfected activity of thought by which we learn to neglect the bad copies and fix our minds upon the originals, which are in heaven. There they are all in their right place, and there goodness and truth shine upon them, enabling us to see them aright.

[1] Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

[2] Schleiermacher considers the Phaedrus as Plato's maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato's earliest works.

the learner's soul. The SYMPOSIUM (συμπόσιον, *banquet*) and the PHAEDO like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The PHILEBUS contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.[1]

43 In the Philebus, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the REPUBLIC (πολιτεία), the TIMAEUS and the CRITIAS, all three of which are closely connected, and the LAWS. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato's works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, "What is justice?" the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is 'writ large.' Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul.[2] His class of rulers correspond to the *reason* (τὸ λογιστικόν); his class of warriors to the (irascible) *impulsive part* (τὸ θυμοειδές); his class of producers to the *appetites* (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (σοφία); the warriors, *courage* (ἀνδρεία); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

[1] *Cf. supra*, p. 3, n. 3.

[2] This division into three parts is based in the Timaeus upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (*a*) a noble part (θυμός) and (*b*) an ignoble part (ἐπιθυμία). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wildauer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie, in the Philosophische Monatschrift, 1873.

follow *self-control* (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which the limbs of the body politic cöoperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it.[1] With this great work are connected the Timaeus and the (unfinished) Critias. The Timaeus describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the Republic. The Critias represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato's Laws stand to the ten books of the Republic is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his Laws as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato's last 49
two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368–7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius's enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incau-

[1] Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler's virtue, (2) wisdom in boldly executing the ruler's commands is the warrior's virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman's virtue.

tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse,[1] Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato's high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

50 The remainder of Plato's life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian hearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes's keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age,[2] and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, 1 = 348–7 B.C.). The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his 'grand tour' in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμεικός), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son

[1] *Cf.* Laws iv., p. 709 e *sqq.* This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

[2] Seneca is probably repeating an 'idle tale' when he says that Plato died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5. 13): "uno et octogesimo ano scribens est mortuus." Perhaps his word "scribens" is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher's pillow.

of Plato's sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51
of Plato's works.[1] They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophical truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached. Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had appeared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories. The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack of completeness which characterized the early systems of philosophy.[2] Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of heaven to the needs of life upon earth,[3] and, the uncompromising ordeal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato's genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato's dialogues

[1] Besides the works already enumerated and the Apology and Crito, there are quite a number of others. Some of these Plato has been supposed not to have written. Those whose authenticity has been questioned connect themselves with the Protagoras; they are: the Ion, Hippias Maior and Minor, the first and second Alcibiades, Lysis, Charmides, Laches Euthyphro. Then there are dialogues connected with the so-called dialectical discourses: the Meno, the Euthydemus, the Cratylus. The Menexenus remains, and the only dialogues with which it can be in any way compared are the Apology and the Phaedrus. Of course no mention is here made of such other short discourses as have been falsely attributed to Plato but are now admitted by all to be spurious.

[2] The best account of the comparative inefficiency of these early philosophers is Plato's own. *Cf.* the passage from the Sophist quoted *supra*, p. 10, note 1.

[3] Cicero, Tusc. v. 4, 10, and Academ. i. 4, 15.

the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in every reader a self-reliant vigor of understanding which shall grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduction, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of his death, — a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word, the written word was dead.

52 The many resources of Plato's artistic imagination are apparent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form (1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the case may be, is made, — *e.g.*, the Republic; or (3) introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely, the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close, and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Symposium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord-

ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan of the author, so in certain of Plato's later writings, in fact very commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the dramatic form is subordinated and all but disappears.

Something must now be said of the two works before us. They 53
are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sentence of Socrates. Of the two the first is

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, we should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said in court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we feel convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily bears such a construction, for Plato's dialogues are all of them conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages. To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of the Apology would require more information than that supplied by Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust.[1] We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence.[2] There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately reproducing the words of his master, — of the father of his soul's new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to reach and to write, 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

[1] We are not warranted in pinning our faith to Xenophon's (?) Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, a production whose origin and value are equally doubtful. Xenophon's Memorabilia, on the other hand, is inadequate for our purpose.

[2] Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold the accuracy of Plato's report. The former argues that the speech suits all the circumstances too well to allow of its not being an exact report, while the latter strives to deal with the arguments used to prove his untrustworthiness. Ueberweg lately has taken this same point of view with great decision. In the admirable introduction of Steinhart is to be found the best presentation of the opposite view.

truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incomparable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetry than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could, even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Socrates in court. In Plato's Apology, Socrates on trial for his life stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by his named and unnamed accusers.[1] He is condemned in court, but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his life-work stand acquitted.

54 However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to have been, — and no one will incline to say they were not appropriate and noble, — the less would Plato feel called upon to depart from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote, to conclude that his Apology of Socrates resembled very closely

[1] *Cf.* Apology, p. 18 **a b** *sqq.*

the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used, — as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind.[1] Plato heard him just as Thucydides heard Pericles, and as Thucydides, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles's speeches,[2] could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates.[3] The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates's trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato's many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato's many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and 55

[1] *Cf.* Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato's trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.

[2] For the best account of this whole matter, *cf.* Professor R. C. Jebb's article on the speeches of Thucydides, published in a volume of Oxford Essays called Hellenica, edited by E. Abbott, Rivingtons, 1871.

[3] There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydides to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates. The intimacy of ten years' standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato's, and *vice versa*. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates's. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydides to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates?

indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution.[1] This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination[2] and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form;[3] for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

56 No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes[4] the terms of the indictment, — he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order, — would prove the speaker's indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged[5] was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in

[1] *Cf.* Apol., p. 26 **b** *ad fin.* and **c**, also p. 28 **e** *sqq.*

[2] *Cf.* Apol., pp. 24 **d**–27 **e**.

[3] *Cf.* Apol., p. 20 **a**–**c**; p. 29 **c** at the end *sqq.* and elsewhere.

[4] *Cf. supra*, § 31.

[5] *Cf.* Apol., p. 26 **b** *sqq.*

courts[1] at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the here- 57
after is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato's addition but Socrates's literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death's deliverance was the firmest foundation for Plato's own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in 58
the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the Eumenides of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the Oresteian trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence 59
proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

[1] *Cf. infra*, § 71, note 2.

Analysis of the First Part, or the Defence Proper, cc. i–xxiv.

(*a*) c. i. **Introduction** (προοίμιον, *exordium*) = { *principium.* / *insinuatio* (ἔφοδος).

(*b*) c. ii. **Statement** (πρόθεσις, *propositio*) of the case and of the plan in the plea.

(*c*) cc. iii–xv. **Refutation** (λύσις, *confutatio*) = { of former accusers, cc. iii–x. / of Meletus, cc. xi–xv.

(*d*) cc. xvi–xxii. **Digression** (παρέκβασις, *digressio*) on Socrates's life.

(*e*) cc. xxiii, xxiv. **Peroration** (ἐπίλογος, *peroratio*). This is an attack upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (*a*) is always intended to prepare the hearers for listening to the speaker's plea. This is especially hard in the face of prejudice against the speaker's person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to *insinuation* ἔφοδος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (*b*) the statement πρόθεσις. This is commonly a plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a *subdivision* (*partitio*), which is sometimes simply a *summary of heads* (*enumeratio*),[1] and sometimes a *detailed account of topics* (*expositio*).[2] Here, again, Socrates's defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (πίστις, *probatio*), represented by (*c*) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

[1] Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumeratione utemur, cum dicemus numero, quot de rebus dicturi simus.

[2] *Ibid.* Expositio est, cum res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absolute.

of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (*d*) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, *i.e. exornatio* or *embellishment*.[1] This, too, can be found in Socrates's speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school-oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required *reinforcement* (*confirmatio*). The transition to (*e*) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonest and dishonorable.[2] This part of

[1] Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 46: Exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et rebus iudicatis et amplificationibus et ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exaugendam et collocupletandam argumentationem.

[2] *Cf.* Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: "*οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, he lent himself to none of the violations of law which were customarily committed in courts.*" It appears that there was no special law forbidding in so many words an oratorical appeal to the emotions of the judges in the ordinary courts. This is confirmed, indeed, by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. 1, a passage particularly important in connection with the Apology). There Aristotle first criticizes various rhetorical practices, and then proceeds to say: "prejudice, pity, anger, and all such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with facts, but affect only the judge himself. Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it." To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian's words (VI. 1, 7): "Athe-

the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unmanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God's will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

60 Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case.[1] The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates's *advocate* (συνήγορος) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

61 The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of 'guilty' just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates's acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death stares him in the face, he does not blench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

62 Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the

CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class[2] of Plato's dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

nis affectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator."

[1] *Cf. supra*, § 34 and note.

[2] *Cf. supra*, § 52.

audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 **d**). This intimacy was unbroken, and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained.[1] Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO. 63

(*a*) cc. I, II. **Prologue** (**πρόλογος**); the *characters* and their *mental situation* (**ἦθός τε καὶ πάθος**).

(*b*) cc. III–X. **Entanglement** (**δέσις** or **πλοκή**) of the logical situation.

1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.

1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

[1] *Cf. supra*, § 36 and note.

(*c*) cc. XI–XV. **Clearing up** (λύσις).[1] The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.

1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life liberty and happiness.
2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.

(*d*) cc. XVI, XVII. **Epilogue** (ἐπίλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato's mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see in both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (*e.g.* p. 45 c). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato's work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato's 'golden rule': Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice.[2] In the Gorgias (see *supra*, § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

[1] For most of the details of the analysis given above Cron is not responsible, though it is substituted for his § 63, where there is a less detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.

[2] See on *ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται*, Crito, p. 49 b.

APPENDIX

ON ATHENIAN COURTS OF LAW.[1]

Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power 66
to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί), and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath[2] of office, to be called upon to act as a δικαστής; δικασταί, *jurymen*,[3] was the official name[4] by

[1] The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Process, Calvary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer, and G. F. Schömann, Griechische Alterthümer, 2 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title Antiquities of Greece by Rivingtons (London, 1880).

[2] The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (149–151), is of doubtful authenticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 153, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause, — a conjecture of Fränkel's, — is not far from the real form: ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων, [περὶ ὧν δ' ἂν νόμοι μὴ ὦσι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκα οὔτ' ἔχθρας], ... καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ δίωξις, [καὶ ἐνορκοῦντι μέν μοι εἴη πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, ἐπιορκοῦντι δὲ ἐξώλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει], *I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred*, [*and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowledge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity*], ... *and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit.* [*If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin seize on me and all my kindred.*] See on ὀμώμοκεν κτέ., Apol., p. 35 c.

[3] The use, in other connexions, of δικαστής with the meaning of *judge* leads many to translate δικασταί *judges* and not *jurymen*. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them jurymen. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the δικασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

[4] The customary form in addressing them was ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, sometimes ὦ ἄνδρες, and once and again ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. *Cf.* Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 e, 26 d, 30 b.

which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten *courts*, of five hundred each, called δικαστήρια, for, like the English word court, δικαστήριον may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, *e.g.* of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a δικαστής was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each juryman received as the badge of his office a staff (βακτηρία) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (σύμβολον), by showing which he secured his fee after his day's service. *Cf.* Dem. *De Cor.* 210. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day's session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

67 Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Heliastic courts, and the jurymen were called also ἡλιασταί from the name ἡλιαία, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is δίκη, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, δίκαι in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) δίκαι in the narrower sense, *private suits*, and (2) γραφαί, *public suits*. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

68 In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (γραφή), or complaint (λῆξις), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters

involved. Most suits thus came before the *nine* archons, commonly before one of the first *three* or before all of the remaining *six*. The first archon, — called ὁ ἄρχων *par excellence*, — dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called βασιλεύς, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called πολέμαρχος, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (μέτοικοι) and foreigners; the remaining six, — called the Thesmothetae, — dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, 69
who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two *witnesses to the summons* (κλητῆρες). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the *preliminary investigation* (ἀνάκρισις). There the plaintiff's charges and the defendant's answer,[1] both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or *confirmation under oath* was called διωμοσία, sometimes ἀντωμοσία.[2] The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the depositions of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (βάσανος) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal

[1] *Cf.* (Dem. XLV. 46) the written charge (λῆξις) in a private suit: Ἀπολλόδωρος Πασίωνος Ἀχαρνεὺς Στεφάνῳ Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεῖ ψευδομαρτυριῶν, τίμημα τάλαντον. τὰ ψευδῆ μου κατεμαρτύρησε Στέφανος μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, *Apollodorus the Acharnian, son of Pasion, accuses Stephanus the Acharnian, son of Menecles, for giving false testimony; the damages named are fixed at one talent. Stephanus testified falsely against me in the statements recorded in the evidence submitted.* The answer is: Στέφανος Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεὺς τἀληθῆ ἐμαρτύρησα μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, *the testimony which I . . . gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted.*

[2] διωμοσία refers strictly to the double oath of the two parties; ἀντωμοσία to the defendant's oath. But both are used for each singly.

upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

70 On the day (ἡ κυρία) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the δικασταί *assigned by lot* (ἐπικεκληρωμένοι) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the *clerk* (γραμματεύς) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the *opening of the case* (εἰσαγωγὴ τῆς δίκης[1]) by the magistrate (εἰσαγωγεύς). *Cf.* Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, VI. 42.

71 The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by *advocates* (συνήγοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. *E.g.* Demosthenes's speech on the Crown was made as Ctesipon's advocate. The *water-clock* (κλέψυδρα, sometimes called simply τὸ ὕδωρ) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions.[2] The jurymen had a right to interrupt the speaker

[1] To this correspond the words ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης, Crito, p. 45 e, just as we find εἰσάγειν used both of τὴν δίκην and of τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. Correspondingly, we find εἰσέρχεσθαι and εἰσιέναι said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning substantially the same thing. Hence the *presiding magistrate*, ἡγεμὼν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, is also called ὁ εἰσαγωγεύς.

[2] According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. XLVI. 10: τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή,

(1) if in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without 72
preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called **ψῆφοι**. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about $170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on **ἐρήμην καταγοροῦντες**, Apol. 18 c), and he was pronounced guilty *in contumaciam*. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called **ἐπωβελία**, *one obol for every drachma*.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) **ἀγῶνες** 73
τιμητοί, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to answer each what question the other asks, but cannot give testimony as witnesses. Cf. Apol., p. 25 d.

(τίμημα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, — like the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας brought against Socrates, — the accuser proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,[1] and the accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition; then followed the decision of the court.[2] It is still a moot point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death, banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (ἀτιμία), confiscation of property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula constantly used at Athens: ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι,[3] *what a man must suffer or pay for his offence.* In case the convicted defendant was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the punishment of death were called the Eleven (οἱ ἕνδεκα). Ten men on this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes; the eleventh was a *scribe*, γραμματεύς. They had general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their subordinates[4] to execute the penalty of death.

[1] *Cf. supra*, § 31; also, § 69 and note.

[2] The technical terms which were used are found in Apol., pp. 36 b, 37 c. It is noticeable that not only τιμᾶσθαι (*sc.* ἑαυτῷ) τινός but also ὑποτιμᾶσθαι (Xen. Apol. 23) were used.

[3] *Cf.* Apol., p. 36 b.

[4] *Cf.* Phaed., p. 116 b.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατη-

17 a

I. 1. **ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς· ἐγὼ δέ**: not *ὑμεῖς μέν· ἐγὼ δέ* because the clauses as wholes, not *ὑμεῖς* and *ἐγώ*, are contrasted.

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: instead of the more usual and technical *ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί*, which Socrates reserves for his closing words (40 a to the end) addressed to those who voted for his acquittal. See on *ὦ ἄνδρες κτέ.*, 26 d, and Introd. p. 49, note 4. — **πεπόνθατε**: *have been affected*, though act. in form is pass. in meaning, and therefore takes *ὑπό* with the gen.

2. **δ' οὖν**: introduces an asserted fact, which is contrasted with the preceding statement of uncertainty, *but at any rate*, Lat. certe. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 3. 5, *εἰ μὲν δίκαια ποιήσω οὐκ οἶδα, αἱρήσομαι δ' οὖν ὑμᾶς κτέ., whether I shall be doing what is right I do not know, but at any rate I will choose you.* Hdt. iii. 80, *καὶ ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὦν, and arguments were urged which to some Greeks seem apocryphal, but at any rate they were urged.*

καὶ αὐτός: *even myself*, sc. "How then may not you have been affected!"

3. **ὀλίγου**: sc. *δεῖν*, used abs. G. 268; H. 956 and 743 b. *Cf.* 22 a. — **πιθανῶς, ἀληθές**: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

17 a

4. **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: qualifies the sweeping denial in *οὐδέν*, *hardly anything*. G. 268; H. 956. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, *cf.* Hdt. ii. 15, *τὸ Δέλτα ἐστὶ κατάρρυτόν τε καὶ νεωστί, ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, ἀναπεφηνός, has only recently, (so to speak,) come to light.*

5. **αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν**: connect both gens. with *ἕν*. *αὐτῶν*, *about them*, designates the persons who are responsible for the *ἕν* (*cf.* below b, *τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον*). *τῶν πολλῶν* gives the sum of which *ἕν* is part. See also on *τοὺς πολλούς* in 18 b. — **τοῦτο**: explaining *ἕν* and in appos. with it. — **ἐν ᾧ**: refers to the passage *where* the statement is made.

6. **χρή**: the original warning was *χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι*. *χρείη*, but not *χρῆν*, would be grammatically possible. G. 243; H. 932. For the use of *χρῆν*, *cf.* 33 d, 34 a, and *Lach.* 181 c. G. 222, N. 2; H. 897.

θῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι 17 b
αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ'
ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν
ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι
λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν,
ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι
μὲν γοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν·
ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι

17 b

10. **εἰ μὴ ἄρα**: *unless perchance*, Lat. nisi forte. In order to suggest that the one safest way out of the difficulty is to beg the whole question at issue, ἄρα introduces a definition of good speaking, and ironically connects with it the assertion that Socrates is a good speaker.

11. **εἰ μέν**: *if indeed*. This use of μέν, like many others, shows its connexion with μήν. The supposition is merely restated.

12. **οὐ κατὰ τούτους**: *but not after their pattern*. A parenthetical statement, which he proceeds to explain (see on μόγις, 21 b, and *cf.* 27 c). The explanation begins with οὐ μέντοι and ends with the chapter. Pending this explanation, these words mean a better or a worse speaker than they, *i.e.* one *not on their level*.

13. **γοῦν**: *at all events*. — **ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν**: *little or nothing*. *Cf.* IId. iii. 140, ἀναβέβηκε ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς κω παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν, *hardly a single one of them has ever been here*. Xen. *Cyr.* vii. 5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιεστηκότων ἤ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα, *now of these bystanders I know next to no one at all*.

14. **ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε**: instead of ἐμοῦ δ' ἀκούσεσθε. The position of ὑμεῖς suggests a contrast with οὗτοι μέν; the sense calls for ἐμοῦ δὲ (ὑμεῖς) ἀκούσεσθε. This collocation leaves opportunity for bringing out πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν with great prominence. For a similar shifting of emphasis, *cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 1. 25, κἀγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐθέλετε ἐξορμᾶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἕπεσθαι ὑμῖν βούλομαι, εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάττετέ με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, *now I for one, if you are minded to bestir yourselves to accomplish this, am ready to follow your lead; if you however appoint me to lead you I make no excuse on the score of my age*. See App. 17 b

15. **κεκαλλιεπημένους** κτέ.: in *Crat.* 399 a b Διὶ φίλος is quoted as ἓ ῥῆμα; when changed to Δίφιλος it becomes an ὄνομα. Here ὀνόματα means *words*, ῥήματα means *phrases*. In grammar ὄνομα means *noun*, ῥῆμα means *verb*. The κόσμος τῶν λόγων (ornatus) means specifically the use of tropes and figures of speech. Orators took great pains in the choice of single words, and in the collocation and suitable arrangement of their words in phrases. Accordingly, in *Symp.* 198 b, Socrates is made to bestow unstinted praise upon Agathon's speech: τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων, *who would not have been beside himself on hearing words and phrases of such marvellous beauty?* Then he contrasts his own fashion of speaking with Aga-

μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, 17
ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμη-
μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν c
ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς
ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ
ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους
εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων
ἀκούητέ μου ἀπologουμένου δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν

17 b thon's as follows: ὅρα οὖν εἴ τι καὶ τοιούτου λόγου δέει, περὶ Ἔρωτος τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων τοιαύτῃ, ὁποῖα δὴ ἄν τις τύχῃ ἐπελθοῦσα, *consider now whether you feel the need of such a speech as this, of hearing the truth told about love in words and phrases arranged just in the way they suggest themselves* (*cf.* εἰκῇ λεγόμενα). See Introd. 55.

c 17. **εἰκῇ, τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι**: the same fact stated under two different but parallel aspects, σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου. See on πάλαι κτέ., 18 **b**, and on καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ., *Crit.* 48 **d**, and for the facts Introd. 34. Also for freq. sneers at the unrefined illustrations and homely vocabulary of Socrates, *cf. Gorg.* 489 **b**–491 **c**. *Cf.* also Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 37, ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, "ἀλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι" ἔφη "δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρῖφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπό σου."

18. **ἃ λέγω**: referring to the speech which follows, *my plea*. — **μηδεὶς προσδοκησάτω**: for the aor. imv. third pers. in prohibitions, see GMT. 86, N. 1 *b*; G. 254, N.; H. 874 b.

20. **τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ**: *for a man as old as I.* πλάττοντι agrees in gender with ἐμοί, *i.e.* the person involved in πλάττοντι and suggested, though not explicitly, by τῇδε (equiv. to τῇ ἐμῇ). The comparison is attracted into the dat., *i.e.* ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ stands for ὥσπερ μειράκιον ἂν πλάττοι. 17 c

21. **εἰς ὑμᾶς**: *before you, sc.* τοὺς δικαστάς, *i.e.* τὸ δικαστήριον. *Cf.* the similar use of ἐν. — **καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ**: *yes, and most fervently too.* καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical '*yes*,' the second καί adds a specification of the intensity with which the request is made, "and indeed I beg of you, and I beg you most fervently too."

22. **δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι**: *cf.* 27 **b**, παρῆτησάμην. — **τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων**: "this has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 **b**, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognized under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. 71), the reference here prob. extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 **a**), alluded to (21 **c** *sqq.*, 23 **c**), and imagined (23 **b**, 29 **c**), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 **d**, 31 **c**, 35 **b**, **c**)." R.

23. **καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἄλλοθι**: see Introd. 25.

ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ 1
ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει d
γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα,
ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω
τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος
ἐτύγχανον ὤν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ

17 c 24. **τραπεζῶν**: *τράπεζαι* (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. *Cf.* Lys. ix. 5, *κἀμοὶ μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διείλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philius's bank.* *Cf.* also *Id.* xxiv. 19–20, where, to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: *ταῦτα λέγων οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι τέχνας ἔχουσι (who follow trades), οὐδὲ τῶν ὡς ἐμὲ εἰσιόντων (my customers) μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὡς τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς (tradesmen). ἕκαστος γὰρ ὑμῶν εἴθισται προσφοιτᾶν (frequent, lounge in) ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπολεῖον (perfumer's), ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουρεῖον (barber-shop), ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον (cobbler's), ὁ δ' ὅποι ἂν τύχῃ, καὶ πλεῖστοι μὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω τῆς ἀγορᾶς κατασκευασμένους (keeping shop), ἐλάχιστοι δὲ ὡς τοὺς πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντας αὐτῆς.* On the last point, *cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 1, where Socrates *αἰσθανόμενος αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Εὐθύδημον) διὰ νεότητα (because he was so young) οὔπω εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσιόντα, εἰ δέ τι βούλοιτο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡνιοποιεῖόν τι (a harness-maker's) τῶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἤει κτέ.*

d 25. **θορυβεῖν**: *θορυβεῖν* and *θόρυβος* describe noisy demonstrations whether of approval or disapproval, and are used esp. of large assemblies. *Cf.* 17 d *Rep.* vi. 492 b, *ὅταν συγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι οἱ πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν . . . καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες κτέ., whenever the multitude gathers and crowds the seats of assemblies, courts, theatres, or camps, or collects in any place where crowds commonly resort, and there makes a great uproar with shouting and clapping of hands meting out praise to this and blame to that in a speech or a play, etc.*

26. **ἐπὶ δικαστήριον**: "the prep. has the notion of *presenting one's self* to the court. *Cf.* Isae. Frg. (Dion H. *de Isae.* 10), *λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου.* The *ἀναβέβηκα* refers to the *βῆμα.*" R.

27. **ἑβδομήκοντα**: see Introd. 17 and App. *Cf.* also Lys. xix. 55, *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔτη γεγονὼς ἤδη τριάκοντα οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὐδὲν πώποτε ἀντεῖπον, οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδείς μοι ἐνεκάλεσεν (brought accusation), ἐγγύς τε οἰκῶν τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὐδὲ πρὸς δικαστηρίῳ οὐδὲ πρὸς βουλευτηρίῳ ὤφθην οὐδεπώποτε, πρὶν ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν γενέσθαι.*

28. **ἐνθάδε**: *i.e. ἐν δικαστηρίοις.* The gen. *τῆς λέξεως* depends upon *ξένως* (G. 182, 1; H. 757 a), the adv. of *ξένος*, — used almost in the sense of *ἄπειρος*, — which in this sense takes the gen., but is rare in Att. prose.

ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν κτέ.: for the position

30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, 18
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ,
τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν — ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων,
ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη — αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν
35 γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα
καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ
τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς b

17 d and repetition of ἄν, see GMT. 42, 3; G. 212, 2; H. 864.

30. **φωνῇ**: *dialect*, with esp. reference to pronunciation, while τρόπῳ, *style of speech*, describes more generally any unusual choice and combination of words.

18 a **ἐτεθράμμην**: *had been brought up*, belongs to the supposed case. See on ὃς ἔμελλεν, 20 a. Foreigners were allowed to appear in court only in exceptional cases. Ordinarily their ξένος, *guest-friend*, or their πρόξενος, *resident consul*, represented them in court and was surety for them.

31. **καὶ δὴ καί**: takes the place of οὕτως καί after ὥσπερ; δή calls attention to the case in point here cited. — **νῦν**: not *now* in contrast to *then*, but *as it is* contrasted with *as it would have been*. "Now that I am not a stranger in Athens, but only a stranger in courts." Lat. nunc is used in the same way. *Cf.* Liv. ii. 12. 14. — **ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ**: rather than ὥς γ' ἐμοί, the reading of inferior Mss. adopted by many editt. The important word is ὡς, not μοί, which is the least emphatic form in which the pron. could be introduced. Here the pers. pron. is used instead of the refl. H. 684. For the analogous use of the oblique cases of αὐτός instead of the ind. refl., see G. 145, 2, N.; H. 684 a. 18 a

32. **ἴσως, ἴσως**: the reason urged is a general one. The influence of style, if felt at all, will be felt just in those cases where the style of the plea is better or worse than the case deserves, — just where it interferes with true judgment. For similar phraseology, *cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 3. 2, ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αὐτὰ τῇ ἡδονῇ χαριζόμενοι (*for their own satisfaction*). *Two Gen. of Ver.* i. 1,

> If haply won perhaps a hapless gain;
> If lost, why then a grievous labor won.

35. **αὕτη**: in place of τοῦτο, by assimilation to the gender of the pred. ἀρετή. It refers to the preceding clause αὐτὸ . . . μή.

II. 1. **δίκαιός εἰμι** κτέ.: for certain adjs. used pers. with the inf., see GMT. 93, 1, N. 2 *b*; G. 261, 1; H. 952.

2. **ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα**: not ψευδῶς, because in the act. the idiom is κατηγορεῖν τί τινος.

4. **ἐμοῦ γὰρ** κτέ.: introducing the reason why Socrates is to speak first πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα . . . κατηγόρους. b

πρὸς ὑμᾶς: with κατήγοροι γεγόνασι,

ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέ- 18
γοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον,
καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι,
ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβά-
νοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τις Σω-
κράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ

18 b which is equiv. to κατηγορήκασι. *Cf. Euthyph.* 2 c, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, where πρός relates to those to whom the accusation is addressed.

5. καί, καί: the first καί emphasizes πάλαι, the second requires no comment. — πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη: see on εἰκῇ κτέ., 17 c. πάλαι goes back to the beginning of the accusations while πολλὰ κτέ. follows out their long continuance. This has been going on more than twenty years at the very least, for the *Clouds* was first put upon the stage in 423, and Socrates was tried in 399.

6. τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον: when followed by the acc. of a person's name, οἱ περί and οἱ ἀμφί mean the person and those connected with him (subjects, followers, companions, adherents). G. 141, N. 3; H. 791, 3 *fin.* Anytus was the most influential accuser. See Introd. 30.

8. τοὺς πολλούς: *most of you.* The art. is not used here (as in 17 a above, τῶν πολλῶν) to call up something familiar; it contrasts most of them, who were caught young and taught to abhor Socrates, with the few, implied in the part. gen. ὑμῶν, to whom this may not have happened. G. 142, 2, N. 2 and N. 3 *b*; H. 665 and 673 b.

παραλαμβάνοντες: this word often is used of one who takes charge of a child and educates it. *Cf. Alc.* I. 121 e, ὃς ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἐτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλείους παιδαγωγοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν. But this sense is too narrow for the present context. More to the point is *Gorg.* 483 e, where λαμβάνειν is used in a wider sense, which is analogous to that of παραλαμβάνειν here, τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾴδοντες κτέ., *taking the best and most vigorous of our number in our earliest youth, and by incantations subduing us as if we were young lions.* 18 b

9. ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν: *prejudiced you against me by unceasing accusations.* Strictly speaking κατηγοροῦντες ἔπειθον is required, but coordination here idiomatically takes the place of subordination. — τις Σωκράτης: τὶς with prop. names conveys an indefiniteness and uncertainty which are always uncomplimentary and which in this case amount to scorn, *an individual* (somebody or other) *named Socrates. Cf. what d' you call him?* used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφὸς ἀνήρ: these words are practically intended to mean a Sophist. "The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation, *cf.* 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so distinctly as to exclude those of Sophist." R. — τά τε μετέωρα . . . ἀνεζητηκώς: popular prejudice coined this phrase, or something like it, to stigmatize all

γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. 18
οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατα- c
σκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου κατήγοροι. οἱ γὰρ ἀκού-
οντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν.

18 b scientific investigation into nature. With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2–12), and even Socrates' contemporaries, the Sophists, — notably Hippias, — were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. *Cf. Prot.* 315 c, ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτῶν τὸν Ἱππίαν, *and they* (Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and Andron) *appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies.* The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς (where ὑπό has the very unusual sense of *beneath and covered by*) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing "in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth" is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*, 184–234. Here the word ἅπαντα adds a final touch of exaggeration. — **φρον-τιστῆς**: used trans. here like φροντίζειν with acc.. For a dat. similarly governed, *cf.* τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, 30 a, where see note. See also App. — "This 'accusation,' σοφὸς . . . ποιῶν, both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that 18 b of the Sophist; the μετέωρα φροντιστής points to the Philosopher, the τὸν . . . ποιῶν to the Sophist." R.

11. **τὸν ἥττω λόγον** κτέ.: any teaching of rhetoric, *as such*, must contain hints as to the most effective means for making the best of a bad case by presenting it skilfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist's single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. *Cf.* the *Clouds*, 889–1104, where Aristophanes introduces the δίκαιος λόγος and the ἄδικος λόγος respectively. They have an argument in which the ἄδικος λόγος wins. *Cf.* Cic. *Brut.* 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: docere se profitebantur quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset. His opposuit sese Socrates, qui subtilitate quadam disputandi refellere eorum instituta solebat verbis.

13. **οἱ δεινοί**: in the pred. The c accusers just mentioned as κατ' ἐξοχὴν δεινοί.

14. **οὐδὲ θεοὺς** κτέ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of

15 ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 18
ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες
πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες,
ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες
ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ
20 τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις d
κωμῳδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ

18 c useful time, but actually (hence the *οὐδέ, not even*, in the text) led to atheism. See Introd. 10, 12, and 33 *fin.*

16. **ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ**: with *ὑμᾶς*.

17. **ἐν ᾗ ἂν ἐπιστεύσατε**: for the potential ind. with *ἄν* denoting what *may have* happened and perhaps *did* happen, see G. 226, 2, N. 2. See the examples in L. and S. *s.v.* *ἄν* B. I. c.

18. **ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες**: supply *δίκην*. The fem. termination is used in this idiom, though *ἔρημος* is more commonly of two terminations, and *κατηγορῶν ἔρημον*, in exactly the sense required here, occurs in Dem. XXI. 87. The acc. is cognate with *κατηγοροῦντες*. G. 159; H. 715 b. *Cf.* also the common law phrases, *διώκειν γραφήν, prosecute an indictment*, *φεύγειν γραφήν, defend a suit at law*. The sense of the whole is repeated in untechnical language by the appended *ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός*. *In fact the case they prosecuted always went by default, with none to speak for the defendant.* When either party to a lawsuit failed to appear, the court, as we say, *entered a default against him*, *ἐρήμην καταγιγνώσκει τινός*, and either one of the two parties to the suit who appeared *ἐρήμην κρατεῖ* or *ἐρήμην αἱρεῖ*, *sc.* *δίκην*. In such a case a plaintiff, if present, *ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖ* (*δίκην*) and the absent defendant *ἐρήμην ὀφλισκάνει δίκην*. — **ἀτεχνῶς**: *absolutely*, *i.e.* without artifice, and hence simply, as a matter of course.

19. **ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον** *κτέ.*: *τοῦτο*, the correlative of *ὅ*, is suppressed for brevity's sake. *τοῦτό ἐστιν* must be read between the lines. The clause with *ὅτι* stands in appos. to this suppressed antec. Often a further step toward brevity is taken, and in place of such a clause as this one with *ὅτι* we have an independent clause, sometimes even introduced by *γάρ*. *Cf.* Isoc. VIII. 53, *ὃ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, οὓς γὰρ ὁμολογήσαιμεν ἂν πονηροτάτους εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν τούτους πιστοτάτους φύλακας ἡγούμεθα τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι, but, what is of all things most grievous! we are wont to consider those the commonwealth's most trustworthy guardians whom we should count as the meanest of our citizens.* 18 c

21. **κωμῳδιοποιός**: the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (see Introd. 25) is here more esp. alluded to, since it contains the specific charges just mentioned. Cratinus, Ameipsias, and Eupolis also ridiculed Socrates. d

ὅσοι δὲ *κτέ.*: the clause *οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι* enlarges the scope of *φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι*. As it is appended as an after-thought, the sense of the leading verb is casually reiterated in *ἄλλους πείθοντες*. Strictly speaking *πεπεισμένοι* is subordinated to *πείθοντες*. Logically the sense requires: *ὅσοι δέ, οἱ μὲν φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι, ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον*. The first *δέ* goes back to the

χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, — οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι 18
ἄλλους πείθοντες, — οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'
ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν
ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου.
ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς
κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορή-
σαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε e
δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ
ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον· εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν 19
διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν

18 d main statement of the preceding sent. about the anonymous accusers, ὁ δὲ . . . εἰπεῖν. On the loose conversational structure of such sents., see Introd. 55.

25. **ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν κτέ.**: τὲ καὶ used here to connect, not two different ideas, but two different ways of putting the same idea. Socrates would be sure always to use his favorite method of question and answer, and therefore *σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον* for him would be practically *ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου*. By thus saying one and the same thing twice over, the speaker expresses his idea all the more effectively.

27. **ἀξιώσατε**: the two notions of *ἄξιον*, worth (price) and right, are as usual blended in this word, *duly grant*. Notice the persistent recurrence in various forms of the idea conveyed by *ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω*. See Introd. 55.

e 29. **οὓς λέγω**: refers to b above. —**οἰήθητε κτέ.**: it was common for a speaker to ask the court to approve of some order of topics which he proposed to follow. For a fuller description of *ἐκείνους*, see b above; notice that it refers to *ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι*. These *old-time accusers*, though the last-mentioned, were the most remote in thought, for Anytus and his crew were actually present as *τῶνδε* shows. H. 696 b. 18 e

32. **εἶεν**: *well*, pointing to what has just been said, and implying that the whole must be accepted by his hearers as a matter of course. It is like "So far, so good!" *ἔστω* often has the same force. Grammatical arguments are used to prove that this *εἶεν* is nothing more nor less than the alternative form used not infrequently in place of the opt. *εἶησαν*. The force of *δή* is very much that of *εἶεν*, for it indicates that the duty of making some plea must be taken for granted.

33. **τὴν διαβολήν**: *the prejudice* produced by the slanders just described. 19 a

34. **ἔσχετε**: *acquired*. See on *ἔσχηκα*, 20 d, and *cf.* Hdt. i. 14, *τὴν τυραννίδα*

35 οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως 19
γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με
ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω
ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν
ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός b
με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες
διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν
5 ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ
περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν

19 a οὕτω ἔσχον οἱ Μερμνάδαι. When ἔχειν means, *be in possession*, ἔσχον means, *came into possession*. G. 200, N. 5 *b*; H. 841. — **ταύτην**: resumptively after the interrupting clause of explanation introduced by ᾗ*ν*.

36. **εἴ τι**: *if at all*. — **ἄμεινον**: used without an expressed standard of comparison because the opposite inevitably suggests itself, "better in any way than that I should not accomplish anything."

πλέον ποιεῖν: proficere.

38. **οὐ πάνυ**: *not at all*. Here certainly *hardly* would not be adequate. *Cf.* *μόγις πάνυ*, 21 **b**.

39. **τῷ θεῷ**: *the divine will* or *God*. The art. is used not because any particular god is referred to, but with a generic or collective force. *Cf. Crit.* 43 **d**, and see on *τῷ θεῷ*, 35 **d** and 42 **a**, and *ὁ θεός*, *Crit.* 54 **e**.

III. 2. **πιστεύων**: not as above, 18 **c**, *fidem habens*, but rather *confidens* or *fretus*. *Cf. Alc.* I. 123 **c**, *τί οὖν ποτέ ἐστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον; Come now, on what does the youth rely?* — **Μέλητος**: see Introd. b 30, and for *γραφήν*, *ibid.* 67.

4. **ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων**: a freq. idiom in comparisons; the leading 19 and dependent clauses are briefly b blended in one; *ἀναγνῶναι* as well as *ἀντωμοσίαν* are involved in this consolidation. The reference is to the formal reading of the documents in a suit before the full court. On *ἀντωμοσία*, see Introd. 69.

5. **ἀδικεῖ**: very commonly, as here, *ἀδικεῖν* has almost the force of a pf. One of its obvious meanings is *ἀδικός εἰμι*, which practically signifies, *I have done wrong* or *I am guilty*. GMT. 10, 1, N. 4; H. 827.

6. **περιεργάζεται**: *is a busybody*. A busybody either minds other people's business or makes too much of his own. Socrates is accused of the first; for a good case of the second, *cf.* Nep. *Arist.* 1.4, sibi non placere quod tam cupide elaborasset, ut praeter ceteros Iustus appellaretur. *Cf.* 20 **c**, *περιττότερον πραγματευομένου*, and see on *τὰ μετέωρα* in 18 **b**. — **οὐράνια**: the art. is omitted because *ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια* form one conception. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 19, *Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα ἠγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα* (*the unuttered*

ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δι- 19
δάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑώρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ c
ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-
φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν
φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε
μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοι-
αύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τίς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι·
μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι·

19 b

plans in man's thought). In *Prot.* 315 c, Plato satirizes the astronomical lore of Hippias.

7. **ἄλλους . . . διδάσκων**: see Introd. 11 and 25.

c 8. **τοιαύτη τις**: Socrates alone is responsible for the exact words; the accusation itself is vague. — **ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε**: in the *Clouds*, Aristophanes put before the Athenians their own feelings against Socrates, he dramatized a prejudice already existing.

9. **Σωκράτη τινὰ** κτέ.: in appos. with *ταῦτα*. For the force of *τινά*, see on *τις Σωκράτης*, 18 b; it implies that Socrates in the *Clouds* bears no close resemblance to the real Socrates. *Cf. Clouds*, 218–225, where Strepsiades on entering Socrates's thinking-shop says: Who is this man up there in the basket? Hearing it is Socrates, he asks him what he's about. Socrates answers *ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον*, *on air I tread and oversee the sun.*

10. **φάσκοντα** κτέ.: subordinated to *περιφερόμενον*.

11. **ὧν**: referring to all statements of the sort above mentioned. — **οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν**: a reënforcement of the *οὐδέν* stated disjunctively. *Cf.* 21 b and 24 a; also for a similar locution, *cf.* Dem. IX. 5, *οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων* (*that you ought to do*) *ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει*. See on *ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν*, 17 b.

19 c

12. **οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων**: *cf.* in e below, *καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι*. "Such knowledge is a fine thing, if any one has it." Socrates ironically hints that no one has it. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* I. 1. 11, *οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ, καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις* (*by what necessary laws*) *ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν*. Those who pursued these studies were crazy, he thought, because man ought first to know himself (*cf. id.* I. 1. 12, *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν*, and 38 a below), and because these physicists looked into questions which were really beyond the sphere of man (*ibid.*, *ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν*) and therefore arrived at impotent conclusions (*cf. id.* IV. 7. 6–7). See on *ἐκ τῆς* κτέ., 26 e, and Introd. 10.

14. **μή . . . φύγοιμι**: Schanz brackets these words: "quia sanam interpretationem spernunt." Stallbaum punctuates "*μὴ . . . φύγοιμι!*"

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. 19 d
μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ
ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ
πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦ-
τοί εἰσι· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ
μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγο-
μένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα
περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδέ γ' εἴ τινος
ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρή-
ματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ e
μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώ-
πους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος
καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες,

19 c The meaning certainly appears to be, *may I never by any chance have to defend myself against Meletus on so serious a charge!* δίκαι is often best represented in translation by the sing. For ὑπό with φεύγειν, see on πεπόνθατε, 17 a. If Socrates despised the wisdom of the natural philosophers, he would be pretending to know what he did not know. Meletus then would have a strong case against him, for the charge would be so serious that Socrates could not attempt to defend himself. Socrates ironically attributes to Meletus and the courts his own strong disapproval of pretended knowledge.

15. ἀλλὰ γάρ: *but the truth is*, the truth, namely, which contradicts the notion that Socrates pretends to know what he is ignorant of, and also gives the reason why Aristophanes's attack does not touch him, but the physicists only.

d 18. οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι: *are in that case, sc.* the one just mentioned; hence the art. is used. 19 d

22. περὶ ἐμοῦ: the colloquial tone is marked in the position of these words. Instead of "the other stories which people tell about me," Socrates says, "the other stories about me, which people tell." The rel. clause is appended as an apparent afterthought.

IV. 1. ἀλλὰ γάρ: in turning to a new topic, a glance is thrown backward (οὔτε . . . ἔστιν), and the new departure begins with the emphatic οὐδέ. ἔστιν is equiv. to the following ἀληθές (ἐστιν).

3. ἐπεί: *although*. Strictly a connecting thought must be supplied. e

4. εἴ τις εἴη: the regular apod. καλὸν ἂν εἴη is represented by its equiv. in sense, δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. GMT. 54, 2 *b*, and compare 63, 4 *b*.

5. ὥσπερ Γοργίας: on Gorgias, see Introd. 12–14. Protagoras was not living at this time. See Introd. 12.

6. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος κτέ.: the

οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς 19
ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βού-
λωνται, — τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολι- 20
πόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσ-
ειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός,
ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν
ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες
οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην —
ἔστον γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε — ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μέν
σου τὼ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν
ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ
τε καὶ ἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δ' b
ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ'
ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην
λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ

19 e ironical surprise of Socrates is reproduced by the anacoluthon in this sent. With οἷός τ' ἐστίν the speaker apparently leads up to πείθειν, but the emphatic τούτους (in which the clause τοὺς νέους οἷς . . . βούλωνται is summed up) is followed by πείθουσι instead. (The pl. after ἕκαστος is not uncommon. H. 609 a.) Then comes the statement of a fact which is surprising, *they pay these men*, and finally the climax is capped by their giving them *thanks to boot*. To give this last point προσειδέναι, which should be a partic. like διδόντας, is put on a par with ξυνεῖναι. For a fuller account of these teachers, see *Prot.* 316 c ff.

20 a 11. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος: "the men just named are not the only ones, *for also, etc.*"

12. ἠσθόμην: see on ἡσθόμην οἰομένων, 22 c.

14. Καλλίᾳ: at Callias's house foreigners, and particularly foreign Sophists, were welcomed. Callias's fondness for Sophists is humorously brought out in the *Protagoras*, where he is almost crowded out of house and home by them. The indulgence of this and of other tastes exhausted his resources, and he died in poverty. His father Hipponicus fell in the battle at Delium (424 B.C.). 20 a

17. ὃς ἔμελλεν: for ἔμελλον and the inf., without ἄν, expressing a *past* likelihood which was not realized, see GMT. 49, 2, N. 3 *e*. Here is a *present* likelihood (see *ib. a* for an analogous use of ἔδει) which is not realized, *who would, in the case supposed* (εἰ . . . μισθώσασθαι), *proceed to make them, etc.*

21. τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κτέ.: *sc.* the boys must be civilized and humanized. Civilization involves the existence of the family and the state, and these require education. *Cf.* Arist. *Pol.* i. 2. 9, ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, *man is by nature a political animal.* b

πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ 20
τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ
γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου δι-
25 δάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν·
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐηνὸν ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην
τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ c
αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην
ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες,
τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γε-

20 b 25. **Εὔηνος κτέ.**: not a word is wasted in this answer, upon the brevity of which largely depends the humor of the story. Evenus is elsewhere mentioned as a teacher of oratory and a writer of elegiacs. A few such poems attributed to him still exist. Here he is introduced as a Sophist and a teacher of virtue. The smallness of his charge for instruction prob. measures accurately the value attached to it by his contemporaries, and places him and his teaching in the second rank. Protagoras charged 100 minas. There have been attempts to distinguish between a younger and an older Evenus, both of whom came from Paros and wrote elegiacs. If there were two, allusion is here made to the elder.

26. **εἰ ἔχοι καὶ διδάσκει**: in the original statement which Socrates may be supposed to have in mind, both of these were in the indic. Both might change to the opt. (GMT. 77, 1; H. 937) after *ἐμακάρισα*. The change to the opt. from *ἔχει* throws *εἰ ἔχοι*, as it were, into the background, leaving *οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει*, which contains a very pointed insinuation, in the more vivid indic. See App.

20 c 27. **ἐμμελῶς**: synonymous with *ὀρθῶς*. Its opposite is *πλημμελῶς* (*discordantly* or *falsely*, of a false note). The word also conveys by innuendo the notion that the teaching of Evenus is *cheap*, and this is the point here made. In *Criti.* 106 b, *μετρίως* and *παρὰ μέλος*, *πλημμελῶς* and *ἐμμελής* are used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until a man sees the truth which a particular error caricatures, he will not renounce his error; to denounce error as such is therefore not enough. Thus far Socrates has argued against the grossly erroneous popular opinion of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit the truth. His upright conduct has been exasperating, for obedience to God has led him to defy men.

1. **ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες κτέ.**: objections dramatized and put in the form of questions. The argument is: "there must be *some* cause." Hence the *γάρ* in *οὐ γὰρ δήπου*.

2. **τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα**: *What is that you have been about?* or better, *What is this about you?* Accordingly *πρᾶγμα* is used either in the sense of pursuit, study, or plan of life; or it has no independent meaning, but is joined with the art.

γόνασω; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττό- 20
τερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος
γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί· λέγε οὖν
ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.
ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειρά- d
σομαι ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε
ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω
τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ
διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν
ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ

20 c and *σόν*, the whole being a paraphrase for Σωκράτης. See on *τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*, *Crit.* 53 d.

3. **περιττότερον**: what overpasses the limit restraining common men, and hence provokes suspicion. See on *περιεργάζεται*, 19 b, and *cf.* Soph. *Ant.* 68, *τὸ γὰρ περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα.* Eur. *Bacch.* 427 ff., *σοφὸν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν· τὸ πλῆθος δ τι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρῆταί τε* (*whate'er the multitude of lowlier men puts faith in and practises*) *τόδ' ἂν δεχοίμαν.* That *σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου* (*although as you say you have been doing nothing*) conveys a statement of fact, not a supposition, is shown by *οὐδέν*. The *ἔπειτα* points the contrast between two statements of fact, (1) *σοῦ* (gen. after *φήμη*) *πραγματευομένου*, and (2) *τοσαύτη φήμη γέγονεν*. The words *εἰ μή τι . . . οἱ πολλοί* (see App.) re-state (1) more mildly and as a supposition. "The evil report did not arise about you while you were doing nothing out of the way, unless your behaviour was eccentric." A man may be eccentric and yet keep within bounds; *cf.* below d and e, also 23 a.

8. **τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν**: *sc.* *σοφός*. To be distinguished from *φήμη τε καὶ λόγος* only as bringing out the bad repute which was their result. *Cf.* the Lat. n o m e n. The words *τὴν διαβολήν* show that *ὄνομα* is not to be taken in its usual sense of *good name* or *fame*, but closely with *διαβολήν*, *both the name and the blame.* d

11. **ἀλλ' ἤ**: this collocation with *οὐδέν* indicates that *ἀλλ' ἤ* arose from the use of *ἄλλος*. For a case where *ἄλλος* precedes it, *cf.* 34 b.

12. **ἔσχηκα**: *I have become possessed of and still have.* See on *ἔσχετε*, 19 a, and *Phaedr.* 241 b, *νοῦν ἤδη ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονηκώς, after he had come to full understanding and gained self-control.*

ποίαν . . . ταύτην: this question treads upon the heels of the preceding sent. so closely that *διά* is not repeated. *ποίαν* is in the pred.; we might expand to *ποία σοφία ἐστὶν αὕτη δι' ἣν τοῦτο . . . ἔσχηκα.* H. 618.

13. **ἥπερ**: *sc.* *διὰ ἐκείνην τοῦτο . . . ἔσχηκα, ἥπερ κτέ., just that which.*

κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν οὓς ἄρτι 20
ἔλεγον μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ e
οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ'
ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί
μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι
ὑμῶν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω,
ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ

20 e

15. **ἢ οὐκ ἔχω κτέ.**: ironical. Such wisdom is one of two things, either superhuman or no wisdom at all.

18. **μὴ θορυβήσητε**: *do not interrupt me with noise*, strictly referring to the moment fixed by **ἐὰν δόξω κτέ.** In 21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (*μὴ θορυβεῖτε*) because the request is less precise, *make no disturbance.* GMT. 80; H. 874 a.

19. **μέγα λέγειν**: not of course in the sense of *speaking out loud* (*cf. Rep.* v. 449 b, *ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἤδη λέγων, beginning to speak above his breath*), but in that of *μεγαληγορεῖν*, as *μέγα φρονεῖν* is used in the sense of *μεγαλοφρονεῖν. Cf. Rich. II.* iii. 2,

> Boys with women's voices
> Strive to *speak big*, and clap their female joints
> In stiff unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν κτέ.: a compressed form of statement, made effective with the audience by the allusion to certain Euripidean strains. (*Cf.* Eur. Frg. 488, *κοὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα, not mine the word, I heard it from my mother.* This line is parodied in *Symp.* 177 a, *ἡ μέν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλὰ Φαιδροῦ τοῦδε.* The same sentiment is found in Eur. *Hel.* 513, *λόγος γάρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος, not mine the word; by clerkly men 'twas spoken.* Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2, 2, nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofellus.) For a similarly compressed statement, *cf. ἱκανὸν τὸν μάρτυρα*, 31 c. "A pred. adj. or subst. is often a brief equiv. for one clause of a compound sent." H. 618. *ἐμόν* and *ἀξιόχρεων* are both preds., and special point is given them by their position. This sent. is far more telling than what might be spun out of it, *sc. λέγω γὰρ λόγον καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ἐρῶ οὐκ ἐμός ἐστι, ἀλλ' ἀνοίσω* (*sc. τὸν λόγον*) *εἰς τὸν λέγοντα ὃς ἀξιόχρεως ὑμῖν ἐστίν.* — **ὃν ἂν λέγω**: equiv. to *ὃν μέλλω λέγειν*, though it is formally a hypothetical rel. clause with indef. antec., "*the word I shall utter, whatever the word may be, that I say, will not be mine, etc.*" *Cf. Crit.* 44 c.

20. **ἀνοίσω**: in the sense of shifting responsibility. For *ἀναφορά* in that sense, *cf.* Eur. *Orest.* 414 ff., *ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἀναφορὰ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς . . . Φοῖβος κελεύσας μητρὸς ἐκπρᾶξαι φόνον.*

τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ κτέ.: it required skill as well as modesty to avoid blurting out here with *τῆς ἐμῆς σοφ'ας.* The *εἰ δή τίς ἐστι* interrupts just in time. *Cf.* Isocr. xv. 50, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐμῆς εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως, εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἴτε διατριβῆς, ἀκηκόατε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, now you have heard all the truth about my talent or methodical study or pursuit, whichever you like to call it.*

ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι 20
τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος
ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε 21
καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε.
καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅ τι ὁρμήσειε. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο
μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ ὅπερ λέγω μή θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες·
ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν

20 e

21. **οἵα**: goes back to **ποίαν** in d above.

22. **Χαιρεφῶντα**: certainly, if the Athenians did *not* know Chaerephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Chaerephon's expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (*Mem.* i. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates *οἳ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι.*

21 a

23. **ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει**: the ἡλιασταί are here taken as representing the whole people; and here, as often, **πλῆθος** is equiv. to δῆμος, and means democratic party. *Cf.* Lys. *passim.* — **ἑταῖρος**: *partisan. Cf. Gorg.* 510 **a**, *τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι, to be a partisan of the government in power.*

24. **τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην**: an allusion, which no one present could fail of understanding, to the exile from which all conspicuous democrats had only four years before returned (in 403 B.C.). The Thirty Tyrants were the authors of this banishment; *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 1, *προεῖπον μὲν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ καταλόγου (not registered on their catalogue of* 3000 *oligarchical sympathizers) μὴ εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ ἄστυ. φευγόντων δὲ εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πολλοὺς ἄγοντες ἐνέπλησαν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα καὶ τὰς Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωρούντων.* All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.

21 a

25. **σφοδρός**: Chaerephon was a born enthusiast. *Cf. Charm.* 153 **b**, *Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὤν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρός με.* Aristophanes calls Chaerephon "*a bat*" (*Birds*, 1554); Chaerephon and Socrates belong to *the jaundiced barefoot brotherhood* (*Clouds*, 104). Browning, *Aristophanes's Apology*,

> In me 'twas equal balanced flesh rebuked
> Excess alike in stuff-guts Glauketes
> Or starveling Chaerephon; I challenge both.

26. **καὶ δή ποτε καὶ** κτέ.: *well then really once. Cf.* 18 **a**. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Chaerephon did at Delphi was an instance of his *σφοδρότης*.

τοῦτο: a cognate acc. after *μαντεύσασθαι* in anticipation of *ἤρετο* κτέ. For *τοῦτο* referring forward, see H. 696 a. For a similar acc. after *μαντεύεσθαι*, *cf.* Eur. *Ion.* 346 f., ΙΩ. *ὁ δ' ἐκτεθεὶς (exposed)* **παῖς** *ποῦ 'στιν; εἰσορᾷ φάος (alive)?* ΚΡ. *οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδείς. ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι.*

27. **ὅπερ λέγω**: *I repeat*, lit. *just what I am saying. Cf.* 17 **c** and 20 **e**.

28. **ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία**: *οὖν* closes an explanatory digression and leads back to *μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι*. The

ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ 21
ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος
τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ b
ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ
ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί
ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν
ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ
σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ

21 a oracle in question is lost, but we have a very fair substitute in Σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης | ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων (or ἁπάντων) Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. See the Schol. on Arist. *Clouds*, 144.

29. **ὁ ἀδελφός**: *sc.* Chaerecrates. We are told that once, when the two were at variance, Socrates intervened as peacemaker. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* ii. 3. 1.

b VI. 3. **τί ποτε αἰνίττεται**: through modesty Socrates takes it for granted that this is "a dark saying." For a genuinely enigmatical oracle, *cf.* Paus. v. 3. 5, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν (Temenus and Cresphontes) αὐτῶν λόγιον τόδε, ἡγεμόνα τῆς καθόδου ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τριόφθαλμον, *that they should make "the three-eyed" leader of their home return.* The "three-eyed" turned out to be Oxylus, son of Andraemon, whom they met riding on a *one-eyed* mule; acc. to Apollodorus, *Oxylus* was one-eyed and bestrode a *two-eyed* horse. See an essay on Greek Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his volume entitled *Essays Classical* (London, 1883).

5. **σοφὸς ὤν**: see on ἐπισταμένῳ, 22 c. — **λέγει φάσκων**: λέγει here refers to the meaning and φάσκων to the words in which it was conveyed.

6. **οὐ δήπου**: *of course I do not suppose.* πού adds a shade of uncertainty to the stress of δή. Notice 21 b that Socrates's long struggle (μόγις πάνυ) is dramatized in these short, quick sents., which suggest a man talking to himself. — **οὐ γὰρ θέμις**: *it would be against his nature.* God, being by nature truthful, could not lie; *cf. Rep.* ii. 382 e, πάντῃ γὰρ ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον, *the nature of divinity and of God is absolutely void of falsehood.* The implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles, esp. in those of Apollo, is proved directly by such words as Pindar's ψευδέων οὐχ ἅπτεται, *he* (Apollo) *sets not his hand to falsehood* (*Pyth.* iii. 9), τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν, 'tis *unlawful for him to have part in a lie* (*Pyth.* ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly by the horror, expressed so often by the tragedians, at finding Phoebus's speech untrue. Against all blasphemous attribution of falsehood to the gods, Plato defends the faith in *Rep.* ii. 383 b, where he reprobates the following lines of Aeschylus (spoken by Thetis in a lost play), κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα | ἡλπιζον εἶναι μαντίκῃ βρύον τέχνῃ (*with skill prophetic fraught*) ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοινῇ παρὼν (*marriage-feast*) αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν | τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν. The hesitating tone adopted by

θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει, 21
ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτρα-
πόμην. ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς
ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν c
τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ
ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέο-
μαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν
τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλεγό-
μενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς

21 b Socrates in mentioning this oracle (21 a), and his interpretation here, suggest that he himself would never have asked Chaerephon's question; the question could be settled by human means and in such cases Socrates's practice agreed with the sentiment in Eur. *Hel.* 753 ff.,

> The gods why question? Nay, we rather should
> With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer
> For what is good, disdaining prophecy, ...
> What prophecy will lead the sluggard man to thrift?
> Of prophets best good counsel is and sense.

Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 9, δαιμονᾶν (*were crazed*) ἔφη δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν (*to learn and know thoroughly*).

8. μόγις πάνυ: *after a long struggle*, a qualification of ἔπειτα ἐτραπόμην which repeats parenthetically the idea of πόλυν χρόνον. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on οὐ κατὰ τούτους, 17 b. For the position of πάνυ, see on οὐ πάνυ, 19 a. — **τοιαύτην τινα**: *sc.* ζήτησιν, purposely vague, "which I began in some such way as this." See on τοιαύτη τις, 19 c.

c **10. ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ**: the oracle is personified.

11. ὅτι: introducing direct quotation, GMT. 79; H. 928 b. — **ἐστί**: *really is.* This whole clause was spoken 21 c with special emphasis.

13. πρὸς ὃν ἔπαθον: *cf. Gorg.* 485 b, ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας, *in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who lisp and are childish.* Contrast the use of πρός in such expressions as πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶν, *pondering in my mind*; πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοποῦμεν, *we consider among ourselves* (*cf.* πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμην in d below).

14. καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as διασκοπῶν τοῦτον. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. ἔδοξέ μοι: idiomatically substituted before δοκεῖν (*to seem*) to avoid ἔδοξα in the unusual but possible sense, *I came to the opinion.* The same anacoluthon occurs both when the nom. part. precedes (*cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 12, καὶ εὐξάμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὁπόσους ἂν κατακάνοιεν τῶν πολεμίων τοσαύτας χιμαίρας καταθύσειν τῇ θεῷ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχον ἱκανὰς εὑρεῖν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν πεντακοσίας θύειν κτέ.) and when it follows (*cf.* Th. iii. 36, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἡβῶσι, ἐπι-

ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' 21
οὔ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι
σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ d
πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλο-
γιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι·
κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ,
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι. ἔοικά γ' οὖν τούτου γε
σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα
οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου
δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε· e
καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα αἰσθανόμενος μὲν
καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιὼς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ

21 c καλοῦντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν, *taxing them with their revolt*).

d 19. **πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν . . . ἐλογιζόμην**: see on line 13 above.

20. **ὅτι . . . εἰμί**: not really dependent like ὅτι οἴοιτο in line 17, but like ὅτι οὑτοσὶ . . . ἔστι in line 11 above.

23. **ὥσπερ οὖν**: the οὖν leads back to κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ κτέ., which in turn contains a reaffirmation of ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . σοφὸς ὤν, b above. Here οὐκ, not οὐδέν, is used, because the antithesis is between not-knowing and false assumption of knowledge. — **ἔοικα γ' οὖν**: *now it seems at least that, etc.* γ' οὖν is a better reading than γοῦν, since ἔοικα and τούτου require precisely the same stress in the connexion of thought. One of the many examples of γέ repeated in Hom. is *Il.* v. 258, τούτω δ' οὐ πάλιν αὖθις ἀποίσετον ὠκέες ἵπποι | ἅμφω ἀφ' ἡμείων, εἴ γ' οὖν ἕτερός γε φύγῃσιν.

24. **αὐτῷ τούτῳ**: serves to prepare the way for the clause with ὅτι, which gives a detailed specification of what is indefinitely stated in σμικρῷ τινι. 21 d

VII. 1. **οὖν**: pointing back to the end of 21 b. — **ἤδη**: *straightway* or *immediately*, vividly bringing up the moment of past time alluded to. e

2. **ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην**: this gives the fact of which Socrates says he was always conscious (αἰσθανόμενος), so that he was constantly tormented (λυπούμενος) and terrified (δεδιώς). With λυπούμενος and δεδιώς, ὅτι would mean *because*; these two parts. should therefore be attached to αἰσθανόμενος. Notice, however, that αἰσθανόμενος followed by ὅτι (*that*) is a very uncommon const. *Cf.* ἀπηχθόμην in d above with ἀπηχθανόμην, here in something like the sense of the colloquial "was getting myself disliked."

ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει: correl. with αἰσθανόμενος μέν, breaks out of the partic. const. Socrates, in stating his determination to do his duty, adopts a conversational style. See on ἔδοξέ μοι in

ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ- 21
σθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει ἐπὶ ἅπαν-
τας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν — ἦ μὴν 22
ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες
ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι
κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστε-

21 e c above, and on ἀλλ' εἰ μέν in 34 e below. *Cf.* also *Lach.* 196 e, τοῦτο λέγω οὐ παίζων ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι κτέ., *I say this not by way of a joke, but I think it absolutely unavoidable, etc.*

3. **τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ**: *the interest of the god*, which required of Socrates that he should refute or confirm the oracle.

4. **ἰτέον οὖν**: a change to the dir. discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vividness. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 5. 24, παρελθὼν δ' αὐτῶν ἄλλος εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ πόλεμον ποιησόμενοι ἥκοιεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξοντες ὅτι φίλοι εἰσί. καὶ ξενίοις, ἢν μὲν ἔλθητε κτέ. *Id.* vii. 1. 39, where the transition is the reverse, μάλα μόλις, ἔφη, διαπραξάμενος ἥκω· λέγειν γὰρ Ἀναξίβιον ὅτι κτέ. Still more striking is *Id. Hell.* i. 1. 27, παρῆνεσαν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, μεμνημένους ὅσας τε ναυμαχίας αὐτοὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς νενικήκατε, *they charged them to be brave men and not to forget in how many sea-fights, "with only your own forces, you have been victorious."* — **σκοποῦντι**: not σκεψομένῳ, for Socrates simply proceeds as he began. Hence the subj. of σκοποῦντι is not expressed. See on διαπειρομένῳ, 27 a.

5. **νὴ τὸν κύνα**: this form of asseveration is a whim of Socrates, upon which the Schol. says, Ῥαδαμάνθυος ὅρκος οὗτος ὁ κατὰ κυνὸς ἢ χηνὸς (*goose*) ἢ πλατάνου (*plane-tree*) ἢ κριοῦ (*ram*) ἢ τινος ἄλλου τοιούτου· οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὅρκος ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων,| ἔπειτα χήν· θεοὺς δ' ἐσίγων (*they named no god*), Κρατῖνος Χείρωσι (*i.e. in the Chirons*). κατὰ τούτων δὲ νόμος ὀμνύναι ἵνα μὴ κατὰ θεῶν οἱ ὅρκοι γίγνωνται, τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Σωκράτους ὅρκοι. A humorous turn is given to this oath in *Gorg.* 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν. Socrates would swear by the Egyptian god, but not by any of the gods whom he worshipped. His objection to doing this may be illustrated by the reasons for "An act to restrain the abuses of players," 3 James I. c. 21. "For the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the holy name of God in Stage-plays, Enterludes, May-games, shews, and the like." See Clarke and Wright on *Merch. of Ven.* i. 3. 21 e

22 a

6. **ἦ μήν**: expresses solemn asseveration, and is introduced to corroborate the preceding oath. The Schol. explains it as meaning ὄντως δή, *in very truth*. It is, however, the usual formula for beginning any affirmation prefaced by a solemn oath.

9. **κατὰ τὸν θέον**: *under the god's command.* The inquiry was commanded of God, because it was possible to understand the meaning of the oracle only by experience, and Socrates's experience had not yet justified

ροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν 22
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα
μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς
πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ
τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' b
αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων
ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει

22 a him in thinking that he understood it.

11. ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος: *my Herculean labors, as I may call them;* the gen. agrees with ἐμοῦ implied in its equiv. ἐμήν. G. 137, N. 1; H. 691. The words πόνους πονοῦντος were sure to remind his hearers of several passages in the tragedians, where Heracles, a character endeared to them chiefly by his heroic struggles, recounts his labors. Socrates compares his own intellectual encounters with the physical ones endured by Heracles, and recounts in a half-tragic vein these "labors" imposed of God. *Cf.* Soph. *Trach.* 1046 f. and 1089 ff.,

In many a heat, by fearful odds hard pressed,
With arms and straining back ere now I strove . . .
Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms of mine,
Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime strength
In haunts Nemean smote the shepherd's bane,
And tamed the lion whom none dared approach,
Or look on, *etc.*

Cf. Eur. *H. F.* 1255–1280, and esp. the chorus, 348–455; Browning in *Aristophanes's Apology* translates the whole of this play. — **ἵνα μοι καὶ κτέ.:** Socrates, assuming for the sake of his point an attitude of opposition, says that he thought he was refuting the oracle (*cf.* 22 c) while really he 22 a
was proving it to be irrefutable. This achievement is ironically stated as his real purpose. *Cf.* ἵνα used by Hom. in indignant or ironical questions, *e.g. Il.* xiv. 364 f., Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ δ' αὖτε μεθιέμεν Ἕκτορι νίκην | Πριαμίδῃ, ἵνα νῆας ἕλῃ καὶ κῦδος ἄρηται, *Argives, and must we to Priam's son Hector again yield the day, that he on our ships may lay hands and be sure of renown?* Socrates was, he here implies, guided to just the result which he least expected. This might easily suggest the irony of fate, so tragically exemplified in Sophocles's *Oedipus the King*, which was first performed about 429 B.C. and presumably was familiar to the court. In clauses with ἵνα (ἐπεί, and ἐπειδή), καί is freq. used simply for greater stress. *Cf. Gorg.* 501 c, συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος, *just to help your argument on to its close.* This is not like καὶ μανθάνοιμι below, b, where καί means *also.* The opt. clause ἵνα γένοιτο depends upon πονοῦντος, which represents the impf. G. 204, N. 1; H. 856 a.

14. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους: see the pas- b
sage from the *Ion* quoted in the note on c below. The κωμῳδιοποιοί are hardly included here. The idea that the genuine poet was a being endowed with exceptional wisdom was common in ancient times. *Cf.* Arist. *Poet.* 9. 3,

μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί 22
λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνο-
μαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον.
ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν
βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν
καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν c
ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ
θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν
πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τι
μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα

22 b φιλοσοφώτερον (*more philosophical*) καὶ σπουδαιότερον (*worthier*) ποίησις ἱστορίας (*prose narrative of facts*) ἐστίν.

17. **πεπραγματεῦσθαι**: used here as a pass., as is made evident by **αὐτοῖς**, the dat. of the agent. G. 188, 3, and 197, 2; H. 769. See also App. — **διηρώτων ἄν**: see on 20 below.

18. **ἵν' ἅμα κτέ.**: mentioned as a subordinate end to be reached by the way. For **καί**, see on 11 above. — **αἰσχύνομαι**: this discovery was discreditable to the poets, and Socrates hesitates to mention it. For this same borrowing of shame from another's actions, see *Crit.* 45 **d** and **e**. When **αἰσχύνεσθαι** means *feel shame at the thought of* an action, it takes the inf., as here, instead of the partic. Socrates feels shame at the idea of telling what nevertheless must be told, because it is the truth.

20. **οἱ παρόντες**: those who were present, *i.e. the bystanders*. Hence **ἂν ἔλεγον**, used with the same iterative force as **διηρώτων ἄν** above. GMT. 30, 2; H. 835.

c 23. **φύσει τινι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες**: the dat. **φύσει** and nom. partic. characterize the same subj. in two parallel ways. Hence they are appropriately coupled by means of **καί**. *Cf.* 18 **b**. — **φύσει**: *by (grace of) nature*. Here used to express what Plato elsewhere means by **θείᾳ μοίρᾳ**, *by the grace of heaven*. Acts done **φύσει** are done unconsciously, are inspired by something below the surface of our every-day selves, whereas conscious acts are, if right, guided by **τέχνη** and **σοφία**, *art* and *wisdom*. *Cf. Ion*, 533 **e**–534 **c**, **πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ** (*epic poets*) **οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης** (*out of knowledge of their art*) **ἀλλ' ἔνθεοι** (*inspired*) **ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι** (*possessed*) **πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ** (*lyric poets*) **οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως... ἅτε οὖν οὐ τέχνῃ ποιοῦντες** (*writing poetry*) **ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς, ἐφ' ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους** (*one can write dithyrambs*), **ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια** (*hymns of praise*), **ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα** (*choral songs*, accompanied by a lively dance), **ὁ δ' ἔπη** (*epics*), **ὁ δ' ἰάμβους** (*iambics*) **... διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν** (*taking all reason out of them*) **τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις.**

22 c

ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα 22
σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ
ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὧπερ καὶ τῶν
πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ᾖα. ἐμαυτῷ
γὰρ ξυνῄδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ d
γ' ἤδειν ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ
τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσαντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπι-
στάμην, καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτάν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ
ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην κα-
λῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα
σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὖτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην

22 c 27. **ἡσθόμην οἰομένων**: like ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων, 23 c. The acc. occurs in 20 a, ὃν ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* ii. 2. 1, αἰσθόμενός ποτε Λαμπροκλέα τὸν πρεσβύτατον υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα (*in a passion with his mother*).

28. **σοφωτάτων**: pred. agreeing with οἰομένων, which contains the subj. of εἶναι. — **ἀνθρώπων**: part. gen. G. 168; H. 650. — **ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν**: *sc.* σοφοί. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 7, ὃ ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν. On the acc. of specification, see G. 160, 1; H. 718.

VIII. 1. **τελευτῶν**: *finally*. For partics. used adverbially, see GMT. 109, N. 8; G. 138, N. 7; H. 968 a and 619 a.

d 2. **ἐπισταμένῳ**: *cf.* 21 b. — **δέ γ'**: γέ gives stress to τούτους, but yields the first place to δέ (*cf.* 24 c, ἐγὼ δέ γε); μέν also takes the same precedence. As a rule, γέ comes immediately after the word which it emphasizes, or else between the noun and its art.

4. **ἠπίσαντο**: *they knew*, without 22 d
any implication that they have ceased to know at the time when he speaks.

6. **ὅπερ καί, καὶ οἱ** κτέ.: this repetition of καί is idiomatic in correl. sents., and may be represented by one Eng. word, *also*. With οἱ ποιηταί it is easy to supply ἔχουσιν from the ἔχειν of the leading clause; similar cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. **διὰ τὸ** κτέ.: here begins the explanation which the preceding clause demands. γάρ might have been added, *i.e.* διὰ γὰρ τὸ . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, or, τὴν γὰρ τέχνην ἐξεργαζόμενος κτέ.

8. **τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα**: adjs. used subst. take the art. after ὁ ἄλλος quite as commonly as substs. do. τὰ μέγιστα refers to affairs of state and of the common weal, as in *Rep.* iv. 426 c, σοφὸς τὰ μέγιστα and *Gorg.* 484 c, γνώσει, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς, ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν, *you shall know if once you proceed to affairs of larger concern and give up philosophy once for all.* *Cf.* also Xen. *An.* ii. 6. 16, and in

τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ 22 e
τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν
μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν
ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην
οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω
ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 23
πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται
καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέ-
ναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ

22 d *Menex.* 234 a, *ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἐπινοεῖς τρέπεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρεῖς.*

9. **πλημμέλεια**: see on *ἐμμελῶς*, 20 c.

10. **ὥστε με**: not *ὥστ' ἐμέ*, which would be too emphatic. It represents *ἀνηρώτων ἐμαυτὸν* without *ἐγώ*. e *Cf.* e below, and see App. — **ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ**: in the name of and, as it were, *on behalf of* the oracle.

11. **δεξαίμην ἄν**: that is "if it were mine to choose." *εἴ μοι γένοιτο ἡ αἵρεσις* is implied. Notice the idioms *ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν* and *ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν*. In both the order is just the reverse of the natural Eng. one. In Lat., the corresponding idioms follow the same order with the Greek.

12. **μήτε τι**: *τι* strengthens the negation *μήτε*. *Cf. οὔτι, μήτι.*

IX. 1. **δή**: here used by way of closing and summing up the previous line of argument. On *ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, see Introd. p. 49, N. 4.

23 a 2. **οἷαι χαλεπώταται**: *sc. εἰσί*, explained by places where the same idiom is expanded, *e.g.* Xen. *Mem.* iv. 8. 11, *ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ἐδόκει* [Σωκράτης] *τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.*

4. **ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι**: instead of *ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο ἐλεγόμην*. Although 23 a *δέ* co-ordinates the whole with *πολλαὶ μὲν κτέ.* and the two form the leading clause, yet the inf. *λέγεσθαι* half incorporates these words with the *ὥστε* clause. This irregular const. is perfectly clear in a conversational style like that of Socrates. It has the effect of stating more distinctly the fact that this epithet *σοφός*, as applied to Socrates, is the capital instance of *πολλαὶ διαβολαί* and results from them. — **σοφός**: introduced to explain precisely what is meant by *ὄνομα τοῦτο*. The nom. *σοφός* leads back to the main statement *πολλαὶ ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι*, which, however, dwells in the speaker's mind as *ἀπέχθημαι*. *σοφός* agrees acc. to rule with the nom. subj. of this *ἀπέχθημαι*. G. 136, N. 3; H. 940. If *ἐμέ*, the acc. subj. of *λέγεσθαι*, had been expressed instead of understood, this nom. would not have been possible. — **εἶναι**: the inf. *εἶναι* is idiomatically used with pred. nouns or adjs. after *ὀνομάζειν, ὀνομάζεσθαι*, and the like. *Cf. Rep.* iv. 428 e, *ὀνομάζονταί τινες εἶναι, are called by certain names. Prot.* 311 e, *σοφίστην ὀνομάζουσι τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι. Lach.* 192 a, *ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν*

με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἐὰν 23
ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς
σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ
ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
φαίνεται τοῦτο λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ
ἐμῷ ὀνόματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ b
εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις
ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ

23 a ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι, *Socrates, what do you mean by (how do you define) this common quality which in all these expressions you call quickness?*

5. **ταῦτα**: see on **ἃ** οὐκ ἦσαν, 22 c. — **ἅ**: *cf. Euthyd.* 295 a, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, *I am most pleased to be self-convicted of this.* Change ἐξελέγχομαι from pass. to act., and the acc. of the person reappears; ταῦτα in the quoted passage, like **ἅ** in the text, is a cognate acc., which, in such collocations, is almost invariably a pron. of some sort. G. 159 and N. 4; H. 725 c.

6. **τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει**: τὸ δέ, *in fact*, is adv., meaning practically the same as τοὐναντίον, for it introduces an assertion which, being true, necessarily contradicts the previous false statement. Plato is particularly fond of this use of τὸ δέ. See, for the adv. use of the art. in Att., G. 143, 1; H. 654 b. — **τῷ ὄντι**: serves to point the contrast between this true statement and the false one which people believe (οἴονται).

8. **καὶ οὐδενός**: brought in as a climax after ὀλίγου. *Cf. Theaet.* 173 e, ἡ δὲ διάνοια ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, *but his* (the philosopher's) *mind regarding all this as little or nothing at all.* The Lat. idiom is much the same as the Greek. Cic. *Or.* 16. 52, rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimam, *a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.* 23 a

9. **τοῦτο λέγειν**: sc. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία κτέ. The argument runs as follows: "People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that 'human wisdom is vanity.' He does not *mean* that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the *name* 'Socrates' because he needs a particular instance." The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακὰ λέγειν τινά. *Cf. Crit.* 48 a. See App.

10. **ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ**: in this compressed idiom ἄν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 53, N. 3; H. 905, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, *cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* i. 3. 2, ἠσπάζετό τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἂν (sc. ἀσπάζοιτο) εἴ τις πάλαι συντεθραμμένος καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἀσπάζοιτο.

13. **ταῦτ' οὖν**: *cf. Prot.* 310 e, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, *that's* b

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν 23
τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ
βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης
τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ
γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ c
εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς
μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι

23 b *just why I have come to you.* G. 160, 2, N.; H. 719 c. The object is omitted as in *Gorg.* 503 **d**, *ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις, if you search in the right way, you shall find. Cf.* εἰδέναι below in **d**.

14. **καὶ ξένων**: notice the not unusual grouping under one art. of two words connected by *καί*.

15. **τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν**: *cf.* on *ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ*, 22 e.

18. **ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ**: *cf. Legg.* iii. 677 e, *μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν*; *Rep.* vii. 520 c, *μυρίῳ βέλτιον*. *Cf.* Xen. *Oecon.* ii. 1–4, where Critobulus and Socrates converse substantially as follows: "C. I have gained reasonable self-control; therefore, Socrates, give me any hints you can: tell me the best way to manage my property. But perhaps you think me already quite rich enough. S. That is my own case, not yours. I am sure that I am a rich man, but I consider you poverty-stricken, and sometimes I am quite worried about you. C. I like that, Socrates! For heaven's sake do be good enough to tell me what price you imagine that your property would fetch, if sold, and what mine would sell for. S. I am sure a fair buyer would be glad of the chance of getting my house and all my property for five minas (about eighty-five dollars). I am sure you are worth more than a hundred times that sum. C. How comes it then that you are so rich and I so poor? S. My income provides amply for all my wants, but for your wants you need three times as much as you have." The possession of five minas must have placed Socrates in the lowest of the four classes established by Solon, that of the *θῆτες*. Originally this lowest class had few political duties and no political rights; later on, a law proposed by Aristides gave them the same rights as the others. 23 b

19. **τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν**: *cf. Phaedr.* 244 e, *ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, madness intervened and by prophesying to those who were in straits found relief by recourse to prayer unto the gods and the observance of their rites.* The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with verbal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns such as *λατρεία* and *εὐχή*, which express the abstract idea of the act denoted by the verb; but Plato uses both the gen. and dat. with *ὑπηρέτης*, and the gen. with *ἐπίκουρος*; while the dat. with *βοηθός* is familiar in many Greek authors. In the const. with *ὑπηρεσία* below, 30 a, the dat. *τῷ θεῷ* takes the place of the gen. here. c

X. 2. **αὐτόματοι**: *of their own motion,*

με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν 23
ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς
σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ
ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
φαίνεται τοῦτο λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ
ἐμῷ ὀνόματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
εἶποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις b
ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ

23 a ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι, *Socrates, what do you mean by (how do you define) this common quality which in all these expressions you call quickness?*

5. **ταῦτα**: see on ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν, 22 c. — **ἃ**: *cf. Euthyd.* 295 a, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, *I am most pleased to be self-convicted of this.* Change ἐξελέγχομαι from pass. to act., and the acc. of the person reappears; ταῦτα in the quoted passage, like ἃ in the text, is a cognate acc., which, in such collocations, is almost invariably a pron. of some sort. G. 159 and N. 4; H. 725 c.

6. **τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει**: τὸ δέ, *in fact*, is adv., meaning practically the same as τοὐναντίον, for it introduces an assertion which, being true, necessarily contradicts the previous false statement. Plato is particularly fond of this use of τὸ δέ. See, for the adv. use of the art. in Att., G. 143, 1; H. 654 b. — **τῷ ὄντι**: serves to point the contrast between this true statement and the false one which people believe (οἴονται).

8. **καὶ οὐδενός**: brought in as a climax after ὀλίγου. *Cf. Theaet.* 173 e, ἡ δὲ διάνοια ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, *but his* (the philosopher's) *mind regarding all this as little or nothing at all.* The Lat. idiom *is* much the same as the Greek. Cic. *Or.* 16. 52, rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimam, *a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.* 23 a

9. **τοῦτο λέγειν**: *sc.* ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία κτέ. The argument runs as follows: "People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that 'human wisdom is vanity.' He does not *mean* that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the *name* 'Socrates' because he needs a particular instance." The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακὰ λέγειν τινά. *Cf. Crit.* 48 a. See App.

10. **ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ**: in this compressed idiom ἄν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 53, N. 3; H. 905, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, *cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* i. 3. 2, ἠσπάζετό τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἂν (*sc.* ἀσπάζοιτο) εἴ τις πάλαι συντεθραμμένος καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἀσπάζοιτο.

13. **ταῦτ' οὖν**: *cf. Prot.* 310 e, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, *that's* b

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν 23
τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ
βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης
τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ
γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ c
εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς
μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι

23 b *just why I have come to you.* G. 160, 2, N.; H. 719 c. The object is omitted as in *Gorg.* 503 d, ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις, *if you search in the right way, you shall find.* *Cf.* εἰδέναι below in d.

14. **καὶ ξένων**: notice the not unusual grouping under one art. of two words connected by καί.

15. **τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν**: *cf.* on ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, 22 e.

18. **ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ**: *cf. Legg.* iii. 677 e, μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν; *Rep.* vii. 520 c, μυρίῳ βέλτιον. *Cf.* Xen. *Oecon.* ii. 1–4, where Critobulus and Socrates converse substantially as follows: "C. I have gained reasonable self-control; therefore, Socrates, give me any hints you can: tell me the best way to manage my property. But perhaps you think me already quite rich enough. S. That is my own case, not yours. I am sure that I am a rich man, but I consider you poverty-stricken, and sometimes I am quite worried about you. C. I like that, Socrates! For heaven's sake do be good enough to tell me what price you imagine that your property would fetch, if sold, and what mine would sell for. S. I am sure a fair buyer would be glad of the chance of getting my house and all my property for five minas (about eighty-five dollars). I am sure you are worth more than a hundred times that sum. C. How comes it then that you are so rich and I so poor? S. My income provides amply for all my wants, but for your wants you need three times as much as you have." The possession of five minas must have placed Socrates in the lowest of the four classes established by Solon, that of the θῆτες. Originally this lowest class had few political duties and no political rights; later on, a law proposed by Aristides gave them the same rights as the others. 23 b

19. **τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν**: *cf.* *Phaedr.* 244 e, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, *madness intervened and by prophesying to those who were in straits found relief by recourse to prayer unto the gods and the observance of their rites.* The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with verbal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns such as λατρεία and εὐχή, which express the abstract idea of the act denoted by the verb; but Plato uses both the gen. and dat. with ὑπηρέτης, and the gen. with ἐπίκουρος; while the dat. with βοηθός is familiar in many Greek authors. In the const. with ὑπηρεσία below, 30 a, the dat. τῷ θεῷ takes the place of the gen. here. c

X. 2. **αὐτόματοι**: *of their own motion,*

χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ 23
αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους
5 ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ
οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργί-
ζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς d
ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν
10 τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν
οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν,
τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέ-
γουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομί-

23 c to be construed with ἐπακολουθοῦντες.

3. χαίρουσιν κτέ.: Plato compares the disconcerting effect of Socrates's homely method with the charm exercised by the smooth discourse of men like Protagoras and Gorgias. Compare the ironical account of the persuasive charms of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias in 19 e above, where especially the implication of τούτους πείθουσι should be noticed. *Cf. Prot.* 317 e–319 a, where Protagoras is represented as giving a very taking account of his own teaching for the benefit of young Hippocrates.

4. μιμοῦνται, εἶτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν κτέ.: *they are for imitating me, and then they undertake, etc.* No strict sequence in time is here marked by εἶτα, although their readiness to imitate must logically have preceded the acts in which their imitation consisted. For a most lively description of the early symptoms of such imitators, *cf. Rep.* vii. 539 b. In other editt. μιμούμενοι is substituted for μιμοῦνται, needlessly, since this use of εἶτα, where κἆτα would seem more natural, is quite common. *Cf.* 31 a, and also Xen. *Mem.* ii. 2, 14, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φυλάξῃ μή σε αἰσθόμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσω- 23 c
σιν, εἶτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς.

6. ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν: see on ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17 b, and on ὀλίγου καὶ οὐδενός, 23 a.

8. ἀλλ' οὐχ: *instead of.* *Cf.* Xen. *An.* ii. 1. 10, where καὶ οὐ is used with the same meaning. See App. — Σω- d
κράτης τις: see on τὶς Σωκράτης, 18 b.

11. ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν: see App.

12. τὰ κατὰ πάντων κτέ.: ταῦτα means the familiar well-worn commonplaces. These may be found in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. Xenophon, referring specifically to the λόγων τέχνη, which is not lost sight of here, uses almost the words of our text in *Mem.* i. 2. 31, τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ, (Critias) *making against him the charge made by the many against philosophers in general.* *Cf.* 18 b c, 19 b, and see on εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, *Crito*, 44 d.

13. ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα κτέ.: the sense requires that from line 10 διδάσκων should be understood, or rather διδάσκων διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. On this implied διδάσκων depend (1) the two accs. τὰ μετέωρα, τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, and (2) the two infs. νομίζειν and ποιεῖν. *Cf.* 26 b and 19 b.

ζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, 23
οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται
προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν· ἅτε οὖν,
οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ξυντε- e
ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν
ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ
τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων,
Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ
ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ 24
τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμά-

23 d 14. **τὰ ἀληθῆ**: *the truth*, namely ὅτι κατάδηλοι κτέ. Eng. idiom requires a sing. or an abstract noun more frequently than the Greek, *e.g.* ταῦτα often means *this*. H. 635. *Cf. Phaed.*, 62 d, ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, *but a fool might perhaps think this, that he ought to run away from his master.*

16. **εἰδέναι**: one man claims knowledge of this, and another, knowledge of that; the absurdity is in all cases the same, *i.e.* their claiming knowledge at all.

e 17. **ξυντεταγμένως**: either (1) *in phrases well combined*, or (2) *with their forces drawn up*, or (3) = κατὰ τὸ ξυντεταγμένον, *i.e. according to a concerted plan*. (2) and (3) make it refer to the united efforts of those represented by the three accusers. ξυντεταμένως, the reading adopted by Schanz, means about the same as σφοδρῶς below, *i.e.* contente, *with might and main*. This would really amount to the same as (2), and suits the context far better than (1) or (3).

19. **ἐκ τούτων**: "*it is upon this footing*, — namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity, — that I am now attacked by, *etc.*" R. In spite of 19 a, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος, which states the fact here alluded to, "in consequence of" would here be an inappropriate translation for ἐκ. On the accusers, see Introd. 30. 23 e

21. **ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, δημιουργῶν, πολιτικῶν, ῥητόρων**: we must not press the word ὑπέρ. The accusers merely *represented* the feelings of their respective classes. The ῥήτορες have not been explicitly mentioned before. For the ποιηταί, *cf.* 22 a; for the πολιτικοί, *cf.* 21 c; for the δημιουργοί, *cf.* 22 d. Prob. the ῥήτορες were thought of under the general designation of πολιτικοί. This is the more likely because the line between men who habitually spoke on public questions, and what we may call professional speakers, was not yet clearly drawn at Athens. All this lends weight to the suggestion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν are a later addition, for which Plato is not responsible. See App. In favor of keeping the words, however, is the fact that Anytus, who, like Cleon, was a βυρσοδέψης, *tanner*, came into collision with the views of Socrates rather as a πολιτικός, than as a

ζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξε- 24
λέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν.
ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑπο-
στειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθά-
νομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν
ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν
ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε. b

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγό-
ρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέ-
λητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς
ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις
γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν

23 c δημιουργός. It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the debasing effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. *Cf.* Xen. *Oecon.* iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the mechanical arts enervate men's bodies and womanize their souls. Also (*ibid.* vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the τεχνῖται will prove cowards.

24 a 26. **ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν**: *there you have, etc.*, "just what I promised to tell you at the beginning of my speech."

27. **ὑποστειλάμενος**: the meaning here is illustrated by many places in Dem., *e.g.*, XXXVII. 48, καὶ τῷ μηδὲν ὑποστελλόμενον μηδ' αἰσχυνόμενον κλαήσειν καὶ ὀδυρεῖσθαι, *by his readiness to resort to absolutely undisguised and shameless wailing and lamentation.* See also XIX. 237, ἀνάγκη δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μετὰ παρρησίας διαλεχθῆναι μηδὲν ὑποστελλόμενον.

28. **τοῖς αὐτοῖς**: *sc.* by just such undisguised and unmitigated statements.

29. **αὕτη, ταῦτα**: both pred.

31. **οὕτως εὑρήσετε**: supply ἔχοντα. The finite verb is also left out in such cases, *cf. Rep.* ii. 360 d, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως, *sc.* ἔχει. 24 a

XI. 2. **πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πρὸς Μέλητον**: *cf.* 18 a, ἀπολογήσασθαι πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα (*sc.* κατηγορημένα) καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους (*sc.* κατηγόρους); the Greek idiom is ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρός (1) τοὺς δικαστάς, (2) τοὺς κατηγόρους, (3) τὰ κατηγορημένα. In Eng. the idiom is to plead (1) *before* the court, (2) *against* the accusers, (3) *against* (*to*) the accusations. b

3. **τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν**: *that upright and patriotic man.* The addition of ὅς φησι suggests that few or none encourage Meletus in "laying this flattering unction to his soul."

4. **αὖθις . . . αὖ**: *once more . . . in turn.* A strong distinction is made between the serious accusation of the first accusers, those who have prejudiced the public mind, and that of Meletus.

5. **ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων**: *as if these were a second set of accusers.* *Cf.* 19 b, ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγό-

αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη 24
φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ
θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα
δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. c
τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ
γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους (ἀδικεῖν με) διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χα-
ριεντίζεται ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ
πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν
οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει
πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;

24 b

ρων, as if we were dealing with accusers. Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and misrepresentation).

6. **ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε**: *πώς, substantially,* implies that the quotation is not literal. See Introd. 31 and 56. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1, 21, **Πρόδικος . . . περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται ὧδέ πως λέγων.**

7. **φησίν**: Meletus, already named as the chief accuser.

c 9. **τὸ ἔγκλημα**: see Introd. 67.

11. **ἐγὼ δέ γε**: see on 22 d.

12. **σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται**: this is an **ὀξύμωρον**; for **χαριεντίζεσθαι** is akin to **παίζειν**, the subst. to which, **παιδιά**, is the contradictory of **σπουδή**. "Meletus treats a serious business (an accusation involving life and death) as playfully as though the whole matter were a joke." *Cf.* 27 a.

13. **εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάς**: **ἀγών** is the usual word for a suit at law; hence the phrase **ἀγωνίζεσθαι δίκην**, *contend in a law-suit.* The sing. is used distributively, *involving men in a law-suit. Cf.* Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 8. 4, **ἔφοροι . . . κύριοι ἄρχοντας . . . καταπαῦσαι καὶ εἰρξαί τε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστῆσαι**, *the ephors had power both to supersede and to imprison the magistrates and to bring them to trial for their lives.* 24 c

14. **ὧν**: not dependent upon **οὐδέν** which is an adv. acc. See on **τούτων**, 26 b.

15. **τούτῳ**: gives greater vividness than **αὐτῷ** would give.

16. **καὶ ὑμῖν**: "so that *you* can see it as plainly as I can."

XII. 1. **δεῦρο, εἰπέ**: *come and tell me. Cf.* below, **ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ. δεῦρο** is freq. found instead of **ἔρχου, ἐλθέ. Cf. Theaet.** 144 d, **Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη**, *come here, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.* Homer has a similar idiom. *Cf. Od.* xvii. 529, **ἔρχεο, δεῦρο καλέσσον ἵν' ἀντίον αὐτὸς ἐνίσπῃ**, *come, summon him hither, that face to face he may tell me himself.* On the cross-examination, see Introd. 71.— **ἄλλο τι ἢ**

Ἔγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; 24 d
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθεί-
ροντα ἐξευρὼν, ὡς φῂς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγο-
ρεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον
αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς; ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις
εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τε-
κμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ'
εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ'
οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις e
πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς
νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι; Μά-
λιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὔ; Ἅπαν-
τες. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν
ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δή; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦ-
σιν ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου- 25

24 c this idiom, in Plato generally without the ἦ, is an abbreviated form of question, *is it otherwise than, etc.*, which always leads up to the answer "assuredly" or "most undoubtedly." H. 1015 b. Here the answer is implied by ἔγωγε.

d 4. **τὸν διαφθείροντα**: *having discovered their corrupter in me, you bring me before this court and make your accusation.* In Eng clearness requires a repetition of the ἐμέ, which in Greek goes only with εἰσάγεις.

5. **εἰσάγεις**: *you summon into court*, commonly with εἰς δικαστήριον or εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς, instead of which τουτοισί is used. Sometimes also εἰσάγειν is found. with the gen. of the charge. *Cf.* 26 a. The word, strictly speaking, should be used only of the magistrates (Introd. 70), but not infrequently it is said of the plaintiff, whose charge occasions the magistrate εἰσάγειν, *to bring into court*, the suit. 24 d

6. **τὸν ποιοῦντα εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον**: for the acc. after μηνύειν, *cf. Andoc.* I. 13, τούσδε Ἀνδρόμαχος ἐμήνυσεν.

7. **τίς ἐστιν**: *cf. King Lear*, i. 1, where Cordelia says to her sisters: I know you what you are.

9. **λέγω**: the pres. because Socrates is only maintaining what he has just asserted. The ellipsis with μεμέληκεν is readily supplied from the context.

12. **οὗτοι, οἱ δικασταί**: *these men, the judges.* The οὗτοι is isolated by the e
voc. from οἱ δικασταί. The οἶδε which follows includes, strictly speaking, only the ἡλιασταί who were present at the trial; but they are evidently taken as representing all δικασταί.

17. **οἱ ἀκροαταί**: *the audience*, all except the δικασταί, who have been mentioned. See on 27 b.

λευταί. Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ 25
ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι
βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς
ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ
δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα
λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι
ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ
μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς b
δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις
ὁ βελτίους ποιῶν ἢ ὀλίγοι, οἷς τε ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί· οἱ
δὲ πολλοί, ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρου-
σιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζῴων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυ-
τος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη

19. **ἀλλ' ἆρα** κτέ.: *cf. Euthyd.* 290 e, **ΣΩ.** ἀλλ' ἆρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιπ-
πος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι; **ΚΡ.** ποῖος Κτήσιππος; S. *Why then, good gracious! have I forgotten, and was it Ctesippus who said it?* C. *Ctesippus? rubbish!* Questions with *μή* take a negative answer for granted. The use of *ἆρα* here marks the last stage in Socrates's exhaustive enumeration. Only the *ἐκκλησιασταί* are left. "Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence possibly it is these gentlemen." But this is absurd, hence *πάντες ἄρα Ἀθηναῖοι κτέ.* — **οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί**: this has probably crept into the text, and was originally a marginal note, put in by way of giving a word parallel to *ἀκροαταί* and *βουλευταί*. There was good reason for varying the sameness of discourse by saying *οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*. There seems less reason for putting this last idea in two ways. All Athenians twenty years of age in full standing (*ἐπίτιμοι*) were members of the public assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) at Athens.

27. **τοὐναντίον πᾶν**: *quite the reverse*, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure or content. *Cf. Gorg.* 516 e, ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. In *Crit.* 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from the many and ignorant to the few, or to the one who has special knowledge.

29. **διαφθείρουσιν**: by its emancipation from the government of *δοκεῖ* this statement is made especially vigorous. The transition has already been half made by *εἷς μέν τις*, where instinctively we supply *ἐστί* in spite of *δοκεῖ*.

31. **πάντως δήπου**: before this Socrates waits a moment, to give Meletus opportunity to answer.

32. **οὐ φῆτε**: the answer *no* is made prominent by the order of clauses. *ἐὰν οὐ φῆτε, if you say no, ἐὰν μὴ φῆτε,*

περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' 25
ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδεῖ- c
κνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε
περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν
ἐστιν ῥᾴκιον ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς;
ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ
μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν 25
b

if you do not say yes. οὐ φῆτε must be taken closely together as equiv. to a verb of denying. GMT. 47, 3, N. *Cf.* Lys. XIII. 76, ἐὰν μὲν φάσκῃ Φρύνιχον ἀποκτεῖναι, τούτων μέμνησθε . . . ἐὰν δ' οὐ φάσκῃ, ἔρεσθε κτέ. For the use of μή, *cf.* Dem. XXI. 205, ἄν τ' ἐγὼ φῶ, ἄν τε μὴ φῶ. — **πολλὴ . . . εὐδαιμονία**: here τις applied to an abstraction particularizes it. Thus the εὐδαιμονία is represented as *of some sort;* this makes the form of statement more specific though still vague.

33. εἰ διαφθείρει, ὠφελοῦσιν: the pres. indic. here is not used in the prot. that immediately belongs to the apod. πολλὴ . . . ἂν εἴη. GMT. 54, 1 *a*. The connexion of thought requires an intervening prot., or some qualifying adv. like εἰκότως. This implied prot., with its apod., goes with εἰ διαφθείρει, ὠφελοῦσιν. *Cf.* 30 **b** and, for a case where δικαίως represents the prot. required by the sense, Xen. *An.* VII. 6. 15, εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ πάντων μάλιστα φίλος ὤν, νῦν πάντων διαφορώτατός (*most at variance*) εἰμι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι δικαίως . . . ὑφ' ὑμῶν αἰτίαν ἔχοιμι;

c **34. ἐπιδείκνυσαι**: the mid. perhaps implies criticism of Meletus's bearing, since ἐπιδείκνυσθαι and ἐπίδειξις are used of pretentious performances. Here, however, ἐπιδείκνυσαι means primarily ἐπιδείκνυς σαυτόν. G. 199; H. 812. For the added ὅτι clause, see the next note, and on τίς ἐστιν, 24 **d**.

36. ὅτι οὐδέν σοι κτέ.: appended to explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. Here at last is the pun upon Meletus's name (*cf.* also 26 **b**), for which the constant recurrence of the idea of μεμέληκε (variously expressed, ἐμέλησεν and περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ in 24 **c**, μέλον γέ σοι and μεμέληκεν in 24 **d**) has already paved the way. For similar plays upon words, *cf.* Soph. *O. T.* 395, ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, *Symp.* 185 **c**, Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, and the obvious play upon Agathon's name, *ib.* 174 **b**; *Rich. II.* II. 1,

Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old, . . .
Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast;
Gaunt am I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε: for the same order, *cf. Men.* 71 **d**, σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν Μένων κτέ. For a different order, see 26 **b**, *Crit.* 46 **a**. In 26 **e** the voc. is not expressed.

3. ὦ τάν: *my friend,* or *my good friend. Cf.* Dem. I. 26, ἀλλ' ὦ τάν, οὐχὶ βουλήσεται. The orthography is much disputed, and we find ὦ τᾶν, ὥταν, and ὃ 'τᾶν.

4. τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας: *i.e.* those who were most unavoidably influenced by them.

ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις 25
βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ- d
σθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα.
Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς
νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
Ἑκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ
σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν
ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μά- e
λιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς
τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα
μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λα-
βεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ,
ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι
δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἤ,
εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ 26
δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτη-

25 d

7. **ἀποκρίνου**: after a pause. — **ὁ νόμος** κτέ.: see Introd. 71 with note 1.

11. **τοσοῦτον σὺ** κτέ.: *τηλικοῦτος* and *τηλικόσδε*, acc. to the context, mean indifferently *so young* or *so old*. See Introd. 30. Notice the chiastic order: —

σύ × *ἐμοῦ*
τηλικούτου × *τηλικόσδε*.

Cf. below, 26 e *fin.*, and *Euthyph.* 2 b, *νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Μέλητον, ἔστι δὲ τὸν δῆμον Πιτθεύς, εἴ τιν' ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον, οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ, a young person who, I conceive, is not much known: his name is Meletus and Pitthis is his deme, — perhaps you remember a Meletus of Pitthis, who has rather a beak, a scrubbed beard, and lank long hair.*

15. **ἀγνοῶ**: for the indic. with **ὥστε**, see GMT. 65, 3; H. 927. 25 e

16. **κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ**: in the case supposed the *κακόν* is the natural result. It is stated, however (*cf.* the equiv. idiom *ἀγαθόν τι λαβεῖν παρά τινος*), as something which the victim goes out of his way to obtain.

18. **οἶμαι οὐδένα**: *cf. Lach.* 180 a, *κοινωνεῖν ἕτοιμος* (*sc.* *εἰμί*), *οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε* (*sc.* *ἕτοιμον εἶναι*).

19. **ἤ, ἄκων**: the verb is supplied from its subordinate clause, *εἰ διαφθείρω*. More usually the verb of the subord. clause is implied and that of the leading clause expressed. Socrates believed that all sin was involuntary, *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει*. See Introd. 17.

21. **καὶ ἀκουσίων**: strictly speaking this is superfluous, since *τοιούτων* takes 26 a

μάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως. 26

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις b

26 a the necessary meaning from its relation to ἄκων. Here is another case of Socrates's homely fashion of repeating himself. See Introd. 55. — For the gen. of the charge after εἰσάγειν, see on εἰσάγειν, 24 d.

23. παύσομαι κτέ.: from ποιῶ we must supply ποιῶν with παύσομαι. Such an ellipsis as this is obvious, and therefore not uncommon. See App.

25. ἔφυγες κτέ.: *you declined*. Socrates offered Meletus every opportunity for such an effort. See Introd. 25. The compound διαφεύγειν in this sense is more common, but *cf.* Eur. *Heracl.* 595 f., αὐτοὶ δὲ προστιθέντες (*imposing*) ἄλλοισιν πόνους, παρὸν σεσῶσθαι (*when they might be wholly spared*), φευξόμεσθα μὴ θανεῖν. From this quotation it appears that μή might have been used before ξυγγενέσθαι and διδάξαι. See Arnold's edit. of Madvig's *Syntax*, 156, Rem. 3. For cases of ἐκφεύγειν qualified by a neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὐ and μὴ οὐ, *cf.* *Soph.* 225 b, οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύξεται (*sc.* ὁ σοφιστής) . . . τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους (*kind*) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς. GMT. 95, 3. *Phaedr.* 277 d e, τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν . . . οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι. GMT. 95, 2 *c*. For an entirely different case, *cf.* 39 a, where τὸ ἀποθανεῖν represents θάνατον. 26 a

XIV. 2. τούτων: see on ὧν, 24 c. b — οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν: a stronger way of saying οὐδέν. The whole is adv., and therefore in the gen. acc. rather than in the gen. See G. 160, 2, and 159, N. 2; H. 719 b.

3. ὅμως δὲ δή: all the carelessness of Meletus is accumulated in ὅμως, and thus the adversative force of δέ is enhanced, while δή brings the statement of contradiction to a point; that is, δή marks transition from a general to a special account of τὴν τοῦ Μελήτου ἀμέλειαν.

4. ἢ δῆλον: appends a more precise and pressing question to the first, and anticipates the answer. In Lat. an is used in this way. The ellipsis in ὅτι κατὰ κτέ. is to be supplied from πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν;

6. ταῦτα: does not go with λέγεις but with διδάσκων.

ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα 26
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν
νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτι-σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς
10 ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον c
λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς
ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος
οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέ-
ρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους· ἢ παντά-
15 πασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους
ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομί-
ζεις θεούς. Ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

26 b 7. **πάνυ μὲν οὖν** κτέ.: Meletus agrees and asserts with all his might and main, *I assure you exactly that is what I do mean.* *πάνυ* and *σφόδρα* give strength to the assertion *ταῦτα λέγω* (*cf.* 25 a), *οὖν* signifies agreement with Socrates, and *μέν* (a weakened *μήν*) gives him the assurance of it.

8. **ὧν ὁ λόγος**: that is, *οὓς λέγομεν*. A prep. is more usual, but compare Thuc. i. 140. 3, *τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα*, with *id.* 139. 1, *τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα*. There are many cases where the gen. is used without a prep. (esp. where *περί* would seem appropriate). Kr. *Spr.* 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however, insists that *περί* is not implied here, and distinguishes between *περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος* and *ὧν ὁ λόγος*, just as between *λέγειν* (*have in mind*) *τινά* and *λέγειν περί τινος*. That such a distinction sometimes holds good is plain from other passages in Plato. *Cf.* Stallb. *in loc.* and *Soph.* 260 a, *σὺν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου* (*sc.* *ὁ λόγος*).

c 10 ff. **πότερον λέγεις** κτέ.: the two horns of this dilemma are, I. *πότερον . . . ὅτι ἑτέρους*, and II. *ἢ . . . διδάσκειν*. In I. there are two subdivisions: (*a*) *διδάσκειν . . . τινας θεούς* and (*b*) *καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα . . . ὅτι ἑτέρους*, — which is described as the inevitable result of (*a*). In II. there are two subdivisions: (*c*) *οὔτε . . . θεούς*, — which contradicts (*b*), — and (*d*) *τούς τε . . . διδάσκειν*, — which contradicts (*a*), but is not *stated* as the result of (*c*). After making his first point (*a*), Socrates, carried away by the minute zeal of explanation, states (*b*) independently of *λέγεις*. Therefore it would be clearer to print *καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα . . . ὅτι ἑτέρους* in a parenthesis if it were not for *ἐγκαλεῖς*, which in sense reënforces *λέγεις*. *καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα*, being strongly affirmative, is followed by *καὶ οὐκ* (rather than *οὐδέ*) *εἰμί*. This, in turn, being strongly neg., is followed by *οὐδέ* (rather than *καὶ οὐκ*) *ἀδικῶ*. Although the sense connects *οὐ μέντοι . . . ἑτέρους* with *νομίζειν . . θεούς* preceding, the syntax connects it with *νομίζω εἶναι θεούς*. From this we supply the ellipsis with *ὅτι ἑτέρους*, *sc.* *νομίζω θεούς*.

14. **τοῦτ' ἔστιν**: *τοῦτο* and *ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς* are not correl. See on *τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη*, 27 d.

17. **ἵνα τί**, κτέ.: *sc.* *γένηται*, *what makes you talk like that?* See on *ἵνα μοι καί*, 22 a.

26 c

οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ 26 d

18. **οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ**: *not even . . . nor yet.* — **ἄρα**: the insinuation of Meletus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek reverenced the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἥλιος πανόπτης. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Prometheus from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Heracles and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punctiliousness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in *Symp.* 220 **d**, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: ὁ δὲ [Σωκράτης] εἱστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτα ᾤχετ' ἀπιὼν προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ, *then, after a prayer to the sun, he took his departure.* On Socrates's religion, see Introd. 32.

19. **ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί**: Meletus uses this form of address, which Plato is careful *not* to put into the mouth of Socrates. See on ὦ ἄνδρες κτέ., 17 a.

20. **Ἀναξαγόρου**: see Introd. 10. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 4, reports that Anaxagoras declared τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον εἶναι διάπυρον (*a red hot mass of stone or iron*) καὶ μείζω τῆς Πελοποννήσου . . . τὴν δὲ σελήνην οἰκήσεις ἔχειν καὶ λόφους καὶ φάραγγας (*ravines*). From this last apparently the public inferred that Anaxagoras held the belief which Meletus attributes so wrongfully to Socrates, *i.e.* τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. The real view of Socrates in regard to such an account of the "all-seeing sun," as was attributed to Anaxagoras, is perhaps represented by the parenthetical refutation introduced by Xenophon in *Mem.* iv. 7. 7. For a criticism of Anaxagoras which is more worthy of Socrates himself, see the one attributed to him in the *Phaedo*, 97 **c**–99 **d**. The capital objection there made to Anaxagoras is that he unfolds his dogmatic views ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν. The argument here is: "apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting." Diogenes Laertius, ii. 3. 5, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν προειπεῖν (*prophesied*) τὴν περὶ Αἰγὸς ποταμὸν (*Aegospotami*) τοῦ λίθου πτῶσιν (*the fall of the stone*), ὃν εἶπεν ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου πεσεῖσθαι.

21. **οὕτω**: qualifying ἀπείρους below as well as καταφρονεῖς.

22. **γραμμάτων**: *in literature.* γράμματα stand in the same relation to μαθήματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.

εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει 26
τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ
25 μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς
ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν e
προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα.

26 d

—οὐκ εἰδέναι: οὐ because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: οὕτως ἄπειροι γραμμάτων εἰσὶν ὥστε οὐκ ἴσασι ὅτι κτέ. This vivid use of οὐ for μή in inf. clauses after ὥστε is not uncommon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here ὥστε οὐκ ἴσασι or ὥστε μὴ εἰδέναι would be equally regular and ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 65, 3; H. 1023 b.

23. βιβλία: *cf.* Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 8, πρῶτος (*sc.* of the philosophers) δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε (*published*) συγγραφῆς.

24. καὶ δὴ καί: *and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.*

25. ἃ . . . ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις: *sc.* the doctrines, not the books. —ἐνίοτε: that is when, as they often might, they chance to see a play in which these doctrines were promulgated, as in Eur. *Orest.* 982,

Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth
With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
Where whirls the clod erst from Olympus flung,
There I would go.

It is said that, in the lost play of *Phaethon*, Euripides called the sun χρυσέαν βῶλον, *a clod of gold*. Such utterances could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and listened to this poet's choral odes, which were sung ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας. The price of admission to the theatre of Dionysus thus appears to have been at most (εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ) one drachma. Ordinary spectators paid two obols, one-third of a drachma, or about six cents. Pericles passed a law providing that Athenians who asked for it should receive two obols for this purpose from the public treasury. The mention here of a maximum admission price of one drachma suggests that the better places may have been reserved by the manager (called θεατρώνης or θεατροπώλης, sometimes even ἀρχιτέκτων) for those who could pay more than six cents. In the account rendered (see Rangabé, *Antiquités Helléniques*, the inscription numbered 57, lines 30–33, also *C. I. A.* I. 324, pp. 171, 175) for building the Erechtheum (407 B.C.) is found the following item: ἀναλώματα· ὠνήματα· χάρται ἐωνήθησαν δύο ἐς ἃ τὰ ἀντίγραφα ἐνεγράψαμεν ₣ IIII, *expenditures: purchases:* [item] *bought two sheets of paper upon which we wrote our accounts, 2 drachmas and 4 obols.* It is accordingly absurd to suggest that a volume of Anaxagoras at this time could have cost as little as one drachma, even if it could be proved that books were sold in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus; or if, that failing, we were content with the notion of a book-market close to the Agora. The part of the ἀγορά where the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood bore the name ὀρχήστρα, but nothing goes to show that books were sold there.

27. ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ἄτοπα: *the more so because of their singularity.* "With-

ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν 26
εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ,
ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ
μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι
ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην
ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε
γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἆρα γνώσε- 27
ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναν-

26 e out taking even that into account, the youths must know well enough that these are not my doctrines." Etymologically ἄτοπα suggests not *absurd*, but *uncommon, eccentric*. See the preceding note.

28. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός: see on ὦ πρὸς κτέ., 25 c, and *cf.* Dem. ix. 15, ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ὦ πρὸς τοῦ Διός, ὅστις εὖ φρονῶν . . . σκέψαιτ' ἄν; This marks the transition to a second argument against the charge of atheism, and hence Meletus repeats the charge. Socrates has already shown the absurdity of the charge viewed as a statement of fact. Now he considers it as a statement of opinion (οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ;), and urges that Meletus is not entitled to hold such an opinion because it conflicts with another of Meletus's own views. See App.

29. ἄπιστος εἶ . . . σαυτῷ: *you are discrediting . . . your own* (*proper*) *self*. *Cf.* the use of πιθανός in the contrary sense, *e.g. Phaed.* 67 e, εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

33. ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι: *in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado.* — **ἔοικε ξυντιθέντι**: there are three possible consts. with ἐοικέναι: (1) it may be followed by the dat. part. as here, (2) it may take the nom. part., (3) it may take the inf. With the partic. nom. or dat. ἐοικέναι means *to offer the appearance of* (*to seem like unto one*) *being*; with the infinitive it means *to seem, on consideration, to be*. For the inf. const. *cf.* 21 d above; for the rarer nom. partic. *cf. Cratyl.* 408 b, ἥ γε Ἶρις ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴρειν (an old-fashioned word meaning *tell*) ἔοικε κεκλημένη, and Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 8, ἐοίκατε τυραννίσι μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείαις ἡδόμενοι. See App. 26 e

34. διαπειρωμένῳ: "one participial clause (ὥσπερ ξυντιθέντι) within another (διαπειρωμένῳ); as *Rep.* viii. 555 e, τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, *they* (the business men) *inserting their sting*, that is, *their money, into any who yields them opportunity, keep inflicting wounds*. Notice that it is ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα, a '*mock-riddle*,' one which has no answer." R. *Cf.* for the use of the pres. partic. *Phaed.* 116 c d, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 37, ἔπεμπον . . . λέγοντας ὅτι κτέ. *An.* ii. 4. 24, ὁ Γλοῦς αὐτοῖς ἐπεφάνη . . . σκοπῶν εἰ διαβαίνοιεν τὸν ποταμόν. *Id.* iv. 5. 8, βρωτόν (*eatables*) διεδίδου καὶ διέπεμπε διδόντας κτέ. See on σκοποῦντι, 21 e. Usually διαπειρᾶσθαι takes the gen., but here the question which follows explains the nature of the διάπειρα. 27 a

35. ὁ σοφὸς δή: *that enlightened man*, spoken with irony. — **ἐμοῦ χαρι-**

τί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 27
τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶπoι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμνησθέ (μοι μὴ b
θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὔ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγώ σοι

27 a **ἐντιζομένου**: for the gen. of noun and partic. with *γνώσεται*, see examples cited in note on *ἠσθόμην*, 22 c.

36. τοὺς ἄλλους: see on *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, b below.

37. τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ κτἑ.: *to contradict himself in so many words.* A more positive phrase than *ἐναντία ἐμαυτῷ λέγειν* above.

XV. **2. ταῦτα λέγειν**: *sc.* *ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης . . . θεοὺς νομίζων κτἑ.*

b **4. τοὺς λόγους**: the art. has nearly the force of a poss. here. G. 141, N. 2; H. 658. In many such cases as here the art., strictly speaking, points out something which the context has already suggested. To all such suggestions a Greek audience was very sensitive. Hence the freq. and delicate use of the dem. art. in Greek. G. 143; H. 654. On the method of Socrates, see Introd. 18, 21, 25, 26.

7. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω: *be always trying to get up a disturbance;* more lit., *disturbing in one way and another.* *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 5. 12, *καὶ οὗτος μὲν* (Menon's soldier) *αὐτοῦ ἥμαρτεν* (missed) *ἄλλος δὲ λίθῳ* (*sc.* *ἵησι τὸν Κλέαρχον*) *καὶ ἄλλος, εἶτα πολλοὶ κραυγῆς γενομένης.* *Ibid.* vii. 6. 10, *μετὰ τοῦτον ἄλλος ἀνέστη ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλος.* See also *Euthyd.* 273 b, *ὅτε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντες* (*stopped*) *διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιν, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς* (*now and then glancing at us*). The acc. is after the analogy of *θόρυβον θορυβεῖν*, *i.e.* a cognate acc. G. 159; H. 715. Here Meletus (*cf.* 25 d) gives no answer apart from such demonstrations of disgust as Socrates complains of. The words in c below, *ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος* suggest that the court was finally forced to interpose. Of course many "waits" of one kind or another may have oc- 27 b

λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπό- 27
κριναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, c
δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ἄνησας ὅτι μό-
γις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμό-
νια μὲν φῄς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ
εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν
λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ
δαιμόνια νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομί-
ζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε
ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας

27 b curred during such a cross-examination as is here given.

11. **τοῖς ἄλλοις**: all except the accuser and the accused; the audience (a above) and more esp. the *δικασταί*. — **τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι**: *please to answer the next question.* "This will go to the bottom of the whole matter." *ἐπὶ τούτῳ* is almost the same as *μετὰ τοῦτο*. *ἐπί* with the dat. easily passes from the meaning of *nearness* to the kindred sense of immediate succession in time. The acc. is like *τὸ ἐρωτηθέν* (*the question which has been asked*) or *τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, the question which is being asked,* freq. used with *ἀποκρίνεσθαι*.

c 13. **ὡς ἤνησας**: *Oh! thank you!* Used absolutely, like iuvare in Lat. — **μόγις**: see on *μόγις πάνυ*, 21 b.

16. **ἀλλ' οὖν**: not essentially different from *δ' οὖν*. See on 17 a. — **δαιμόνιά γε**: "To make the reasoning sound, *δαιμόνια* here and *δαιμόνια πράγματα* above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of *δαιμόνια καινά* was based simply on Socrates's *τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adj. use, *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, 31 c." R. 27 c

17. **τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ**: elsewhere and in its stricter use this means the written affidavit put in as a rejoinder by the accused; rarely as here, the *accusation* or *the written affidavit* of the accuser. So in Hyper. *Eux.* §§ 4, 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocration on the word *ἀντιγραφή* says, evidently referring to this passage: **Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖ ἀντωμοσίαν καὶ ἀντιγραφήν.** See Introd. 69 and N. 1 and 2.

19. **ἔχει**: repeated by way of answering *yes* after *οὕτως ἔχει*; similarly the simple verb is often repeated after a compound form. See on *Crit.* 44 d. — **δή**: *certainly.* Such an affirmation is not only self-evident (justified by common sense), but also follows from the admission which Meletus already has made.

20. **τοὺς δαίμονας κτέ.**: the definition here given is consistent with

αὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ; 27 d
Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖ-

27 c Greek usage from Homer to Plato. In Homer *θεός* and *δαίμων*, applied to any divinity in particular or to divinity in general, are all but interchangeable terms. The distinction between them, if distinction there is, suggests itself rather in the adjs. derived from them than in the two nouns themselves. Hesiod, *Op.* 108–125, calls the guardian spirits that watch over men *δαίμονες*; to the rank of *δαίμονες* he says those were raised who lived on earth during the golden age. He distinguishes between *θεοί*, *δαίμονες*, and *ἥρωες*, and this same distinction is attributed to Thales. On this Plato based the fancy expressed in the *Symposium* (202 e): *πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ (intermediate) ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ . . . ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον (interpreting and convoying) θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς (commands and rewards) τῶν θυσιῶν.*

27 d 21. **φῂς ἢ οὔ**: three Eng. words, *yes or no?*, will translate this. See on *οὐ φῄτε*, 25 b.

22. **εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι** *κτέ.*: a complex prot., which falls into two simpler conditions, each of which excludes the other. The latter apply the broader supposition *εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι* in turn to alternative apodoses, both of which it limits. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* vii. 6. 15, for a very similar construction: *ἐπεί γε μὴν ψεύδεσθαι ἤρξατο Ξένθης περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ*, — this might readily have taken the form of a prot., — *εἰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ αὐτόν, δικαίως ἄν με καὶ αἰτιῷσθε καὶ μισοῖτε· εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ . . . φίλος ὢν νῦν . . . διαφορώτατός εἰμι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι δικαίως . . . ὑφ' ὑμῶν αἰτίαν ἔχοιμι;* On the combination of indic. and opt., see GMT. 54, and on *εἰ διαφθείρει, κτέ.*, 25 b above. 27 d

23. **τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη**: by *τοῦτο* the preceding conditions, *εἴπερ . . . ἡγοῦμαι* and *εἰ . . . δαίμονες*, are grasped into one; and, thus combined in *τοῦτο*, they become the subj. whose pred. is the suppressed (*ἐκεῖνο*) antec. of *ὅ*. To *ὅ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι* is appended *φάναι*, which explains it and has the same subj.; all this points back to *θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων*, 27 a.

27. **ὧν**: equiv. to *ἐξ ὧν*, for "when the antecedent stands before the relative, a preposition (in this case *ἐκ*) belonging to both usually appears only with the first." See H. 1007. — **δή**: *you know.*

30 δας ἡγοῖτο [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων, [τοὺς ἡμιόνους] ἵππους δὲ καὶ 27 e
ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως
σὺ [ταῦτα] οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν
ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα·
ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀν-
35 θρώπων, ὡς [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα
ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε
ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν. 28

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ
ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ
εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ
5 πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ
ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ'
ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ

27 e 30. **τοὺς ἡμιόνους**: these words do not interfere with the grammar, although they make sad havoc with the sense, unless *ἤ* disappears.

33. **ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι, κτέ.**: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Meletus (*cf.* 23 **d**), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. *ἀπορῶν* and *ἀποπειρώμενος*, in connexion with *ἐγράψω*, refer to continued action in past time. — **ἐγκαλοῖς**: the opt. represents Meletus's original reflexion *τί ἐγκαλῶ;* The subjv. might have been retained. GMT. 71.

34. **ὅπως δὲ σὺ κτέ.**: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in *δαιμόνια*. The second *τοῦ αὐτοῦ* must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one which might be dispensed with. See App. — **πείθοις ἂν ὡς [οὐ]**: is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. *ὅπως* means *how* or *by which* after *μηχανή*. A similar use of *ὡς* is explained GMT. 65, 1, N. 4. 27 e

XVI. 1. **ἀλλὰ γάρ, ... ταῦτα**: this phrase dismisses one topic to make room for the next one. 28 a

5. **ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ**: *will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be.* *αἱρεῖν* and *ἁλίσκεσθαι* are technical terms of the law, as is the case with *φεύγειν* and *διώκειν*.

7. **δή**: *certainly*. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, *cf.* 31 **d**. — **πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθούς**: instead of *καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς*. The first *καί* is the idiomatic *καί* of comparisons. *Cf.* 22 **d**, *ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί*, and the idiom *εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος*. The second *καί* is

ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ᾔρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν· 28
οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἶτ' b
οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας,
ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον
λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει
δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα
ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον
σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ
ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ
λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε c
ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου

28 a equally idiomatic, and joins πολλούς with a second adj. *Cf.* πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες.

9. **οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν...στῇ**: *the rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case. Cf. Phaed.* 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, *we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear. Gorg.* 520 d, and *Rep.* v. 465 b. There is a touch of irony in this way of saying "I do not think." Socrates as it were enlists on the side of the rule. This idiom throws no light on οὐ μή with subjv. or fut. indic. GMT. ²89, 1, N. 2. For the quasi-impersonal use of στῇ, *come to a stand-still, cf.* Arist. *Eth. Nic.* vi. 9. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. *Theaet.* 153 d, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται . . . εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν (*tethered*), πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη. In such contexts the aor. στῆναι denotes the entrance into a state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 19,

b N. 1. — **εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει**: a question indicating surprise. The perversity of Socrates, in view of the fact just recited, is unreasonable. When such a question is accompanied by an urgent statement of the reason for surprise (here τοιοῦτον... ἐξ οὗ, κτέ.), it may be introduced by εἶτα or ἔπειτα, otherwise not. 28 b

11. **ἐγὼ δὲ κτέ.**: *cf. Crit.* 48 d for the same thought, and Xen. *An.* iii. 1. 43, for its application to the risks of war. In the *Ajax* of Sophocles, 473–480, the same idea is brought to the following climax: —

> Honor in life or honorable death
> The nobly born and bred must have.

13. **κίνδυνον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι**: *the question of life or death. Cf.* for the use and omission of the art., *Rep.* i. 334 e, κινδυνεύομεν (*perhaps we, etc.*) οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι (*have defined*). *Cf.* for the thought, *Aj.* 475–476: —

> τί γὰρ παρ' ἦμαρ ἡμέρα τέρπειν ἔχει
> προσθεῖσα κἀναθεῖσα τοῦ γε κατθανεῖν;

15. **ὅταν πράττῃ**: *whenever he does anything.* GMT. 62. See App.

17. **τῶν ἡμιθέων**: *i.e.* τῶν ἡρώων. Hesiod, *W. and D.* 158, calls the fourth race, ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος οἱ καλέονται | ἡμίθεοι κτέ., and he counts among their number the heroes that laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.

18. **ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός**: any appeal c to the example of Achilles was always

κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ 28
20 εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι,
θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρή-
σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτε-
νεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ'
Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν
25 θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησέ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον
δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, d
αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα
μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν
ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ
30 κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ·
οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' 28
c

very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, *Od.* xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the blest. *Cf. Symp.* 179 e, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmodius:—

> No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
> But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
> Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away,
> And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. **θεὸς οὖσα**: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. *Cf.* Hom. *Od.* iv. 369 and 468, *θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν.* The passage from Hom. *Il.* xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (*οὑτωσί πως*), and partly word for word.

24. **ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας κτέ.**: at this point **ὥστε** is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without *μέν*) had preceded it.—**τοῦ θανάτου**: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with *θάνατος* as an abstract noun. *Cf.* 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a b, *Crit.* 52 c. For the art. used as here, *cf.* 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. **μή . . . οἴει**: see on *ἀλλ' ἄρα*, 25 a. d

31. **ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ**: instead of *ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευσθείς* or even *τἀχθείς*. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative *ἢ ἡγησάμενος*

ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κιν- 28
δυνεύειν μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο
μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες

28 d κτέ. This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander's order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ἡγησάμενος κτέ. In the sense ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ is the alternative of ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ. See App.

33. **ὑπολογιζόμενον**: as in b above, ὑπολογίζεσθαι means *take into account, i.e.* in striking a balance. *Cf. Crit.* 48 d, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in ὑπολογίζεσθαι, *cf. Phaedr.* 231 b, οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο . . . καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ὃν εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι προφασίζεσθαι οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι κτέ. The force of ὑπό here is very near to that of ἀντί, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. **πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ**: moral turpitude (turpe), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. *Cf.* 29 b and Soph. *Ant.* 95 ff.,

Nay, leavê me and my heart's untoward plan
To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer
That shall estop me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the proposition that disgrace is more frightful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 28 b, if he can prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo. 28 d

1. **δεινὰ ἂν εἴην . . . λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν**: much here depends upon disentangling past, pres., and fut. See GMT. 55, 3, Rem. The prot. (limiting the apod. δεινὰ ἂν εἴην κτέ., lit. *I should prove to have done a dreadful thing*) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μέν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δέ, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circumstances. See on 5. The outrageous conduct for him would be with this *combination* of facts and convictions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: *if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post.* The repetition of μέν and δέ respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition *cf.* Isocr. vii. 18, παρ' οἷς μὲν γὰρ μήτε φυλακὴ μήτε ζημία τῶν τοιούτων καθέστηκε μήθ' αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσί, παρὰ τούτοις μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων, ὅπου δὲ μήτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι μήτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν,

[illegible]

[illegible] ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ [illegible] Δηλίῳ: Potidaea, a [illegible] colony on the [illegible], which became a [illegible] of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connection with Corinth. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this [illegible] allegiance to persuade the Po-

[illegible] says that Socrates [illegible] the prize which was [illegible] himself [illegible]. *Cf.* [illegible] b.c. — The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life. — Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 4, ἀφ' οὗ ἥ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λε-

ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὖ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ 28
ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος,
ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν
καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβη-
θεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. 29
δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι
τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν
τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι
οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ
εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνα-

28 e βαδείᾳ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ' Ἱπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνωται (*has been humbled*) μὲν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κτέ. Notice that both Plato and Xen. say ἐπὶ (not ἐν) Δηλίῳ, because at the time there was no extended settlement at or near the place. For the gallantry of Socrates in the retreat, *cf. Symp.* 221 a b. Alcibiades was mounted, and therefore could observe better than at Potidaea how Socrates behaved, and he says: ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον . . . πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος (his companion in flight) τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα δῆλος ὢν . . . ὅτι εἴ τις ἅψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. See also the similar testimony of Laches in *Lach.* 181 b.

4. ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν: The repeated allusions which are scattered through Plato's dialogues to the brave conduct of Socrates in these battles show that it was well known at Athens. — **ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις**: *just like many another man.* He is careful not to make too much of the facts. The indef. τις here means some, *i.e.* any indefinite person, because many persons are thought of under ἄλλος. 28 e

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος: *i.e. now that my post is assigned me by the god,* a circumstance of the supposition εἰ λίποιμι, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον: *as I thought and understood, sc.* when I heard the oracle which was given to Chaerephon. — **δεῖν**: depends on the force of *commanding* in τάττοντος. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that *he must live, etc.*

8. λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν: so worded as to suggest λιποταξίου γραφή, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his civil rights, *i.e.* suffered ἀτιμία. 29 a

9. τἄν: τοί, *truly,* emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

14. ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν: *sc.* ὁ δοκῶν εἰδέναι, *i.e.* the same indef. subj. which is to be thought of with the preceding infs. *Cf.* below **b**, and 39 d. As a rule, the third person, when it means vaguely *any one* (the French *on*) or *anything,* is

τον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν 29
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν
κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ b
ἐπονείδιστος ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ
ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀν-
θρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός τού φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ
ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶο-
μαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι,
καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα.
πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ
ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι·
ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς c

29 a not expressed. — **τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ**: by prolepsis for *οὐδ' εἰ ὁ θάνατος, not even whether death*, *i.e.* whether death may not actually be. Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, *cf.* 37 b. See on *τοῦ θανάτου*, 28 c, for the use of the art.

15. **ὄν**: here, as usual, in the gender of *ἀγαθόν*, which is implied in the pred. *μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν*.

17. **τοῦτο**: not in the gender of *ἀμαθία*. This makes a smoother sent. than *αὕτη πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ κτέ.*, which was the alternative. —

b **αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος**: *that very same reprehensible*, limiting *ἀμαθία* and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b–23 e.

19. **τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἄν**: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, *i.e. ὅτι κτέ.* Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after *ἄν*. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on *ἢ . . . ἄκων*, 25 e. — **καὶ ἐνταῦθα**: *here too.*

20. **εἰ δή**: *if really, i.e.* if, as the 29 b oracle suggests.

21. **οὐκ εἰδὼς . . . οὕτω**: *i.e. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα . . . οὕτω. οὕτως* sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly *so likewise*. *Cf. Men.* 80 c, *παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν ποιῶ.*

24. **ὧν . . . ἐστιν**: a notable instance of assimilation. G. 153; H. 994. See on *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων*, 37 b. *κακά* is related to *ὧν* as *ἀγαθά* in the next line is related to *ἅ*. — **οἶδα εἰ**: see on *τὸν θάνατον κτέ.*, above a.

26. **εἰ ἀφίετε . . . εἰ οὖν ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἄν**: the speaker weakens *εἰ νῦν ἀφίετε* (*if you are now ready to acquit me*) by the explanatory detail of *εἴ μοι εἴποιτε* and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this release may be granted, until the weaker clause *εἰ ἀφοιτε* comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began. — **ἀπιστήσαντες**: conveys c the idea of disregarding rather than that of *disbelieving*. This meaning

ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ 29
εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων
πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς
30 ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι
διαφθαρήσονται — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ
τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρί-
βειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων,
35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, d
εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζο-
μαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ
ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλο-
σοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος
40 ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἰώθα, ὅτι, ὦ

29 c of ἀπιστεῖν is not uncommon in Plato. *Cf. Laws*, 941 c, ὁ μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεῖ τε καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἅπαντα εὐτυχοῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσας τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιῷδέ τινι μαχέσθω νόμῳ.

27. **οὐ δεῖν, οἷόν τε εἶναι**: in the original form this would be οὐκ ἔδει and οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν. GMT. 15, 3; H. 853 a. — **εἰσελθεῖν**: on this use of εἰσέρχεσθαι, see Introd. 70 with the note. Meletus probably argues: "If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies."

29. **εἰ διαφευξοίμην**: fut. opt. in indir. disc. GMT. 26; 69, 1; H. 855 a. — **ἂν ... διαφθαρήσονται**: an uncommon apod. GMT. 37, 2, N. 1; H. 845. See App.

33. **ἐφ' ᾧτε**: for const. with inf., see GMT. 99; H. 990 a.

35. **οὖν**: after a digression.

29 d 36. **ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι**: a fictitious apostrophe. *Cf.* Dem. VIII. 35, εἰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔροιντ' ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πέμπετε ὡς ἡμᾶς ἑκάστοτε πρέσβεις κτέ. See App. — **ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ**: *you have my friendship and my love, but, etc.* ἀσπάζεσθαι designates the greeting of friends. *Cf. Od.* iii. 34–35, where Nestor and his sons see Telemachus and Mentes, ἀθρόοι ἦλθον ἅπαντες, | χερσίν τ' ἠσπάζοντο καὶ ἑδριάασθαι ἄνωγον. *Cf.* also *Il.* x. 542, τοὶ δὲ χαρέντες | δεξιῇ ἠσπάζοντο ἑπέεσσί τε μειλιχίοισιν.

37. **πείσομαι**: *cf. Acts* iv. 19, ὁ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἀποκριθέντες εἶπον πρὸς αὐτούς· εἰ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐνώπιον (*in the sight*) τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑμῶν ἀκούειν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίνατε, *ibid.* v. 28, πειθαρχεῖν (*obey*) δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

38. **οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι**: see on οὐδὲν κτέ., 28 a. For οὐ μή with the subj. in strong denials, see GMT. 89, 1; H. 1032.

ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29
εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ
αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα καὶ
δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς e
ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντί-
ζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν
καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι
ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλα-
χίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 30
καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,
καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυ-

20 d

41. **πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης** κτέ.: *cf.* Xen. *An.* vii. 3. 10, *προσελθὼν δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι ἔλεγε· σὺ καὶ πόλεως μεγίστης εἶ καὶ παρὰ Σεύθῃ τὸ σὸν ὄνομα μεγιστόν ἐστι.* The gen. is in appos. with Ἀθηναῖος Ἀθηνῶν ὤν. *Cf. Hipp. Ma.* 281 c, *ἡ ὑμετέρα τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνη.* G. 137, N. 1; H. 691. For the points of superiority, *cf.* Thuc. ii. 35–46.

42. **εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν**: for the full meaning, *cf.* 38 c–39 d, also Thuc. ii. 40, 41. Here *ἰσχύς* means the strength which rules the kingdom of the mind (*σοφία*). *Cf.* Thuc. i. 138, where he says of the typical Athenian Themistocles: *ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάζεσθαι.* This *φύσεως ἰσχύς*, when circumstances disclosed its perfection, was *σοφία*, the virtue of virtues, chiefly prized by Socrates as including all others.

χρημάτων . . . ψυχῆς: the same prolepsis as that in 29 a, where *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ* is pointedly mentioned before its time. Notice the significant use of the art. with *ψυχῆς*, a word which like *σῶμα* often appears without the art. in cases that seem to require it; *τῆς* accordingly has the force of a possessive pron. G. 141, N. 2; H. 658. 29 d

45. **οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ**: see on *ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει*, 21 e. e

47. **ἐρήσομαι, ἐξετάσω, ἐλέγξω**: these words in this order represent the process by which Socrates so often disconcerted his fellow-countrymen. Beginning with a harmless *question* or two, his method soon proved uncomfortably *scrutinizing* (*ἐξετάσω*), and generally ended by *convicting* (*ἐλέγξω*) of ignorance.

50. **ταῦτα νεωτέρῳ ποιήσω**: *ποιεῖν*, like *πράττειν* and *ἐργάζεσθαι*, often takes in addition to the acc. of the thing done a dat. of the person *for* whom the thing is done, but the acc. of the person *to* whom it is done. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 3, *οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα παθεῖν οἷα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οἱ θεοὶ ποιήσειαν. Ibid.* 24. *καὶ ἡμῖν γ' ἂν οἶδ' ὅτι τρισάσμενος* (*thrice gladly*) *ταῦτ' ἐποίει, εἰ ἑώρα ἡμᾶς μένειν παρα-* 30 a

52. **ὅσῳ . . . ἐστὲ γένει**: the thought

τέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ 30
ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ
55 πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο
πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους
καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρη-
μάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως b
ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων· οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται,
60 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

30 a of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The cor- of ὅσῳ readily suggests itself ith μᾶλλον. *Cf.* the same case, 39 d. *Cf. Euthyph.* 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ ιον εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος.

55. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: see on δοῦλος, *Crit.* 50 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; *cf.* also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ἡμῖν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, *e.g.* Cic. *de Legg.* i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populorum, *etc.*

58. πρότερον: *sc.* ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς. μηδέ is not a third specification with μήτε . . . μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

b 60. ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the mending of his fortunes; this is ἀρετή (*skill in the art of right living*), *i.e.* wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σοφιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη; (ii. 6. 22–25) his analysis of what makes a καλός τε κἀγαθός (*gentleman*), where of all such he says, δύνανται πεινῶντες (*fasting*) καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν . . . δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν (*selfish greed*) ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως (*righteously*) κοινωνεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8, 9, and 10) the success which his practical advice brought to his friends Aristarchus, Euthērus, Crito, and Diodorus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on εὖ πράττειν with young Callias, τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον, *Euthyd.* 278 e–282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is εὐτυχία (*good-luck*). The gods endow us with such 30 b

κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ 28
20 εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι,
θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν
25 θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησέ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, d
αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ
30 κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' 28
c

very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, *Od.* xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the blest. *Cf.* *Symp.* 179 e, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmodius: —

> No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
> But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
> Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away,
> And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. **θεὸς οὖσα**: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. *Cf.* Hom. *Od.* iv. 369 and 468, *θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν*. The passage from Hom. *Il.* xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (*οὑτωσί πως*), and partly word for word.

24. **ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας κτέ.**: at this point *ὥστε* is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without *μέν*) had preceded it. — **τοῦ θανάτου**: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with *θάνατος* as an abstract noun. *Cf.* 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a b, *Crit.* 52 c. For the art. used as here, *cf.* 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. **μή . . . οἴει**: see on *ἀλλ' ἄρα*, 25 a. d

31. **ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ**: instead of *ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευσθείς* or even *τἀχθείς*. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative *ἢ ἡγησάμενος*

ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κιν- 28
δυνεύειν μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο
μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες

28 d κτέ. This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander's order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ἡγησάμενος κτέ. In the sense ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ is the alternative of ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ. See App.

33. ὑπολογιζόμενον: as in b above, ὑπολογίζεσθαι means *take into account, i.e.* in striking a balance. *Cf. Crit.* 48 d, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in ὑπολογίζεσθαι, *cf. Phaedr.* 231 b, οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο . . . καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ὃν εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἠγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι προφασίζεσθαι οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι κτέ. The force of ὑπό here is very near to that of ἀντί, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ: moral turpitude (turpe), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. *Cf.* 29 b and Soph. *Ant.* 95 ff.,

Nay, leavē me and my heart's untoward plan
To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer
That shall estop me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the proposition that disgrace is more frightful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 28 b, if he can prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo. 28 d

1. δεινὰ ἂν εἴην . . . λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν: much here depends upon disentangling past, pres., and fut. See GMT. 55, 3, Rem. The prot. (limiting the apod. δεινὰ ἂν εἴην κτέ., lit. *I should prove to have done a dreadful thing*) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μέν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δέ, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circumstances. See on 5. The outrageous conduct for him would be with this *combination* of facts and convictions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: *if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post.* The repetition of μέν and δέ respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition *cf.* Isocr. vii. 18, παρ' οἷς μὲν γὰρ μήτε φυλακὴ μήτε ζημία τῶν τοιούτων καθέστηκε μήθ' αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ, παρὰ τούτοις μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων, ὅπου δὲ μήτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι μήτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν,

Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς 28 e
ᾑρεῖσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ

28 d ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐξιτήλους γίγνεσθαι τὰς κακοηθείας, *for (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice,* that while among these, I say, *even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condonation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf.* also *Gorg.* 512 **a**. Notice that the μέν clause is important only with reference to the δέ clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the δέ clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μέν clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and
e German idiom by the use of some word like "while" in the μέν clause.

2. οἱ ἄρχοντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle.— **ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε**: the δικασταί are here taken as representing the whole δῆμος, from which they were selected by lot. See Introd. 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 **e** and 25 **a**. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the ἐκκλησιασταί. *Cf.* 25 **a**.

3. ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ . . . Δηλίῳ: Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the peninsula Chalcidice, which became a tributary ally of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connexion with Corinth. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this divided allegiance to persuade the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens, which 28 e
they did in 432 B.C. The Potidaeans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the beleaguering force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidaea, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. *Cf. Symp.* 219 **e**–220 **e**, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidaean campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν ἐξ (*after*) ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τἀριστεῖα (*the prize for gallantry in action*) ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοί, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον (*when I was wounded*) οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. *Cf. Charm.* 153 **b** c. — The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life. — Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 4, ἀφ' οὗ ἥ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Δε-

ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὖ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ 28
ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος,
ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν
καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβη-
θεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. 29
δεινὸν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι
τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν
τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι
οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ
εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνα-

28 e βαδείᾳ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ' Ἱπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνωται (*has been humbled*) μὲν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κτέ. Notice that both Plato and Xen. say ἐπὶ (not ἐν) Δηλίῳ, because at the time there was no extended settlement at or near the place. For the gallantry of Socrates in the retreat, *cf. Symp.* 221 a b. Alcibiades was mounted, and therefore could observe better than at Potidaea how Socrates behaved, and he says: ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον . . . πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος (his companion in flight) τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα δῆλος ὢν . . . ὅτι εἴ τις ἅψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. See also the similar testimony of Laches in *Lach.* 181 b.

4. ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν: The repeated allusions which are scattered through Plato's dialogues to the brave conduct of Socrates in these battles show that it was well known at Athens. — ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις: *just like many another man.* He is careful not to make too much of the facts. The indef. τις here means some, *i.e.* any indefinite person, because many persons are thought of under ἄλλος. 28 e

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος: *i.e. now that my post is assigned me by the god,* a circumstance of the supposition εἰ λίποιμι, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον: *as I thought and understood, sc.* when I heard the oracle which was given to Chaerephon. — δεῖν: depends on the force of *commanding* in τάττοντος. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that *he must live, etc.*

8. λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν: so worded as to suggest λιποταξίου γραφή, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his civil rights, *i.e.* suffered ἀτιμία. 29 a

9. τἄν: τοί, *truly,* emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

14. ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν: *sc.* ὁ δοκῶν εἰδέναι, *i.e.* the same indef. subj. which is to be thought of with the preceding infs. *Cf.* below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the third person, when it means vaguely *any one* (the French *on*) or *anything,* is

τον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν 29
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν
κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ b
ἐπονείδιστος ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ
ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀν-
θρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός τού φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ
ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴο-
μαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι,
καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα.
πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ
ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι·
ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς c

29 a not expressed. — **τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ**: by prolepsis for *οὐδ' εἰ ὁ θάνατος, not even whether, i.e.* whether death may not actually be. Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, *cf.* 37 b. See on *τοῦ θανάτου*, 28 c, for the use of the art.

15. **ὄν**: here, as usual, in the gender of *ἀγαθόν*, which is implied in the pred. *μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν*.

17. **τοῦτο**: not in the gender of *ἀμαθία*. This makes a smoother sent. than *αὕτη πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ κτέ.*, which was the alternative. —

b **αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος**: *that very same reprehensible*, limiting *ἀμαθία* and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b–23 e.

19. **τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἄν**: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, *i.e. ὅτι κτέ.* Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after *ἄν*. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on *ἡ . . . ἄκων*, 25 e. — **καὶ ἐνταῦθα**: *here too.*

20. **εἰ δή**: *if really, i.e.* if, as the 29 b oracle suggests.

21. **οὐκ εἰδὼς . . . οὕτω**: *i.e. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα . . . οὕτω. οὕτως* sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly *so likewise. Cf. Men.* 80 c, *παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν ποιῶ.*

24. **ὧν . . . ἐστιν**: a notable instance of assimilation. G. 153; H. 994. See on *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων*, 37 b. *κακά* is related to *ὧν* as *ἀγαθά* in the next line is related to *ἃ*. — **οἶδα εἰ**: see on *τὸν θάνατον κτέ.*, above a.

26. **εἰ ἀφίετε . . . εἰ οὖν ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἄν**: the speaker weakens *εἰ νῦν ἀφίετε* (*if you are now ready to acquit me*) by the explanatory detail of *εἴ μοι εἴποιτε* and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this release may be granted, until the weaker clause *εἰ ἀφίοιτε* comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began. — **ἀπιστήσαντες**: conveys c the idea of disregarding rather than that of *disbelieving*. This meaning

ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ 29
εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων
πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς
30 ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι
διαφθαρήσονται — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ
τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρί-
βειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων,
35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, d
εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζο-
μαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ
ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλο-
σοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος
40 ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι, ὦ

29 c of ἀπιστεῖν is not uncommon in Plato. *Cf. Laws*, 941 c, ὁ μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεῖ τε καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἅπαντα εὐτυχοῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσας τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιῷδέ τινι μαχέσθω νόμῳ.

27. **οὐ δεῖν, οἷόν τε εἶναι**: in the original form this would be οὐκ ἔδει and οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν. GMT. 15, 3; H. 853 a. — **εἰσελθεῖν**: on this use of εἰσέρχεσθαι, see Introd. 70 with the note. Meletus probably argues: "If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies."

29. **εἰ διαφευξοίμην**: fut. opt. in indir. disc. GMT. 26; 69, 1; H. 855 a. — **ἂν ... διαφθαρήσονται**: an uncommon apod. GMT. 37, 2, N. 1; H. 845. See App.

33. **ἐφ' ᾧτε**: for const. with inf., see GMT. 99; H. 999 a.

35. **οὖν**: after a digression.

36. **ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι**: a fictitious apostrophe. *Cf.* Dem. VIII. 35, εἰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔροιντ' ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πέμπετε ὡς ἡμᾶς ἑκάστοτε πρέσβεις κτέ. See App. — **ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ**: *you have my friendship and my love, but, etc.* ἀσπάζεσθαι designates the greeting of friends. *Cf. Od.* iii. 34–35, where Nestor and his sons see Telemachus and Mentes, ἀθρόοι ἦλθον ἅπαντες, | χερσίν τ' ἠσπάζοντο καὶ ἐδριάασθαι ἄνωγον. *Cf.* also *Il.* x. 542, τοὶ δὲ χαρέντες | δεξιῇ ἠσπάζοντο ἑπέεσσί τε μειλιχίοισιν. 29 d

37. **πείσομαι**: *cf. Acts* iv. 19, ὁ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἀποκριθέντες εἶπον πρὸς αὐτούς· εἰ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐνώπιον (*in the sight*) τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑμῶν ἀκούειν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίνατε, *ibid.* v. 28, πειθαρχεῖν (*obey*) δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

38. **οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι**: see on οὐδὲν κτέ., 28 a. For οὐ μή with the subj. in strong denials, see GMT. 89, 1; H. 1032.

ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29
εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ
αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα καὶ
δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς e
ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντί-
ζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν
καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι
ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλα-
χίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 30
καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,
καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυ-

29 d **41. πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης** κτέ.: *cf.* Xen. *An.* vii. 3. 19, *προσελθὼν δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι ἔλεγε· σὺ καὶ πόλεως μεγίστης εἶ καὶ παρὰ Σεύθῃ τὸ σὸν ὄνομα μεγιστόν ἐστι.* The gen. is in appos. with Ἀθηναῖος = Ἀθηνῶν ὤν. *Cf. Hipp. Ma.* 281e, *ἡ ὑμετέρα τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνη.* G. 137, N. 1; H. 691. For the points of superiority, *cf.* Thuc. ii. 35–46.

42. εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν: for the full meaning, *cf.* 38 c–39 d, also Thuc. ii. 40, 41. Here *ἰσχύς* means the strength which rules the kingdom of the mind (*σοφία*). *Cf.* Thuc. i. 138, where he says of the typical Athenian Themistocles: *ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι.* This *φύσεως ἰσχύς*, when circumstances disclosed its perfection, was *σοφία*, the virtue of virtues, chiefly prized by Socrates as including all others.

χρημάτων . . . ψυχῆς: the same prolepsis as that in 29 a, where *τὸν θάνατον* is pointedly mentioned before its time. Notice the significant use of *the art.* with *ψυχῆς*, a word which like *σῶμα* often appears without the art. in cases that seem to require it; *τῆς* accordingly has the force of a possessive pron. G. 141, N. 2; H. 658.

29 d

45. οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ: see on *ὅμως δὲ* e *ἐδόκει*, 21 e.

47. ἐρήσομαι, ἐξετάσω, ἐλέγξω: these words in this order represent the process by which Socrates so often disconcerted his fellow-countrymen. Beginning with a harmless *question* or two, his method soon proved uncomfortably *scrutinizing* (*ἐξετάσω*), and generally ended by *convicting* (*ἐλέγξω*) of ignorance.

50. ταῦτα νεωτέρῳ ποιήσω: *ποιεῖν*, like *πράττειν* and *ἐργάζεσθαι*, often takes in addition to the acc. of the thing done a dat. of the person *for* whom the thing is done, but the acc. of the person *to* whom it is done. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 3, *οἴομαι γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα παθεῖν οἷα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οἱ θεοὶ ποιήσειαν.* *Ibid.* 24, *καὶ ἡμῖν γ' ἂν οἶδ' ὅτι τρισάσμενος* (*thrice gladly*) *ταῦτ' ἐποίει, εἰ ἑώρα ἡμᾶς μένειν παρασκευαζομένους.* 30 a

52. ὅσῳ . . . ἐστὲ γένει: the thought

τέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ 30
ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ
55 πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο
πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους
καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρη-
μάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως b
ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων· οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται,
60 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

30 a of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The cor- ... of ὅσῳ readily suggests itself with μᾶλλον. *Cf.* the same case, 39 d. *Cf. Euthyph.* 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ ... ου εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος.

55. **τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν**: see on **δοῦλος**, *Crit.* 50 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; *cf.* also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ... ῦν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, *e.g.* Cic. *de Legg.* i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populorum, *etc.*

58. **πρότερον**: *sc.* ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς. μηδέ is not a third specification with μήτε . . . μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

b 60. **ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα**: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the mending of his fortunes; this is 30 b ἀρετή (*skill in the art of right living*), *i.e.* wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σοφιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη; (ii. 6. 22–25) his analysis of what makes a καλός τε κἀγαθός (*gentleman*), where of all such he says, δύνανται πεινῶντες (*fasting*) καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν . . . δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν (*selfish greed*) ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως (*righteously*) κοινωνεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8, 9, and 10) the success which his practical advice brought to his friends Aristarchus, Euthērus, Crito, and Diodorus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on εὖ πράττειν with young Callias, τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον, *Euthyd.* 278 e–282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is εὐτυχία (*good-luck*). The gods endow us with such

λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ 30
τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς
ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν; ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή,
65 καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι. c

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως

30 b common sense as we have, *Euthyph.* 15 a, *Rep.* ii. 366 c, 375 c–e, 379 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, *Rep.* x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά: this *ταῦτα, all this*, covers more ground than the *ταῦτα* above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. "If *this* corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true." With *εἰ διαφθείρω, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη*, *cf. εἰ ὠφελοῦσιν*, 25 b, where see note.

63. πρὸς ταῦτα: *wherefore.*

65. ὡς ἐμοῦ κτέ.: *knowing that I should never alter my ways.* *ποιήσοντος ἄν* represents *ποιήσω ἄν*. GMT. 41, 4; H. 845 and 861. *Cf.* Dem. XIX. 342, *τοὺς ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐκείνῳ ποιήσοντας ἀνῃρηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσεσθε*. See on *διαφθαρήσονται*, 29 c. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the *εἰ μέλλω* used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 25, 2; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with *ἄν*, see GMT. 54, 1 *b*; H. 901 a. 30 b

66. πολλάκις: *many times* or *many deaths.* The Eng. idiom like the Greek requires no definite specification such as "to die a hundred deaths." In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. *Cf.* *ἀκήκοας μυριάκις ἀγὼ βούλομαι*, Ar. *Nub.* 738; *ἔτνους* (*for pea-soup?*); *βαβαιάξ, μυριάκις ἐν τῷ βίῳ*, *Ran.* 63. *Cf.* *τρισάσμενος*, quoted from Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not unnaturally uses *μυριάκις* where he exclaims (IX. 65), *τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου.* — **τεθνάναι**: the absolute contradictory of *ζῆν*, here used rather than the somewhat weaker *ἀποθνῄσκειν*. This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. *Cf.* 39 e, 43 d, and the similar use of *καλεῖν* and *κεκλῆσθαι*, *γιγνώσκειν* and *ἐγνωκέναι*, *μιμνήσκειν* and *μεμνῆσθαι*, *κτᾶσθαι* and *κεκτῆσθαι*. c

XVIII. 2. **οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν**: he asked them *μὴ θορυβεῖν*. See above on *θορυβεῖν*, 17 d, and on *μὴ θορυβήσητε*, 20 e.

3. καὶ γάρ, μέλλω γάρ, εὖ γὰρ ἴστε: the first *γάρ* is closely connected with *ἀκούειν*, the second goes back to the leading clause *μὴ θορυβεῖν* and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three

βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, 30
ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ
μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλά-
ψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο· d
οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος
βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ
ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος
τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ-
λον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν
ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω
ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ'
ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν
ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, e

30 c times already. The third *γάρ, now*, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of *γάρ* after prons. and advs., *e.g.* 31 b after *ἐνθένδε*, and in general after any prefatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in *τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς*, 20 e. *γάρ* with this force is esp. freq. after *ὃ δὲ* (*τὸ δὲ*) *μέγιστον, δεινότατον*, also after *σημεῖον δέ, τεκμήριον δέ* and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. **βοήσεσθε**: this is more than a disturbance (*θορυβεῖν*); it is an outcry.

9. **θεμιτὸν ἀμείνονι ἄνδρι βλάπτεσθαι**: *cf.* 21 b. *θεμιτόν* takes the dat., and, after the analogy of *ἔξεστιν*, an inf. (*βλάπτεσθαι*) is added. The pass. *βλάπτεσθαι* makes this const. appear more unusual than *e.g.* in *Phaedo*, 67 b, *μὴ καθαρῷ* (*unclean*) *γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ*. For the import of the words *θέμις* and *θεμιτόν*, see on *οὐ γὰρ θέμις*, 21 b.

30 d 10. **ἀποκτείνειε μεντἄν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν**: *ἀποκτείνειν* is used here secondarily of the *δικασταί* and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. *ἀτιμία* involved the forfeiture of some or all of the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the *ἄτιμος* was looked upon by the state as dead, *i.e.* he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. *Cf. Rep.* viii. 553 b, *εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα*. See App.

11. **ἄλλος τίς που**: *many another*. See on *ἄλλος*, 28 e.

15. **ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν**: *cf.* Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, *Euthyph.* 5 b c, *εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε* (ὁ Μέλητος), *εὕροιμ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός* (*rotten*) *ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ*.

οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό- 30
τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ
20 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθε-
στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπό μύωπός τινος· οἷον
δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν
τινα ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκα-

30 e

18. **ἀτεχνῶς ... προσκείμενον**: added instead of a clause with *οἷος* to explain *τοιοῦτον*. See on *οἷος δεδόσθαι*, 31 a. — **εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν**: *though it sounds rather absurd to say so*, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech." This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. *προσκείμενον* is the regular pass. of *προστιθέναι*. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. **ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος**: *by a gadfly*. For this word, *cf.* Aesch. *Supp.* 307, 308, *βοηλάτην* (*ox-driving*) *μύωπα κινητήριον* (*urging on*), *οἶστρον* (*gadfly*) *καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλου πέλας*. Also in the *Prometheus* Io's tormentor is called *οἶστρος* (567) and *ὀξύστομος μύωψ* (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a *ἱππηλάτης μύωψ*. Notice how humorously (*γελοιότερον*) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the *μύωψ* is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (*προσκαθίζων*), and does not allow them even a nap; he *bothers* them incessantly when they are drowsing (*οἱ νυστάζοντες*). Then they make an impatient dash (*κρούσαντες*) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, *cf.* Verg. *Aen.* vi. 90, nec Teucris addita Juno; Usquam aberit. *μύωψ* is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of *spur*. See App. — **τινός**: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is startling. — **οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ... προστεθεικέναι**: lit. *in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state, — such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc.*, a repetition of *προσκείμενον* [*ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that *οἷον* really refers not to the *μύωψ* simply but to the *μύωψ* engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by *τοιοῦτόν τινα* and the explanatory clause with *ὅς*.

23. **ὀνειδίζων ἕκαστον**: *ὀνειδίζειν* alone requires the dat. *Cf. Il.* ii. 254, *τῷ νῦν Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν ἦσαι ὀνειδίζων*, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of *πείθων*; both *πείθων* and *ὀνειδίζων* are however introduced simply to explain *ἐγείρων*, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. **τὴν ἡμέραν ... προσκαθίζων**: this specifies the means by which the

30 e

31 a

στον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθί- 31
ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄν-
δρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως
τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι,
κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτεί-
ναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ
μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν.
ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρω- b
πίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι
καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη,
τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα
ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμε-
λεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον
καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα
λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλ-
λα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε

31 a process of awakening, indicated by the three preceding partics., was made possible. Pres. and aor. partics. express the means, as the fut. partic. expresses purpose. GMT. 109; H. 969.

26. **ἴσως τάχ' ἄν**: *may be perhaps*, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of *ῥᾳδίως* is well indicated by the repetition of the *ἄν*, which has already served to emphasize *κρούσαντες*. Notice, however, that grammatically it is required only once and goes with the verb of the apod. *ἀποκτείναιτε*. See on *ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν*, 17 d.

27. **ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες** κτέ.: *like men disturbed in their nap*. This sarcasm could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the *δικαστὴς νυστάζων* was a common sight. *Cf. Rep.* 405 c, *μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ*. *Cf.* Quint. *Inst.* iv. 1. 73.

29. **εἶτα**: see on *μιμοῦνται* κτέ., 23 c.

31. **οἷος δεδόσθαι**: *cf. Crit.* 46 b. For the inf. without the art., limiting certain adjs. and advs., see GMT. 93; H. 1000.

32. **οὐ γάρ**: see on *καὶ γάρ*, 30 c. — **ἀνθρωπίνῳ**: the neut. used subst. *Cf. Phaed.* 62 d, *ἔοικε τοῦτο ἀτόπῳ*. Commonly the neut. is used predicatively, *e.g. ἔοικε τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι*.

34. **ἀνέχεσθαι ἀμελουμένων**: for the acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT. 112, 2, N. 2; H. 983.

37. **εἰ μέντοι**: *if, to be sure*. *τοί* influences the apod. (*εἶχον ἂν* κτέ.) as well, *then at least I should have some reason*, *i.e.* there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. *Cf.* 34 b, *αὐτοὶ τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν* κτέ.

οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. 31 c

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτε-

31 b **41. οὐχ οἷοί τε**: "They would doubtless make the assertion, *cf.* 19 d; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it." R. The leading idea of the clause *ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι . . . μάρτυρα* is expressed in the partic., not in *ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι*. For cases where *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, used with a partic., does not contain the main idea, *cf.* 28 b, 29 d, *Crit.* 53 c. — **τοῦτο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι**: *sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι*. *ἀπό* in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, *to go to such an extreme with their shamelessness*, or, *to be so absolutely shameless as this*. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 13, *ἀποθύουσιν*, meaning *pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice*.

c **43. τὸν μάρτυρα**: *sc. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὃν παρέχομαι ἱκανός ἐστιν*. *Cf.* 20 e. *ἱκανόν* is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. **ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον**: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty *as in* itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 7), *ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα, ὀκνοῦντα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*. He pointedly asks Charmides: *εἰ δέ τις, δυνατὸς ὢν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πόλιν αὔξειν (advance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὀκνοίη δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δειλὸς νομίζοιτο;* See also *ibid.* i. 6. 15. 31 c

2. **πολυπραγμονῶ**: *am a busybody*. See on *περιεργάζεται*, 19 b. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. *Cf. Gorg.* 526 c, *ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ*. There is a subtle irony in *πολυπραγμονῶ* as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really *πολυπράγμων*. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iii. 11. 16, *καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων (ridiculing) τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην (abstention from business)*, "'Ἀλλ', *ὦ Θεοδότη*," *ἔφη*, "*οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι σχολάσαι (be at leisure)· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν (keep me busy)*." *Cf.* 33 a b.

3. **ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος**: there is no implication, as in 17 d, of *ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα*. The *πλῆθος* commonly assembled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates

ρον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς 31
ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν
τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ d
ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκ
παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ
ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔ-
ποτε· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.
καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς
ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε e
λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται
οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος
καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον 32

31 c thus would, like every one else, be obliged to ascend. *Cf.* Dem. XVIII. 169, *ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπορεύεσθε καὶ . . . πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω κάθητο.* — **τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον**: see on *τῷ πλήθει*, 21 a.

5. **θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή]**: see Introd. 27, with first N. on p. 21, and 32. *φωνή* is explanatory of the vague *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, and is in the pred.: *a something divine and from God manifests itself to me, a voice.* This thought is earnestly reiterated below in nearly the same words. See App.

d 6. **ὃ δὴ καί**: see on *ὃ δὲ καί*, 28 a. — **ἐπικωμῳδῶν**: Meletus caricatured Socrates's utterances about the *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον* by making them out to be the belief in *καινὰ δαιμόνια*. *Cf.* 26 e.

7. **ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον**: *ever since my boyhood.* This partic. followed by **ἀπό** or **ἐκ**, when time is referred to, corresponds to various idioms, here to *ever since.* The case of the partic. is that of the word which it limits. *Cf. Legg*, ii. 661 b, *ταῦτά ἐστι ἀδίκοις κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας.*

31 d 9. **ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦται πράττειν**: *cf.* 32 b, and see on *μηδὲν ποιεῖν*. — **τοῦτο**: governed by *πράττειν*, which is expressed in the subordinate clause. *Cf. Lach.* 179 a, *ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, to leave them free to do what they wish.*

12. **πάλαι . . . πάλαι**: the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship began as soon as a man was twenty.

13. **ἀπολώλη, ὠφελήκη**: the earlier Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in *-ειν*. G. 119, 4; H. 458 a.

15. **οὐ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὐδενί**: a remarkable repetition of the neg. *Cf.* 34 e.

16. **γνησίως**: *uprightly* or *openly.*

ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσε- 32
20 σθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα./ ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ
5 ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ

32 a

19. **καὶ εἰ**: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that *even* then the conclusion is unassailable; *εἰ καί* (*cf.* 30 e) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. **ἀλλὰ μή**: *and not*. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For *ἀλλά* in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. **οὐ λόγους κτέ.**: as Demosthenes says (II. 12), *ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα* (*deeds*), *ματαιόν τι* (*folly*) *φαίνεται καὶ κενόν*. *Cf. Lach.* 188 c–e, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as *τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ . . . ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία, really living in tune, where a man makes his own life a concord of words and deeds, composed really in the Dorian mode, which is the only true Greek harmony.*—**ὃ ὑμεῖς κτέ.**: the audience as representing the Athenians in general. "You appreciate facts only, there is no nonsense about you." Here appears what amounts to the common *τόπος* of rehearsing a man's services in his own defence, of which practice Lysias (XII. 38) says, *οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὐτῷ προσήκει ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἐστί, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα λέγοντες* (*raising side issues*) *ἐνίοτε ἐξαπατῶσιν, ὑμῖν ἀποδεικνύντες ὡς στρατιῶται ἀγαθοί εἰσιν κτέ.* For another instance of this practice indulged in, *cf.* 28 e–29 a. 32 a

3. **οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί**: stronger than *οὐδενί ἄν*. *Cf. Gorg.* 512 e, *τὴν εἱμαρμένην* (*fate*) *οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι*, and *ibid.* 521 c, *ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν . . . , How confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things!* G. 77, 1, N. 2; H. 290 a.

4. **ὑπεικάθοιμι**: second aor. opt. from *ὑπείκειν* with *αθ* appended to the stem, *i.e. ὑπεικ-*. G. 119, 11; H. 494 and a. The present *ὑπεικάθειν*, like *διωκάθειν* (*διώκειν*), *ἀμυνάθειν* (*ἀμύνειν*) and *σχέθειν* (*ἔχειν*), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this *θ* adds strength to the meaning of *ὑπείκειν*. In certain cases this *θ* is appended in the pres. *τελέθειν, φαέθειν, φλεγέθειν*. *Cf.* Curt. *Griech. Etym.* pp. 62 and 63.

5. **ἅμα ἀπολοίμην**: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary *ἄν* gets itself supplied from *οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί* above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes *ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἄν*; Riddell defends Ast's conjecture, *ἅμα κἄν*. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App. — **φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά**: *cheap and tedious commonplaces*, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,

δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν 32
ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· b
καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε

32 a by way of reproof, says to Socrates (*Gorg.* 482 e) σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν φορτικά. *Cf. Rep.* ii. 367 a, ταῦτα . . . Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. For δημηγορικά, which has the sense of *in bad taste, cf. Gorg.* 494 c, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates's remarks, says ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. See also on κεκαλλιεπημένους, 17 c. It was common in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth. This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

b 7. **ἐβούλευσα δέ**: *but I was chosen to the senate, i.e.* the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate's chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία (*assembly*). A preliminary decree (προβούλευμα) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. **ἔτυχεν . . . πρυτανεύουσα**: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each φυλή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 36 days, *i.e.* one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρυτάνεις during its term of office) one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπιστάτης held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 B.C., the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόεδροι, whom the ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by lot from the non-prytanising tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates's time, the φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, and the ἐπιστάτης of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζειν) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the δῆμος Ἀλωπεκή, in the φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of Ἀντιοχὶς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial. — **ὅτε ὑμεῖς κτέ.**: after the Athenian success off the islands called Arginusae, in 406 B.C. This battle is also spoken of as ἡ περὶ Λέσβον ναυμαχία, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 32–35. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in failing to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded "not guilty." The squad-

32 b

λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ 30
τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς
ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, Ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή,
65 καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι. c

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως

30 b common sense as we have, *Euthyph.* 15 a, *Rep.* ii. 366 c, 375 c–e, 379 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, *Rep.* x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά: this ταῦτα, *all this*, covers more ground than the ταῦτα above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. "If *this* corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true." With εἰ διαφθείρω, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, *cf.* εἰ ὠφελοῦσιν, 25 b, where see note.

63. πρὸς ταῦτα: *wherefore.*

65. ὡς ἐμοῦ κτέ.: *knowing that I should never alter my ways.* ποιήσοντος ἄν represents ποιήσω ἄν. GMT. 41, 4; H. 845 and 861. *Cf.* Dem. xix. 342, τοὺς ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐκείνῳ ποιήσοντας ἀνῃρηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσεσθε. See on διαφθαρήσονται, 29 c. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the εἰ μέλλω used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 25, 2; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with ἄν, see GMT. 54, 1 *b*; H. 901 a. 30 b

66. πολλάκις: *many times* or *many deaths.* The Eng. idiom like the Greek requires no definite specification such as "to die a hundred deaths." In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. *Cf.* ἀκήκοας μυριάκις ἀγὼ βούλομαι, Ar. *Nub.* 738; ἔτνους (*for pea-soup?*); βαβαιὰξ, μυριάκις ἐν τῷ βίῳ, *Ran.* 63. *Cf.* τρισάσμενος, quoted from Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not unnaturally uses μυριάκις where he exclaims (ix. 65), τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου. — **τεθνάναι**: the absolute contradictory of ζῆν, here used rather than the somewhat weaker ἀποθνῄσκειν. This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. *Cf.* 39 e, 43 d, and the similar use of καλεῖν and κεκλῆσθαι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐγνωκέναι, μιμνήσκειν and μεμνῆσθαι, κτᾶσθαι and κεκτῆσθαι. c

XVIII. 2. **οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν**: he asked them μὴ θορυβεῖν. See above on θορυβεῖν, 17 d, and on μὴ θορυβήσητε, 20 e.

3. **καὶ γάρ, μέλλω γάρ, εὖ γὰρ ἴστε**: the first γάρ is closely connected with ἀκούειν, the second goes back to the leading clause μὴ θορυβεῖν and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three

βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, 30
ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ
μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλά-
ψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο·
οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος d
βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ
ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος
τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ-
λον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν
ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω
ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ'
ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν
ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, e

30 c times already. The third *γάρ*, *now*, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of *γάρ* after prons. and advs., *e.g.* 31 **b** after *ἐνθένδε*, and in general after any prefatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in *τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς*, 20 **e**. *γάρ* with this force is esp. freq. after *ὃ δὲ* (*τὸ δὲ*) *μέγιστον*, *δεινότατον*, also after *σημεῖον δέ*, *τεκμήριον δέ* and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. βοήσεσθε: this is more than a disturbance (*θορυβεῖν*); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτὸν ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ βλάπτεσθαι: *cf.* 21 **b**. *θεμιτόν* takes the dat., and, after the analogy of *ἔξεστιν*, an inf. (*βλάπτεσθαι*) is added. The pass. *βλάπτεσθαι* makes this const. appear more unusual than *e.g.* in *Phaedo*, 67 **b**, *μὴ καθαρῷ* (*unclean*) *γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ*. For the import of the words *θέμις* and *θεμιτόν*, see on *οὐ γὰρ θέμις*, 21 **b**.

10. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἄν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν: 30 d *ἀποκτείνειν* is used here secondarily of the *δικασταί* and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. *ἀτιμία* involved the forfeiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the *ἄτιμος* was looked upon by the state as dead, *i.e.* he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. *Cf. Rep.* viii. 553 **b**, *εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα*. See App.

11. ἄλλος τίς που: *many another*. See on *ἄλλος*, 28 **e**.

15. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν: *cf.* Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, *Euthyph.* 5 **b c**, *εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε* (*ὁ Μέλητος*), *εὕροιμ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός* (*rotten*) *ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.*

οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό- 30
τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ], ὥσπερ
ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθε-
στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπό μύωπός τινος· οἷον
δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν
τινα ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκα-

30 e

18. **ἀτεχνῶς ... προσκείμενον**: added instead of a clause with *οἷος* to explain *τοιοῦτον*. See on *οἷος δεδόσθαι*, 31 a. — **εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν**: *though it sounds rather absurd to say so*, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech." This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. *προσκείμενον* is the regular pass. of *προστιθέναι*. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. **ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος**: *by a gadfly*. For this word, *cf.* Aesch. *Supp.* 307, 308, *βοηλάτην* (*ox-driving*) *μύωπα κινητήριον* (*urging on*), *οἶστρον* (*gadfly*) *καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλου πέλας*. Also in the *Prometheus* Io's tormentor is called *οἶστρος* (567) and *ὀξύστομος μύωψ* (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a *ἱππηλάτης μύωψ*. Notice how humorously (*γελοιότερον*) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the *μύωψ* is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (*προσκαθίζων*), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (*οἱ νυστάζοντες*). Then they make an impatient dash (*κρούσαντες*) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, *cf.* Verg. *Aen.* vi. 90, nec Teucris addita Juno|Usquam aberit. *μύωψ* is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of *spur*. See App. — **τινός**: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is startling. — **οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ... προστεθεικέναι**: lit. *in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state, — such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc.*, a repetition of *προσκείμενον* [*ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that *οἷον* really refers not to the *μύωψ* simply but to the *μύωψ* engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by *τοιοῦτόν τινα* and the explanatory clause with *ὅς*.

23. **ὀνειδίζων ἕκαστον**: *ὀνειδίζειν* alone requires the dat. *Cf. Il.* ii. 254, *τῷ νῦν Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν ἦσαι ὀνειδίζων*, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of *πείθων*; both *πείθων* and *ὀνειδίζων* are however introduced simply to explain *ἐγείρων*, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. **τὴν ἡμέραν ... προσκαθίζων**: this specifies the means by which the

30 e

31 a

στον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθί- 31
ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄν-
δρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως
τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι,
κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτεί-
ναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ
μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν.
ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρω- b
πίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι
καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη,
τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα
ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμε-
λεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνον
καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα
λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλ-
λα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε

31 a process of awakening, indicated by the three preceding partics., was made possible. Pres. and aor. partics. express the means, as the fut. partic. expresses purpose. GMT. 109; H. 969.

26. **ἴσως τάχ' ἄν**: *may be perhaps*, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of *ῥᾳδίως* is well indicated by the repetition of the *ἄν*, which has already served to emphasize *κρούσαντες*. Notice, however, that grammatically it is required only once and goes with the verb of the apod. *ἀποκτείναιτε*. See on *ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν*, 17 d.

27. **ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες** *κτέ.*: *like men disturbed in their nap.* This sarcasm could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the *δικαστὴς νυστάζων* was a common sight. *Cf.* Rep. 405 c, *μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ*. *Cf.* Quint. *Inst.* iv. 1. 73.

29. **εἶτα**: see on *μιμοῦνται κτέ.*, 23 c.

31. **οἷος δεδόσθαι**: *cf. Crit.* 46 b. For the inf. without the art., limiting certain adjs. and advs., see GMT. 93; H. 1000.

32. **οὐ γάρ**: see on *καὶ γάρ*, 30 c. — b **ἀνθρωπίνῳ**: the neut. used subst. *Cf. Phaed.* 62 d, *ἔοικε τοῦτο ἀτόπῳ*. Commonly the neut. is used predicatively, *e.g. ἔοικε τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι*.

34. **ἀνέχεσθαι ἀμελουμένων**: for the acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT. 112, 2, N. 2; H. 983.

37. **εἰ μέντοι**: *if, to be sure.* *τοί* influences the apod. (*εἶχον ἄν κτέ.*) as well, *then at least I should have some reason, i.e.* there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. *Cf.* 34 b, *αὐτοὶ τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν κτέ.*

οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. 31 c

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτε-

31 b **41. οὐχ οἷοί τε**: "They would doubtless make the assertion, *cf.* 19 **d**; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it." R. The leading idea of the clause *ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι . . . μάρτυρα* is expressed in the partic., not in *ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι*. For cases where *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, used with a partic., does not contain the main idea, *cf.* 28 **b**, 29 **d**, *Crit.* 53 **c**. — **τοῦτο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι**: *sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι*. *ἀπό* in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, *to go to such an extreme with their shamelessness*, or, *to be so absolutely shameless as this*. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 13, *ἀποθύουσιν*, meaning *pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice*.

c **43. τὸν μάρτυρα**: *sc. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὃν παρέχομαι ἱκανός ἐστιν*. *Cf.* 20 **e**. *ἱκανόν* is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. **1. ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον**: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 7), *ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα, ὀκνοῦντα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*. He pointedly asks Charmides: *εἰ δέ τις, δυνατὸς ὢν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πόλιν αὔξειν (advance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὀκνοίη δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δειλὸς νομίζοιτο;* See also *ibid.* i. 6. 15. 31 c

2. πολυπραγμονῶ: *am a busybody*. See on *περιεργάζεται*, 19 **b**. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. *Cf. Gorg.* 526 **c**, *ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ*. There is a subtle irony in *πολυπραγμονῶ* as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really *πολυπράγμων*. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* iii. 11. 16, *καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων (ridiculing) τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην (abstention from business)*, "'Αλλ', *ὦ Θεοδότη*," *ἔφη*, "*οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι σχολάσαι (be at leisure)· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν (keep me busy)*." *Cf.* 33 **a b**.

3. ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there is no implication, as in 17 **d**, of *ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα*. The *πλῆθος* commonly assembled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates

ρον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς 31
ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν
τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ d
ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκ
παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ
ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔ-
ποτε· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.
καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς
ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε e
λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται
οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος
καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον 32

31 c thus would, like every one else, be obliged to ascend. *Cf.* Dem. XVIII. 169, ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπορεύεσθε καὶ . . . πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω κάθητο. — **τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον**: see on τῷ πλήθει, 21 a.

5. **θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή]**: see Introd. 27, with first N. on p. 21, and 32. **φωνή** is explanatory of the vague θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, and is in the pred.: *a something divine and from God manifests itself to me, a voice.* This thought is earnestly reiterated below in nearly the same words. See App.

d 6. **ὃ δὴ καί**: see on ὃ δὲ καί, 28 a. — **ἐπικωμῳδῶν**: Meletus caricatured Socrates's utterances about the θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον by making them out to be the belief in καινὰ δαιμόνια. *Cf.* 26 e.

7. **ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον**: *ever since my boyhood.* This partic. followed by **ἀπό** or **ἐκ**, when time is referred to, corresponds to various idioms, here to *ever since.* The case of the partic. is that of the word which it limits. *Cf. Legg*, ii. 661 b, ταῦτά ἐστι ἀδίκοις κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας. 31 d

9. **ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦται πράττειν**: *cf.* 32 b, and see on μηδὲν ποιεῖν. — **τοῦτο**: governed by πράττειν, which is expressed in the subordinate clause. *Cf. Lach.* 179 a, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ἅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, *to leave them free to do what they wish.*

12. **πάλαι . . . πάλαι**: the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship began as soon as a man was twenty.

13. **ἀπολώλη, ὠφελήκη**: the earlier Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in -ειν. G. 119, 4; H. 458 a.

15. **οὐ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὐδενί**: a remarkable repetition of the neg. *Cf.* 34 e.

16. **γνησίως**: *uprightly* or *openly.*

ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσε- 32
σθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ

32 a

19. **καὶ εἰ**: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that *even* then the conclusion is unassailable; *εἰ καί* (*cf.* 30 e) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. **ἀλλὰ μή**: *and not*. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For *ἀλλά* in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. **οὐ λόγους κτέ.**: as Demosthenes says (II. 12), *ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα* (*deeds*), *ματαιόν τι* (*folly*) *φαίνεται καὶ κενόν*. *Cf. Lach.* 188 c–e, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as *τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ . . . ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία, really living in tune, where a man makes his own life a concord of words and deeds, composed really in the Dorian mode, which is the only true Greek harmony.*— **ὃ ὑμεῖς κτέ.**: the audience as representing the Athenians in general. "You appreciate facts only, there is no nonsense about you." Here appears what amounts to the common *τόπος* of rehearsing a man's services in his own defence, of which practice Lysias (XII. 38) says, *οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὐτῷ προσήκει ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἐστί, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ*

32 a

σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα λέγοντες (*raising side issues*) *ἐνίοτε ἐξαπατῶσιν, ὑμῖν ἀποδεικνύντες ὡς στρατιῶται ἀγαθοί εἰσιν κτέ.* For another instance of this practice indulged in, *cf.* 28 e–29 a.

3. **οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί**: stronger than *οὐδενὶ ἄν*. *Cf. Gorg.* 512 e, *τὴν εἱμαρμένην* (*fate*) *οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι*, and *ibid.* 521 c, *ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν . . . , How confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things!* G. 77, 1, N. 2; H. 290 a.

4. **ὑπεικάθοιμι**: second aor. opt. from *ὑπείκειν* with *αθ* appended to the stem, *i.e. ὑπεικ-*. G. 119, 11; H. 494 and a. The present *ὑπεικάθειν*, like *διωκάθειν* (*διώκειν*), *ἀμυνάθειν* (*ἀμύνειν*) and *σχέθειν* (*ἔχειν*), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this *θ* adds strength to the meaning of *ὑπείκειν*. In certain cases this *θ* is appended in the pres. *τελέθειν, φαέθειν, φλεγέθειν*. *Cf.* Curt. *Griech. Etym.* pp. 62 and 63.

5. **ἅμα ἀπολοίμην**: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary *ἄν* gets itself supplied from *οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί* above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes *ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἄν*; Riddell defends Ast's conjecture, *ἅμα κἄν*. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App. — **φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά**: *cheap and tedious commonplaces*, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,

δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν 32
ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· b
καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε

32 a by way of reproof, says to Socrates (*Gorg.* 482 e) σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν φορτικά. *Cf. Rep.* ii. 367 a, ταῦτα . . . Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. For δημηγορικά, which has the sense of *in bad taste*, *cf. Gorg.* 494 c, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates's remarks, says ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. See also on κεκαλλιεπημένους, 17 c. It was common in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth. This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

b 7. **ἐβούλευσα δέ**: *but I was chosen to the senate*, *i.e.* the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate's chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία (*assembly*). A preliminary decree (προβούλευμα) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. **ἔτυχεν . . . πρυτανεύουσα**: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each φυλή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 36 days, *i.e.* one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρυτάνεις during its term of office) one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπιστάτης held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 B.C., the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόεδροι, whom the ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by lot from the non-prytanising tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates's time, the φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, and the ἐπιστάτης of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζειν) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the δῆμος Ἀλωπεκή, in the φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial. — **ὅτε ὑμεῖς κτέ.**: after the Athenian success off the islands called Arginusae, in 406 B.C. This battle is also spoken of as ἡ περὶ Λέσβον ναυμαχία, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 32–35. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in failing to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded "not guilty." The squad- 32 b

ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ 32
τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἅθροους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς
ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος

32 b

ron detailed for this duty had been hindered, they said, by stress of weather. The main fleet went in pursuit of the worsted enemy. The details of the case for and against them cannot satisfactorily be made out, though the reasons are many and strong for thinking them innocent. The illegality of the procedure by which they were condemned is undoubted. They were condemned *ἀνόμως* (1) because judgment was passed upon them *ἀθρόους, i.e. μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας*, — this was illegal, since not only the general practice at Athens, but the decree of Cannonus (*τὸ Καννωνοῦ ψήφισμα*) provided *δίχα* (*apart*) *ἕκαστον κρίνειν*, — (2) because they had not reasonable time allowed them for preparing and presenting their defence. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 5, *βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὐτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον.* See Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 33 ff. and 7; *Mem.* i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2.

9. **τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς**: the round number of all the generals is given here. One of the ten, Archestratus, died at Mitylene, where Conon, another of them, was still blockaded when the battle was fought. Of the remaining eight who were in the battle, two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, flatly refused to obey the summons to return to Athens. Thus only six reached Athens, and these, Pericles, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinides, Aristocrates, and Thrasyllus, were put to death. — **τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας**: not only the dead but those who were floating about in danger of their lives. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 11, *παρῆλθε δέ τις εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων* (*on a meal-barrel*) *σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν* (*enjoined upon*) *δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους* (*those who were drowning*), *ἐὰν σωθῇ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο* (*rescued*) *τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.* *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 2. 3, where *τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων* is equiv. to *τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὄντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.* Here the fuller expression would perhaps be *οὐκ ἀνελομένους ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ναυμαχήσαντάς τε καὶ κακῶς πεπραγότας.* G. 191, N. 6; H. 788 a. For this subst. use of *οἱ ἐκ* with the gen. there are many parallels; such subst. use is common with preps. denoting close relation to their object, — *in, on, from, etc.* Notice the point given to *παρανόμως* by its position; it comes in almost as if it began an independent sent. *Cf. Lach.* 183 **b**, *τοιγάρτοι ὃς ἂν οἴηται γραφὴν παρανόμων καλῶς ποιεῖν . . . εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν εἰκότως.* Xenophon says that the Athenians soon repented of their rash and illegal action. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 35, *καὶ οὐ πόλλῳ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο, οἵτινες τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν* (*deceived*) *προβολὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι* (their case was thus prejudiced by an informal vote of the assembly) *καὶ ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι, ἕως ἂν κριθῶσιν.* The fate of these generals was remembered thirty years afterward by the Athenian admiral Chabrias. He won a great victory off Naxos (B.C. 376) but neglected to pursue the enemy, in order to save the men on the wrecks and bury the dead. *Cf.* Diod. XV. 35.

32 b

τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους 32
[καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἕτοιμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι
με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ
βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με c
δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βου-
λευομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία
ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον
αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος

32 b

12. **ἠναντιώθην**: used absolutely as often. — **μηδὲν ποιεῖν**: after the neg. idea in *ἠναντιώθην*. GMT. 95, 2, N. 1 a; H. 963 and 1029. But *cf.* 31 d e.

13. **καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην**: *and I voted against it, i.e.* allowing the question to be put. See App. Socrates was *ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων* on this day and followed up this opposition, — manifested when in consultation with the other *πρυτάνεις*, — by absolutely refusing to put the question to vote. *Cf. Gorg.* 474 a; Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 8; iv. 4. 2. For a different account of the facts, see Grote's *Greece*, c. 64, *fin.* Connect **ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην** with *μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων*. — **ἐνδεικνύναι, ἀπάγειν**: *ἔνδειξις* and *ἀπαγωγή* were two summary methods of procedure in making prosecutions. Both dispensed with the usual delay, and allowed the magistrates (in *ἔνδειξις*, it was the board of the Thesmothetae; in *ἀπαγωγή*, it was usually the board called *οἱ ἕνδεκα*) to deal summarily with certain charges. *ἔνδειξις* was a form of summary indictment, laying information usually against one who discharged functions or exercised rights for which he was legally disqualified, as when an *ἄτιμος* entered public places in Athens; *ἀπαγωγή* was the summary arrest and giving in charge of a man caught in actual crime. *Cf.* Poll. VIII. 49, *ἡ δὲ ἀπαγωγή, ὅταν τις ὃν ἔστιν ἐνδείξασθαι μὴ παρόντα τοῦτον παρόντα ἐπ' αὐτωφώρῳ λαβὼν ἀπαγάγῃ*. The two processes might therefore be used in the same case. 32 b

14. **τῶν ῥητόρων**: these professional speakers had no class privileges; only their more frequent speaking distinguished them from ordinary citizens.

15. **βοώντων**: *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 12, *τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται*. Apparently the crowd jeered at Socrates. *Cf. Gorg.* 474 a, *πέρυσι (a year ago) βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν*.

16. **μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι**: *to place myself on your side.* c

19. **οἱ τριάκοντα**: they were called the Thirty rather than the Thirty Tyrants. — **αὖ**: *in turn.* Both democracy and oligarchy, however opposed in other respects, agreed in attempting to interfere with the independence of Socrates.

20. **εἰς τὴν θόλον**: *the Rotunda.* The name *σκιάς* was also applied to it from its resemblance to a parasol. *Cf.* Harp. (*s.v. θόλος*) who further says it was the place ὅπου ἐστῶντα

Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις 32
ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον βουλόμενοι ὡς πλεί-
στους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' c
ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ
ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον
μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ
γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα,
ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου
ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾠχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγα-

32 c (*dine*) *οἱ πρυτάνεις*. *Cf.* also Poll. viii. 155, *ἡ θόλος ἐν ᾗ συνεδείπνουν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πεντήκοντα τῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων βουλῆς, ἡ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή*. *Cf. E. M. s.v. θόλος ὀροφὴν εἶχε περιφερῆ οἰκοδομητήν, οὐχὶ ξυλίνην, ὡς τὰ ἄλλα οἰκοδομήματα*. The Thirty used the *θόλος* as their official residence.

21. **Λέοντα**: Leon of Salamis was an Athenian general. He, like Lysias's brother Polemarchus and many others (Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 30), fell a victim of the rapacity of the Thirty. — **οἷα**: *i.e. τοιαῦτα γὰρ*. *Cf.* Cic. *Cat.* III. 10. 25, quale bellum nulla ... barbaria ... gessit. — **δή**: in speaking of an incontrovertible fact, *indeed*. Notice the order of words.

23. **ἀναπλῆσαι**: *implicate*, the Lat. implere, or contaminare. *ἀνάπλεως* is used similarly. *Cf. Phaed.* 67 **a**, *ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ* (*except so far as*) *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως*. With this passage *cf.* especially Antipho, II. **a**, 10, *συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτιούς*. For the facts, *cf.* Lys. XII. 93, *συνωφελεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἠξίουν, συνδιαβάλλεσθαι δ' ἠνάγκαζον*. See also Critias's *speech in the Odeum*, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 9: *δεῖ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τιμῶν μεθέξετε οὕτω καὶ τῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν. τῶν οὖν κατειλεγμένων Ἐλευσινίων καταψηφιστέον ἐστιν, ἵνα ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν καὶ θαρρῆτε καὶ φοβῆσθε*. 32 c

24. **εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν**: a supposition contrary to fact with suppressed apod. used by way of showing hesitation. *Cf.* the same const. in *Euthyd.* 283 **e**, *ὦ ξένε Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν "σοὶ εἰς κεφαλήν," ὅ τι μαθόν μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει κτέ*. The usages of gentle speech at Athens adopted this formula to soften and excuse a strong expression. *Cf. Gorg.* 509 **a**, *ταῦτα ... κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερον εἰπεῖν ἐστί, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις*. The *ἀγροικότερόν τι*, for which Socrates apologizes, is undoubtedly the curt and blunt colloquialism of *μέλει μοι οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν*. Such an apology perhaps would prepare the less sensitive modern for language not less curt and blunt, but far more "colloquial." d

26. **τοῦτου δέ**: pointedly summarizes the preceding clause.

28. **ὥστε**: not the correlative of *οὕτως*, but to be connected immediately with *ἐξέπληξεν*. The idiom *ἐκπλήττειν τινὰ εἴς τι* is similar.

29. **ᾠχοντο, ᾠχόμην**: *went straight*

γον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν 32
διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη·
καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες. e

XXI. Ἆρ' οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι,
εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ
ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλεί-
στου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ 33
βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ
ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ
τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλ-
λοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκα-
λος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος
καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτε-

32 d *off.* The recurrence of the same word only makes more plain the difference of the courses pursued.

31. διὰ ταχέων: a common expression with Thucydides and Xenophon, equiv. to διὰ τάχους. *Cf.* διὰ βραχέων, *Prot.* 339 a; *Gorg.* 449 a. The Thirty were only eight months (June 404–Febr. 403) in power, for they ceased to rule when Critias fell at Munychia in the engagement with Thrasybulus and the returned exiles. In the interim before the restoration of the democracy, ten men, doubtless one for each φυλή, were put in their place. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 23.

e **32. μάρτυρες**: possibly proceedings were here interrupted for these witnesses, though it seems quite as likely that Socrates is appealing to the δικασταί themselves to be his witnesses. Hermann, who thus understands it, reads ὑμῶν instead of ὑμῖν, an unnecessary change.

XXI. **1. ἆρ' οὖν**: by οὖν we are referred to what immediately precedes for our answer to this question. 32 e

2. ἔπραττον: distinctly refers to a continued course, a line of action.

3. τοῖς δικαίοις: *whatever was just*, neut., a concrete way of expressing an abstraction.

5. ἀλλ' ἐγώ: *i.e.* "however it may be with others, as for me, I, *etc.*" 33 a

6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ξυγχωρήσας. This amounts to a very direct appeal to the facts, and may be regarded as a shorter substitute for τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι ὥστε (or οἷος) μηδενὶ ξυγχωρῆσαι, καὶ γὰρ φανοῦμαι μηδενὶ ξυγχωρήσας. For the commoner but more vague idiom, *cf. Crit.* 46 b.

9. ἐγὼ δὲ κτέ.: see Introd. 25, *fin.*

11. τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος: see on πολυπραγμονῶ, 31 c. ἐπιθυμεῖ does not exclude either ἐπεθύμησε or ἐπιθυμήσει, but rather implies them. *Cf.* τυγχάνει in 18 d. The notion of habitual action is conveyed in the form of the same single act indefinitely repeated.

ρος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρή- 33
μματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' b
ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν,
καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω.
καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν
δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ
μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ'
ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ ἄλλοι
πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

33 a 12. **οὐδέ**: applies neither to the *μέν* nor to the *δέ* clause separately, but to their combination. See on *δεινὰ ἂν εἴην*, 28 d.

b 15. **ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν**: characteristic of the Socratic *συνουσία*. See Introd. 19. — **ἀκούειν** *κτέ.*: first *ἀκούειν* is to be construed with *βούληται* (see on *τοῦτο*, 31 d), then *παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἀκούειν* is to be supplied from the preceding. After *παρέχω*, *ἀκούειν*, like *ἐρωτᾶν* above, expresses purpose. See G. 265 and H. 951; also, for the use of the act. voice, see G. 261, 2, Rem.; H. 952 a. Socrates means: I am ready for questions, but if any so wishes he may answer and hear what I then have to say.

16. **τούτων ἐγὼ** *κτέ.*: *ἐγώ* is placed next to *τούτων* for the sake of contrast, while *τούτων*, though it is governed by *τις*, inevitably adheres to *τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι*. This last corresponds as a pass. to *αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν* or *προστιθέναι*. The notion of responsibility is colored, like the Eng. "have to answer for," with the implication of blame. For an account of those whom Socrates had chiefly in mind, see Introd. 24 and 33.

17. **ὑπεσχόμην**: is meant probably as a side thrust at imposing promises like the one attributed to Protagoras about his own teaching in *Prot.* 319 a. Socrates himself followed no profession strictly so called, had no ready-made art, or rules of art, to communicate. His field of instruction was so wide that he can truly say that, in the accepted sense of *διδάσκειν* and *μανθάνειν* at Athens, his pupils got no learning from him. They learned no *μάθημα*, acquired no useful (professional) knowledge. He put them in the way of getting it for themselves. Plato makes Socrates decline to become the tutor of Nicias's son (*Lach.* 207 d). He taught nothing positive, but removed by his searching questions the self-deception which prevented men from acquiring the knowledge of which they were capable. See his successful treatment of the conceited *Εὐθύδημος ὁ καλός*, in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2.

33 b 19. **ἄλλοι πάντες**: not very different in meaning from *ἄλλος τις*, 28 e. It differs from *οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες*, the common reading here, just as *πάντες ἄνθρωποι* (*all conceivable men*) differs from *πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι*. In such cases if the noun alone would not have taken the art., it does not take it when qualified by *πᾶς* and the like. Compare *all others* and *all the others*. Here we have a complete antithesis,

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες 33
πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- c
ναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες
χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς,
οὖσι δ' οὔ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ
φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαν-
τείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ?
ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράτ-
τειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ εὐέλεγκτα.
εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ d
διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι

33 b to ἰδίᾳ, which takes the place of the more usual δημοσίᾳ; Socrates calls attention to the publicity of the places where he talks (*cf.* 17 c) and to the opportunity of conversing with him offered to all alike.

c XXII. 3. **εἶπον**: the ὅτι clause really answers διὰ τί . . . διατρίβοντες; but grammatically it is an appended explanation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is governed by εἶπον. — **ἀκούοντες, ἐξεταζομένοις**: both are in close relation with χαίρουσι; contrast the const. of the same parties. in 23 c.

5. **οὐκ ἀηδές**: *i.e.* ἥδιστον, a case of λιτότης (*simplicity*), or μείωσις (*diminution*), quite like the Eng. *not at all unpleasant.* Such are the common οὐχ ἥκιστα (πάντων μάλιστα) and οὐ πάνυ (*cf. not quite*). Socrates perhaps agreed with La Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*, 31, Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres. — **ὡς ἐγώ φημι**: *as I maintain*, implying not so much that he makes his assertion now as that he now emphatically calls attention to the assertion already made and substantiated. For the analogous use of the pres. expressing continued result of past action, see GMT. 10, N. 4; H. 827. Here φημί almost means *I am maintaining and have maintained.* See on ὅπερ λέγω 21 a, and *cf. Lach.* 193 e, βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον; . . . τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει.

33 c

6. **ἐκ μαντείων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ**: a phrase which suggests that ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου has made room for παντὶ τρόπῳ. The καί before παντί is best rendered by *and generally.* For the facts, *cf.* 21 b and *Crit.* 44 a.

7. **τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη**: *ever at any time at all, any other.*

8. **θεία μοῖρα**: *will of Providence.* What is appointed by the Deity is contrasted with a man's own choice; the phrase freq. qualifies what man attains or enjoys through no effort or desert of his own but almost ἀγαθῇ μοίρᾳ (*by the grace of good luck*). *Cf. Rep.* 493 a; Arist. *Eth.* i. 9. 1.

9. **εὐέλεγκτα**: *easy to prove*, not *easy to disprove.* So ἐλέγχειν means *prove a point by disproving its contradictory.*

10. **εἰ γὰρ δή**: *for if really, i.e.* as we must suppose if Meletus speaks truth.

11. **χρῆν κατηγορεῖν**: ἄν is not required. GMT. 49, 2, N. 3 *a.* The con- d

γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώ- 33
ποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ
κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν
οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ
ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπε-
πόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖ-
σθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς
ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ
δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ e

33 d clusion states an unfulfilled obligation. H. 897. All the prots. here expressed, including εἰ διαφθείρω and εἰ ἐπεπόνθεσαν, belong to the first class (GMT. 49. 1; H. 893), and the apod. χρῆν involves its own unfulfilled condition. GMT. 49, 2, N. 3, Rem. 1. χρῆν together with this implied prot. forms the apod. which goes with εἰ διαφθείρω κτέ. GMT. 55, 1. This prot. is disjunctively elaborated in two parallel clauses, (1) εἴτε ἔγνωσαν, (2) εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον. See on εἴπερ κτέ. 27 d. Instead of εἴτε . . . εἴτε we have εἴτε . . . εἰ δέ (like οὔτε . . . οὐδέ), which gives a certain independence to the second member. Hence it is treated as a condition by itself, and the leading protasis, εἰ διαφθείρω, is substantially repeated in εἴπερ ἐπεπόνθεσαν. *If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting some young men, and have corrupted others, then (if they were doing their duty) they would, supposing some of them convinced on growing older that in their youth I, etc., now stand forth, etc.*

13. **ἀναβαίνοντας**: see on ἐπὶ δικαστήριον, 17 d.

15. **τῶν ἐκείνων**: on the repetition of the art. here, see G. 142, 2; H. 668.

16. **τοὺς προσήκοντας**: Eng. idiom suggests either τῶν προσηκόντων or προσήκοντας without the art. After the detailed enumeration, πατέρας . . . ἄλλους, τοὺς προσήκοντας is introduced appositively to sum up, and therefore the article is used. 33 d

17. **καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι**: combine with μεμνῆσθαι, and the idea is that of μνησικακεῖν, a word which had lately been much used in the political turmoils at Athens. *Cf.* the final agreement between oligarchs and democrats, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 43, ἢ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν.

18. **πάντως**: as in answers, *certainly*. — **ἐνταυθοῖ**: connect with πάρεισιν, which thus denotes the result of παριέναι. We might call it here the perf. of παριέναι. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 2. 2, καὶ λαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα παρῆσαν εἰς Σάρδεις. For the converse, *cf.* 36 c, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦ.α.

19. **Κρίτων**: it is he whose name is given to the well-known dialogue of Plato. See Introd. 62.

20. **δημότης**: see on ἔτυχε πρυτανεύουσα, 32 b. — **Κριτοβούλου**: although his father Crito modestly declares (*Euthyd.* 271 b) that he is thin (σκληφρός) in comparison with his exquisite playmate Clinias (cousin of Alcibiades), Critobulus was famous for his beauty. See Xen. *Symp.* 4. 12 ff.

Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφι- 33
σιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὧν
οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος
ὁ Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου — καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος
τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη
— καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός·

33 d He was one of Socrates's most constant companions. The Oeconomicus of Xenophon is a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. The affection between Socrates and Crito is best shown by the pains taken by the former in furthering Critobulus's education. In the Memorabilia (i. 3. 8 ff.) Socrates indirectly reproves Critobulus by a conversation in his presence held with Xenophon. The same lesson he reinforces (ii. 6. esp. 31 and 32). That it was needed appears from the impetuous character shown by Critobulus in Xenophon's Symposium. *Cf.* 3. 7, τί γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγιστον φρονεῖς (*of what are you proudest?*); ἐπὶ κάλλει, ἔφη. That Critobulus perplexed his father is shown in *Euthyd.* 306 **d**, where, speaking of his sons, Crito says: Κριτόβουλος δ' ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει (*is getting on*) καὶ δεῖταί τινος, ὅστις αὐ- e τὸν ὀνήσει. — **ὁ Σφήττιος**: of the δῆμος Σφηττός in the φυλὴ Ἀκαμαντίς.

21. Αἰσχίνου: like Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes, Aeschines (surnamed ὁ Σωκρατικός) carefully wrote down the sayings of Socrates after the master's death. Three dialogues preserved among the writings of Plato have been attributed to Aeschines the Socratic. The Eryxias possibly is by him, but hardly either the Axiochus or the treatise περὶ ἀρετῆς. Aeschines was unpractical, if we can trust the amusing account given by Lysias (fr. 3) of his attempt to establish, with borrowed money, a τέχνη μυρεψική (*salve-shop*). His failure in this venture may have led him to visit Syracuse, where, according to Lucian (*Parasit.* 32), he won the favor of Dionysius. — **Ἀντιφῶν**: Aeschines and Antiphon here present should not be confused with their more celebrated namesakes, the orators. This Antiphon was of the δῆμος Κηφισιά in the φυλὴ Ἐρεχθηίς, but nothing further is known of him. 33 e

22. Ἐπιγένους: the same whom Socrates saw (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 12) νέον τε ὄντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα. Socrates reproached him then and there for not doing his duty to himself and to his country by taking rational exercise. — **τοίνυν**: *moreover*, a transition. The fathers of some have been named, now he passes on to the case of brothers.

23. ταύτῃ: *i.e.* the one in question.

25. ἐκεῖνός γε: *he at least, i.e.* ὁ ἐκεῖ = ὁ ἐν Ἅιδου, Θεόδοτος, named last but the more remote. *Cf. Euthyd.* 271 **b**, where ἐκεῖνος refers to Critobulus just named. — **αὐτοῦ**: Νικόστρατος, of whom he is speaking. Since his brother is dead, Nicostratus will give an absolutely unbiassed opinion. — **καταδεηθείη**: lit. *deprecari*, but really it means here *overpersuade, i.e.* persuade a man against his better judgment. *Cf.* καταχαρίζεσθαι, 35 **c**.

26. Θεάγης: this brother of Para-

ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλά- 34
των, καὶ Ἀιαντόδωρος οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ
ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μά-
λιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον
μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ
παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου
πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν
ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκεί-
ους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ b

33 e lus is known through *Rep* vi. 496 b, where Plato uses the now proverbial expression, *ὁ τοῦ Θεάγους χαλινός, the bridle of Theages, i.e.* ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Theages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Demodocus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Demodocus is one of the speakers in the Theages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

34 a 27. **Ἀδείμαντος**: son of Aristo and brother of Plato and of Glaucon (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6. 1); both of Plato's brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantus are introduced in the Republic; Adimantus is older, and is represented as not on so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. **Ἀπολλόδωρος**: surnamed *ὁ μανικός* because of his intense excitability. *Cf. Sympos.* 173 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 d, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 c, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor. In the *Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους* (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as *ἐπιθυμήτης μὲν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ (Σωκράτους), ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης (a simpleton)*. Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Acantodorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigenes) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollodorus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison. 34 a

29. **μάλιστα μέν**: *by all means*. In the clause beginning with *εἰ δέ, ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ* is referred to by *τότε* and contrasted with *νῦν παρασχέσθω*.

31. **ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ**: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 165, *παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος, ἕως ἂν εἴπῃς.*" R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (*τὸ ὕδωρ*) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. *Cf.* Lys. xxiii. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15, *καί μοι ἐπίλαβε* (addressed to an officer of the court) *τὸ ὕδωρ*. See App.

35. **γάρ**: calls upon us to draw a b conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (*πάντας βοηθεῖν, κτλ.*) proves my inno-

οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ 34
ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσή-
κοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ'
ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν
ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομ' ἂν ἀπο-
λογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. f
τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, c
εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζό-
μενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν
δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μά-
λιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς,
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων,

34 b cence; for how else can we account for the following? γάρ applies to both clauses αὐτοὶ μέν and οἱ δέ; more especially to the latter. For λόγον ἔχοιεν, see on εἰ μέντοι, 31 b.

37. οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες: this partic., like ἄρχων and συνάρχων, has by usage become substantially a noun. The poets apparently were the first to use partics. in this way. *Cf.* Aesch. *Pers.* 245, ἰόντων τοῖς τεκοῦσι; Eur. *El.* 335, ὁ ἐκείνου τεκών. The participial use and the use as a noun subsisted side by side. *Cf. Legg.* ix. 868 b, τῶν προσηκόντων τῷ τελευτήσαντι, and *ibid.* τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ τελευτήσαντος. GMT. 108, 2; H. 966.

38. ἀλλ' ἤ: see on ἀλλ' ἤ, 20 d.

XXIII. 1. εἶεν δή: this closes the argument proper of the defence, and marks the beginning of the peroration.

2. ἴσως τοιαῦτα: *in much the same strain.*

3. ἀναμνήσθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ: many δικασταί had been defendants.

4. εἰ ἐδεήθη κτέ.: see, esp. for the force of μέν and δέ, on δεινὰ ἂν εἴην, 28 d. — ἐλάττω ἀγῶνα: the μέγιστος ἀγών was one involving a man's franchise and his life. *Cf.* Dem. xxi. 99, παιδία γὰρ παραστήσεται καὶ κλαήσει καὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐξαιτήσεται, and 186, οἶδα τοίνυν ὅτι τὰ παιδία ἔχων ὀδυρεῖται (*the defendant will bring his children and burst into lamentations*) καὶ πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ταπεινοὺς ἐρεῖ, δακρύων καὶ ὡς ἐλεεινότατον ποιῶν αὑτόν. For another appeal which was customary in Athenian courts, see on οὐ λόγους and φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά, 32 a. 34 c

6. παιδία αὐτοῦ: see App.

8. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα: *and then finds that I.* To be sure Socrates had enough friends and to spare who were present in court, but he refused to make such wrongful use of their presence and sympathy. ἄρα implies that any one who knew Socrates of course would be surprised at such unseemliness where he was concerned.

ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα 34
ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς
αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις
ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει — οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, d
ἐπιεικὴ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ
ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης
πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ
υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη,
δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβα-
σάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν
οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω e

34 c 9. **ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι**: of course Socrates is far from believing himself that the risk he runs is a desperate one.

10. **αὐθαδέστερον σχοίη**: *would be too easily offended*, more lit. represented by *more (than otherwise) self-willed*. The *δικασταί* might easily be too proud to submit to criticism of their own conduct in like cases; the more so because Socrates said that he was too proud (*cf.* e below) to follow their example. *Cf.* La Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*, 34, Si nous avions point d'orgueil, nous ne nous plaindrions point de celui des autres.

11. **αὐτοῖς τούτοις**: causal. — **εἰ δή**: see on *εἰ δή*, 29 b.

d 12. **γὰρ**: "(I say *if*,) for though I do not expect it of you yet (making the supposition) *if* it should be so." The force of *εἰ δ' οὖν* is resumptive.

13. **ἐπιεικῆ**: *not harsh, i.e.* conciliatory.

14. **καὶ οἰκεῖοι**: "I am not alone in the world, but I too have relatives." — **τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου**: this idiom (with the gen. of the proper name) is 34 d common in quotations. No verb is expressed, and the quotation is in apposition with *τοῦτο, etc.* *Cf. Theaet.* 183 e, *Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε*. This const. is not confined to quotations. *Cf.* the freq. use of *δυοῖν θάτερον* as in *Phaed.* 66 e, *δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν*. The quotation is from Hom. *Od.* xix. 163, *οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης*.

16. **καί, καί**: not correlative. The first *καί* means *also*, while the second introduces a particular case under *οἰκεῖοι* and means *indeed* or *even*.

17. **τρεῖς**: not added attrib. but appositively, *three of them*. Their names were Lamprocles (Xen. *Mem.* ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. Diog. Laert. II. 26; *Phaed.* 116 b.

20. **αὐθαδιζόμενος**: *it is not in a vein of self-will or stubbornness*. See on c above.

21. **εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἔχω κτέ.**: e

πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ 34
ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι
ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν πόιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔ-
νομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν
δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ 35
εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ἠτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται,
αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας,
ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργα-
ζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦν-
ται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ

34 e *whether I can look death in the face or not.* At this point the grammatical consistency breaks down. ἀλλά ought to be followed by a partic. (*οἰόμενος* perhaps), but *οὔ μοι δοκεῖ* is the only trace of it. See on *ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει*, 21 e. The anacoluthon (H. 1063) is resorted to because Socrates wishes to mention his real motive, and yet to avoid saying bluntly "I am too brave to do anything so humiliating." Having said *εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως κτέ.* the next clause (*πρὸς δ' οὖν κτέ.*) shapes itself accordingly.

22. **ἄλλος λόγος**: *another question* or matter. *Cf.* Dem. IX. 16, *εἰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἢ μηδὲν ὑμῖν αὐτῶν ἔμελλεν, ἄλλος ἂν εἷς λόγος οὗτος.* — **δ' οὖν**: *but at all events* or *at any rate*, like certe after sive — sive. See on *δ' οὖν*, 17 a.

24. **οὐδέν**: see on *ἀποτρέπει*, 31 d. — **τοῦτο τοὔνομα**: *sc. σοφός.* See on *ὄνομα δὲ κτέ.*, 23 a. Socrates purposely avoids using the word *σοφός* either here or below.

25. **ψεῦδος**: used as the contrary of the adj. *ἀληθές*. *Cf. Euthyd.* 272 a, *ἐάν τε ψεῦδος, ἐάν τε ἀληθὲς ᾖ*. Sometimes it is even used attrib. with a noun. *Cf. Polit.* 281 b, *παράδοξόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὄνομα*. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* IX. 115, *ὦ γέρον, οὔτι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατελέξας.* — **ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι**: *however that may be, people have arrived at the opinion. Cf. Prot.* 327 c, *ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γοῦν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας* (*non-professionals*).

26. **τό**: used here to indicate that what follows is quoted. G. 141, N. 7.

35 a 27. **οἱ δοκοῦντες**: *those generally reputed.* Here Socrates may have had Pericles in mind, if Plutarch's gossip is truth. *Cf. Pericl.* 32. 3, *Ἀσπασίαν μὲν οὖν ἐξητήσατο, πολλὰ πάνυ παρὰ τὴν δίκην, ὡς Αἰσχίνης φησίν, ἀφεὶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς δάκρυα καὶ δεηθεὶς τῶν δικαστῶν, he begged Aspasia off, though Aeschines says it was by a flagrant disregard of justice, by weeping for her and beseeching the jurymen.*

32. **ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων**: the subj. of this gen. abs. is the same as that of *ἀποθανοῦνται*. This is not the regular const., for usually the gen. abs. expresses a subord. limitation, and clearness demands an independent subj. Here, and in many cases where it introduces an independent idea, it depends

ἀποκτείνητε· οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περι- 35
άπτειν, ὥστ' ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ δια-
35 φέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε b
ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι
γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁτιοῦν
εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
40 αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ
ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν
πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν
μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀπο- c
φεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια,
5 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι

35 a on the leading clause for its subj. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 4. 12, καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτοῖς χρήματα διδῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις μετὰ Κύρου ἀναβᾶσι . . . καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐπὶ μαχῇ ἰόντων. G. 183 and 278, 1, N.; H. 972 a d.

b 36. **οὗτοι**: a very pointed reiteration.

39. **ἡμεῖς, ὑμᾶς**: the defendant and the δικασταί. *Cf.* c below.

40. **τοῦ εἰσάγοντος**: *the one who, etc.*, or '*him who*,' here conveying the notion of quality, *the man so shameless as to.* G. 276, 2; H. 966. The phrase is borrowed from the stage. *Cf. Legg.* viii. 838 c, ὅταν ἢ Θυέστας ἢ τινας Οἰδίποδας εἰσάγωσιν.

XXIV. 1. **χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, οὐδὲ δίκαιον**: after the unseemly practice has been condemned by reference to τὸ καλόν (δόξα), it is found still more inconsistent with τὸ δίκαιον, and this is conclusive against it. The second οὐδέ (with ἀποφεύγειν) is merely *the idiomatic* correlative of the first one. On the argument involved, see 35 b Introd. 71, *fin.*

3. **διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν**: perhaps c the full idea would be, διδάσκειν καὶ διδάξαντα (or διδάσκοντα) πείθειν. For, strictly speaking, πείθειν may be the result of mere entreaties, but this Socrates would probably have called βιάζεσθαι rather than πείθειν. *Cf.* d below.

4. **ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι**: this explains ἐπὶ τούτῳ. καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον, "make a present of justice." Notice the evil implication of κατά in composition.

5. **ὀμώμοκεν**: part of the oath taken by the δικασταί was, καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν. The orators were always referring to this oath. *Cf.* Aeschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 6, *etc.* See Introd. p. 49, note 2. *Cf.* also the sentiment, grateful to Athenian hearers, with which Iolaus be-

οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν 35
χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· 35
οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με,
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ
μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως
τε μέντοι νὴ Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Με- d
λήτου τουτουΐ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ
δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ
ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγο-

c gins his appeal to Demophon, king of Athens, Eur. *Heracl.* 181 ff., ἀναξ ὑπάρχει μὲν τόδ' ἐν τῇ σῇ χθονί, | εἰπεῖν ἀκοῦσαι τ' ἐν μέρει πάρεστί μοι,| κοὐδείς μ' ἀπώσει πρόσθεν, ὥσπερ ἄλλοθεν. οὐ belongs to ὀμώμοκεν not to the inf., for otherwise the negative would be μή and not οὐ. (*Cf. Phaedr.* 236 e, ὄμνυμι γάρ σοι . . . ἦ μὴν . . . μηδέποτέ σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς ἐπιδείξειν). *He has sworn not that he will, etc., but that he will, etc.* See Dr. Gildersleeve's article in the *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. I. p. 49.

7. ἐθίζεσθαι: *allow yourselves to be habituated.*

8. ἡμῶν: includes both the speaker and the court referred to above by ἡμᾶς and ὑμᾶς respectively.

9. ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι: notice the order. Socrates adds μήτε ὅσια last because he remembers the ἐπιορκεῖν above. Perjury involves wrong to the gods named in the violated oath, hence οὐδέτεροι ἂν εὐσεβοῖεν.

10. ἄλλως . . . καί: the hyperbaton (H. 1062) consists in interrupting the familiar phrase ἄλλως τε καί to make room for μέντοι νὴ Δία, after which ἄλλως is forgotten and πάντως is brought in with καί, *ten thousand times less so too because I actually, etc.* See App. There is an intended humor in this accumulated agony of emphasis which leads up to what Socrates has called Meletus's practical joke. *Cf.* 26 e, δοκεῖ νεότητι γράψασθαι and 27 a, τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος. *Cf.* also the ironical allusions to this charge throughout the Euthyphro, particularly (3 b) φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν (almost, *manufacturer*) εἶναι θεῶν, and (16 a) οὐκέτι αὐτοσχεδιάζω (*deal at random*) οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ (*have new-fangled notions*) περὶ αὐτά (τὰ θεῖα).

12. πείθοιμι καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοί- d μην: a double opposition which forcibly brings out (1) the absurdity of doing any real violence (βιάζεσθαι is a strong word) by simple entreaties, (2) the incompatibility between πείθειν and βιάζεσθαι. All this gives in a nutshell the drift of Socrates's earnest objection to the practice of irrelevant appeals for pity and mercy. For the full force of βιάζεσθαι, *cf. Rep.* vi. 488 d, ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι, (*by persuasion or by violence*) τὸν ναύκληρον.

13. θεοὺς . . . εἶναι: extraordinarily separated, giving great emphasis to εἶναι. The whole arrangement of words here is intended to arrest the attention and thus prevent their important meaning from being slighted.

ροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ 35
οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς
τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖ-
ναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, e
ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ 36

35 d

15. **πολλοῦ δεῖ** κτέ.: *this is far from (lacks much of) being the case (so).*

17. **ἐπιτρέπω τῷ θεῷ**: *cf.* 42 a, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. Socrates sees a divine providence in any decision that may be rendered, and concludes his plea with words of submission.

18. **ἄριστα**: what Socrates understood to be ἄριστον for every man may be read in the Euthydemus (279 a–281 e), where Socrates discusses happiness with Clinias; and at the end of the Phaedrus in his prayer: ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν (*within*)· ἔξωθεν (*outward acts and fortunes*) δ' ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων. — **καὶ ὑμῖν**: he is loyal to the δικασταί; since they represent Athens, they are his friends. *Cf.* the words of Phaedrus at the end of the prayer, καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

XXV. Here ends Socrates's plea in answer to Meletus, Anytus, and Lyco. But much remained to be discussed and decided before the case was disposed of. The pleadings in a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας, like those in a γραφὴ παρανόμων, were (1) a speech of the prosecution, (2) a speech of the defendant in reply, (3) a vote on the defendant's guilt or innocence. This would end the matter if the defendant were acquitted. But the judges found a verdict of guilty against Socrates. After such a verdict there remained always (4) a speech from the prosecution urging the penalty already proposed or a compromise, and (5) a speech on behalf of the defendant in which he actually proposed some penalty to be inflicted (ἀντιτίμησις) in place of his opponent's. *Cf.* Aeschin. III. 197 f. After c. XXIV. comes the verdict of the δικασταί, which is followed by the τίμησις of Meletus. Then with c. XXV. begins the ἀντιτίμησις of Socrates. Then comes the final vote fixing the penalty. See Introd. 74.

35 d

1. **τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν**: the inf. with e the art. is placed at the beginning of the clause, and depends upon a word of prevention expected instead of ξυμβάλλεται. "Many things contribute toward my not grieving," *i.e.* prevent me from grieving. G. 263, 2, and 160, 1; H. 961. *The fact that I feel no disposition to make an outcry, results from many causes, etc. Cf.* Rep. i. 331 b, τὸ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι . . . μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται, where the parallel is complete except that, because of the long and intricate specifications (omitted in quot.

μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε 36
τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων
τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾠόμην ἔγωγε
οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς
ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπε-
φεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀπο-
πέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον

35 e above), there is a repetition of the inf. in *εἰς τοῦτο*.

36 a 2. **ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε**: a definition of *τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι*.

3. **καὶ ... γέγονε**: a departure from the beaten track. *καὶ ὅτι οὐκ κτέ.*, though regular, would have been cumbrous. The important fact detaches itself from any connective like *ὅτι*. This is often the case in clauses connected with *τέ ... καί*, *οὔτε ... οὔτε*, *μέν ... δέ*. See on *ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει*, 21 e, and *διαφθείρουσιν*, 25 b. — **οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον**: *no surprise, i.e.* not unexpected. Compare *ᾠόμην* just below almost in the sense of *ἤλπιζον*. The use of *ἔλπις* and *ἐλπίζειν* and the like to express expectation, without reference to the pleasure or pain involved in the event expected, is common enough in Greek; sometimes even the context makes the expectation one of pain or harm to come. In English, hope is rarely used in the sense of mere expectation, but *cf. Rich. III.* ii. 4, I hope he is much grown since last I saw him; *Mer. of Ven.* ii. 2, As my father, being I hope an old man, shall fruitify unto you.

6. **οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον**: *so close*. *οὕτως* is separated from *ὀλίγον* by *παρά*, a case of apparent hyperbaton. See on *ἄλλως τε κτέ.*, 35 d. The combination *παρ' ὀλίγον* is treated as inseparable, because the whole of it is required to express the idea "a little beyond," *i.e. close*. The whole idea of *by a small* 36 a *majority* is qualified by *οὕτως*. The *ὀλίγον* was thirty votes. *Cf.* Dem. xxiv. 138, *Φιλίππου τὸν Φιλίππου τοῦ ναυκλήρου υἱὸν μικροῦ* (*almost*) *μὲν ἀπεκτείνατε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἀντιτιμωμένου παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους* (*within a small majority*) *ἠτιμώσατε*. The subj. of *ἔσεσθαι* is of course to be supplied from *τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν*. — **ὡς ἔοικεν**: used freq. (like the Eng. "as it appears") in cases even of the greatest certainty.

7. **εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.**: strictly speaking 31. Diog. L. ii. 5. 41, says: *κατεδικάσθη, διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα μιᾷ πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν* (*sc. ψήφων*). The total number of votes against him was therefore 281; so that 220 of the 501 *δικασταί* (see Introd. 66) must have voted in his favor. Socrates probably counted the numbers roughly, as he heard them, and said that thirty votes would have turned the scale. When Aeschines was acquitted of the charge of *παραπρεσβεία*, *betrayal of trust when on an embassy*, brought by Demosthenes, his majority is said to have been also thirty votes. For Demosthenes, as here for Socrates, such defeat was, under the circumstances, victory. See Introd. 72.

8. **ἀποπέφευγα**: *i.e.* alone, Meletus could not have got 100 votes, since with two helpers he failed to get 300.

τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμὰς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων. 36 b

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονο-

36 a 10. **εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη**: for the accusers and their respective importance, see Introd. 30. Notice *ἀνέβη . . . κατηγορήσοντες*.

11. **χιλίας δραχμάς**: see Introd. 72.

b — **τὸ πέμπτον μέρος**: (*cf.* Dem. XVIII. 103, *τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐκ ἔλαβεν*) *the* indispensable fifth part, not *a* fifth part. The acc. is used because the whole fifth is meant. *Cf. Prot.* 329 e, *μεταλαμβάνουσιν . . . τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο οἱ δὲ ἄλλο.* Xen. *An.* iv. 5. 5, *οὐ προσίεσαν πρὸς τὸ πῦρ τοὺς ὀψίζοντας, εἰ μὴ μεταδοῖεν αὐτοῖς πυρούς . . . ἔνθα δὴ μετεδίδοσαν ἀλλήλοις ὧν εἶχον ἕκαστοι.*

XXVI. 1. **τιμᾶται θανάτου**: *fixes my penalty at death.* See Introd. 73. For the omission of the art. when *θάνατος* means the penalty of death, *cf.* 37 b, and see on *τοῦ θανάτου*, 28 c.

2. **ὑμῖν**: ethical dat. G.184, 3; H.770.

3. **ἢ δῆλον κτέ.**: with *ἤ* (an) is appended the interrogative answer to the first question, which is merely rhetorical. — **τῆς ἀξίας**: *sc. τιμῆς*. This ellipsis is so common that *ἡ ἀξία* is treated as a noun; here *τιμῆς* may easily be supplied from the verb. On *παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι*, see Introd. 74.

4. **ὅ τι μαθών**: strictly speaking, this is the indir. form of *τί μαθών*, which hardly differs from *τί παθών*. GMT. 109, N. 7 *b*; H. 968 c. Both idioms ask, with astonishment or disapproval, for the reason of an act. They resemble two English ways of asking 'why?' 'what possessed (*μαθών*) you?' 'what came over (*παθών*) you?' So *ὅ τι μαθών* = an emphatic *because*. The indir. question here is loosely connected with the leading clause. Such connexion as there is depends upon the notion of deciding a question implied in *τί ἄξιος . . . ἀποτῖσαι*, "what sort of a penalty do I deserve to pay *since the question involved is what possessed me*," etc. This is more striking than the regular phrase *οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων* or *ἀγαγών*. *Cf. Euthyd.* 299 **a**, *δικαιότερον ἂν τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι ὅ τι παθὼν σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν.* — **ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας**: this is more fully explained below by *ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦα*, for which see on 9 below.

36 b 5. **ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί**: *sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται*, supplied from *ἀμελήσας*. *Cf.* Hdt. vii. 104, *ἀνώγει δὲ τώὐτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντες ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι (sc. κελεύων)*. **ἕκαστος** is often to be supplied from **οὐδείς**. For a similar ellipsis, see Hom. *Od.* vi. 193, *οὔτ' οὖν ἐσθῆτος δεινήσεαι οὔτέ τευ ἄλλου | ὧν ἐπέοικ ἱκέτην ταλαπείριον ἀντιάσαντα (sc. μὴ δεύεσθαι)*. Socrates's specifications cover both public and private life.

μίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 36
ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον
εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σῴζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ c
ἦα, οἳ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφε-
λος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον [ἰὼν] εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγί-
στην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκα-
στον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος
καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς
τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

36 b 6. **καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν** κτέ.: *and magistracies besides and plots and factions.* ἄλλων is attrib. to ἀρχῶν ξυνωμοσιῶν, and στάσεων. *Cf. Phaedo*, 110 e, καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις (*as well as in animals*) τε καὶ φυτοῖς. Homer uses a similar idiom, *Od.* i. 132, πὰρ δ' αὐτὸς κλισμὸν θέτο ποίκιλον ἔκτοθεν ἄλλων μνηστήρων. Socrates means to include all performances which bring a citizen into public life; he talks of responsible public offices as on a par with irresponsible participation in public affairs. Of course στρατηγία is a public office, and among the most important; but δημηγορία is not so, even in the case of the ῥήτορες. For the facts, *cf.* 32 b.

7. **ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων**: the former relates to political factions, the so-called ἑταιρίαι, instituted to overthrow the existing government, the latter to revolutions, whether from democracy to oligarchy, or from oligarchy to democracy. Such combinations and seditions were rife toward the end of the Peloponnesian war. See Grote, c. LXV.

8. **ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτόν** κτέ.: freq. the pron. is not given, and then the const. is different. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 4. 20, ἱκανοὶ ἡγησάμενοι εἶναι . . . ταῦτα πράττειν κτέ. Like the present case is *Soph.* 234 e, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι. 36 b

9. **εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα**: the reading ὄντα can hardly be defended. See App.

11. **ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ** κτέ.: *but toward privately benefiting individuals.* This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας, which, though ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα furnishes its verb, still requires a positive expression to explain οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον. ἐνταῦθα, as is often the case with οὗτος, is resumptive, and restates ἐπὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον κτέ. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ἰών comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, 19 e. c

13. **μὴ πρότερον** κτέ.: *cf.* 30 a b.

14. **πρὶν ἐπιμεληθείη**: πρίν takes the opt. on the principle of oratio obliqua, since the tense of the leading verb (ἦα) is secondary. GMT. 67, 1; 66, 2, N. 1; H. 924.

15. **ὅπως ἔσοιτο**: GMT. 45; H. 885 a.

16. **τῶν τε ἄλλων**: not a third specification in line with μήτε . . . μήτε, but connected with the whole μὴ πρό-

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγα- 36 d
θόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν
πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεο-
μένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ
ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς
τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλ-
λον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν
Ὀλυμπίασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν
εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ e

36 c τερον . . . πόλεως. — **κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον**: repeats ἐκ παραλλήλου the thought conveyed by οὕτω, which points back to μὴ πρότερον . . . πρίν, *i.e.* so that what was essential might not be neglected in favor of what is unessential.

d 17. **τί οὖν** κτέ.: a return to the question asked above, with omission of what does not suit the new connexion. Notice in the next line the position of δεῖ, which is emphasized by the γέ that follows, *if you insist that, etc.*

20. **ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ**: *a poor man who has richly served the state.* He is poor, and therefore needs the σίτησις, which he deserves because he is an εὐεργέτης. εὐεργέτης was a title of honor, bestowed under special circumstances upon citizens and non-citizens.

22. **μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως**: with colloquial freedom Socrates combines two idioms οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ and ὅτι πρέπει οὕτως ὡς. See App.

23. **ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι**: those entertained by the state (1) were invited once or (2) were maintained permanently. Socrates is speaking of (2), *i.e. maintenance in the prytaneum.* The archons dined in the θεσμοθέσιον; the senatorial Prytanes dined in the θόλος, and in later times also those called ἀείσιτοι, — certain Eleusinian priests, scribes, heralds, *etc.* See on εἰς τὴν θόλον, 32 c. The public guests sat at table in the Πρυτανεῖον, which was at the foot of the northeast corner of the Acropolis. Some of them earned the distinction by winning prizes in the national games, some received it on account of their forefathers' benefactions to the state, *e.g.* the oldest living descendants of Harmodius and of Aristogeiton respectively were thus honored. The most ancient Πρυτανεῖον on the Acropolis was in historic times used only for certain religious ceremonies. 36 d

24. **ἵππῳ** κτέ.: *i.e.* κέλητι, *race-horse;* ξυνωρίδι, *a pair;* ζεύγει, *four horses abreast.* Since a victory in the great panhellenic festivals was glorious for the country from which the victor came, he received on his return the greatest honors, and even substantial rewards. *Cf. Rep.* v. 465 d, where Plato speaks of the μακαριστὸς βίος ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι, *the blissful life Olympian victors lead.*

26. **οὐδὲν δεῖται**: only rich men could afford to compete. e

δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶ- 36
σθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. 37

XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλη-
σίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβο-
λήσεως, ἀπανθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι
μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω·
ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα· ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανά-
του μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε b
ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς
ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν, πολλοῦ
δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός,
ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς
ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητός μοι
τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν

37 a **28. ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως**: *cf.* above τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι. The art. is omitted, since this is thrown in merely to explain τούτου.

XXVII. 3. **ἀπανθαδιζόμενος**: *in the spirit of stubbornness.* This serves to explain παραπλησίως κτέ. For the facts, see on τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην, 35 d. — **τὸ δέ**: refers to the act which has been only incidentally touched upon (ταυτὶ λέγων = ὅτι ταῦτα λέγω). ὁ δέ, οἱ δέ, τὸ δέ, are used without a preceding μέν when they introduce some person or topic in contrast to what has just been dwelt upon, here περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου κτέ. For a different use of τὸ δέ, see on τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, 23 a.

4. ἐκὼν εἶναι: an apparently superfluous inf. G. 268, N.; H. 956 a. For the facts, see on ἢ ἄκων, 25 e.

7. ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις: for instance the Lacedaemonians. *Cf.* Pseudo Plut. *Apopth. Lac. s.v.* Ἀναξανδρίδου or Ἀλεξανδρίδου), c. 6, ἐρωτῶντός τινος αὐτόν, διὰ τί τὰς περὶ τοῦ θανάτου δίκας πλείοσιν ἡμέραις οἱ γέροντες κρίνουσι, πολλαῖς, ἔφη, ἡμέραις κρίνουσιν, ὅτι περὶ θανάτου τοῖς διαμαρτάνουσιν (*those who go completely wrong*) οὐκ ἔστι μεταβουλεύσασθαι (*to reconsider*). Thucydides also says in his account of Pausanias, i. 132. 5, χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς (*their own countrymen*), μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεῦσαί τι ἀνήκεστον. 37 a

11. ἀδικήσειν, ἐρεῖν, τιμήσεσθαι: the fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GMT. 27, N. 2; H. 855) intention.

13. τί δείσας: *what fear is there to induce me?* Supply verbs from the three infs. above. b

14. φημί: see above 28 e–30 b.

ἐστιν ; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, 37
τούτου τιμησάμενος ; πότερον δεσμοῦ ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν c
ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ,
τοῖς ἕνδεκα ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτί-
σω ; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ
ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
σωμαι ; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μεν-
τἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ
δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ
οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς d

37 b 15. **ἕλωμαι ὧν . . . ὄντων**: a remarkable const., arising from *ἕλωμαί τι ἐκείνων ἃ εὖ οἶδα κακὰ ὄντα*, by the assimilation of *ἐκείνων ἅ* to *ὧν* and of *κακὰ ὄντα* to *κακῶν ὄντων*, and the insertion of *ὅτι* after *οἶδα*. *εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι* and *οἶδ' ὅτι* occur freq. (in parenthesis) where *ὅτι* is superfluous. See on *δῆλον ὅτι*, *Crito*, 53 a, and *cf.* Dem. XIX. 9, *μνημονεύοντας ὑμῶν οἶδ' ὅτι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομνῆσαι*, *to remind you, although I know that most of you remember it*. *Cf. Gorg.* 481 d, *αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σοῦ ἑκάστοτε . . . ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ . . . οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν*. So the acc. and inf. may follow *ὅτι* and *ὡς*.

16. **τούτου κτέ.**: a part (*τι*) of *ὧν*, *by fixing my penalty at that*. See App.

c 17. **δουλεύοντα**: as a man in prison, who ceases to be his own master.

18. **τοῖς ἕνδεκα**: see Introd. 75 and *cf. οἱ ἄρχοντες*, 39 e. — **ἀλλὰ χρημάτων**: a neg. answer to the preceding rhetorical question is here implied; otherwise *ἤ* might equally well have been used. The second *ἀλλά* introduces an objection, which answers the question immediately preceding it. — **καὶ δεδέσθαι κτέ.**: *to remain in prison*. GMT. 18, 3, N. *Cf.* in Dem. XXIV. 63, *the* document which winds up with: *ἐὰν δ' ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως (ἕως) ἂν ἐκτίσῃ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῇ*. 37 c

19. **νῦν δή**: *just now*.

20. **ἐκτίσω**: for the fut. with rel. denoting purpose, see GMT. 65, 1; H. 911. — **ἀλλὰ δή**: *but then*. See on *ἀλλὰ δή*, *Crit.* 54 a. The *ἀλλά* points to the impossibility just asserted of Socrates's paying a fine himself, while *δή* introduces the one possible alternative.

22. **φιλοψυχία**: *clinging to life*, which is opposed to *εὐψυχία* (*courage*). *Cf.* Eur. *Hec.* 315, *πότερα μαχοῦμεθ', ἢ φιλοψυχήσομεν ; ibid.* 348, *κακὴ φανοῦμαι καὶ φιλόψυχος γυνή* ; also the speech where Macaria chooses to die, *Heracl.* 516 ff., *κοὐκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι δῆτ', ἐὰν δή τις λέγῃ | "τί δεῦρ' ἀφίκεσθ' ἱκεσίοισι σὺν κλάδοις | αὐτοὶ φιλοψυχοῦντες ; ἔξιτε χθονός·"* with the admiring words of Iolaus, *ibid.* 597 ff., *ἀλλ' ὦ μέγιστον ἐκπρέπουσ' εὐψυχίᾳ | πασῶν γυναικῶν, . . . —* **εἰ . . . εἰμί**: *cf.* 30 b, and see on *διαφθείρουσιν*, 25 b.

23. **ὅτι ὑμεῖς μέν**: *that (if) you, my fellow-citizens, proved unable to bear my company*. After this we look for something like this: "then others will prove still less able to bear it." But instead, we find a question with *ἄρα*, *will others then, etc.*, answered by **πολ-**

λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, 37
ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα
αὐτὰς διώσουσι ῥᾳδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς
οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην
ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ
γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι
ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ e
ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω,
οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυ-
χίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν
ζῆν; τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας
ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι

37 c λοῦ γε δεῖ. The dependence of the whole upon ὅτι is forgotten because of the intervening detailed statement.

d 25. **βαρύτεραι**: fem. because τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς is the most important idea and τοὺς λόγους is incidentally added by way of explanation. For agreement with the most prominent noun, see G. 138, N. 2 *b*.

28. **ὁ βίος**: the art. as here used has something of its original demonstrative force; accordingly ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν is appended as if to a dem. pron., *that would be a glorious life for me, to be banished at my time of life.* Notice that ἐξέρχεσθαι means *go into exile*; φεύγειν, *live in exile*; and κατιέναι, *to come back from exile.* Instead of τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ, the commoner idiom would be τηλικῷδε ὄντι. But *cf.* τηλικοίδε ἄνδρες, *Crit.* 49 a; *Euthyd.* 293 b, πολὺ γὰρ ῥᾷον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα, and *Legg.* i. 634 d, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τηλικοῖσδε ἀνδράσι πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον. — **ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης** κτέ.: *cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 4. 31, ἀναβοώντων ἀλλήλων ξυνήκουον εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας πόλεως. Elsewhere we find the substantive repeated, *e.g.* τόπου . . . τόπον, 40 c. 37 d

The whole expression suggests the restless life led by the so-called sophists. *Cf. Soph.* 224 b, where the typical sophist is described as τὸν μαθήματα ξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα, *one who goes from town to town buying up and selling knowledge for coin.* *Cf.* also *Prot.* 313 a–314 b.

e 33. **δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους**: to describe the involuntary cause in contrast to οὗτοι αὐτοί.

XXVIII. 2. **ἐξελθὼν ζῆν**: *to live on in exile.* This forms a unit to which σιγῶν and ἡσυχίαν ἄγων are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of ἡσυχίαν ἄγων is plain from 36 b.

3. **τουτὶ δή**: *that is the thing of which, etc.*; cognate acc. after πεῖσαι. — **τινάς**:

ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγι- 38
στον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρε-
τῆς τοὺς λόγους–ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς
ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετά-
ζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα
δ' ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως
ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ
ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελ- b
λον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ
ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι, τοσούτου

37 e *some*, used habitually by the orators where they will not or cannot be definite. Socrates probably means almost all of the Athenians.

38 a 6. **εἰρωνευομένῳ**: see Introd. 26. — **καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν**: it is not duty only, it is the highest good and gives the greatest pleasure.

8. **τοὺς λόγους**: *his speeches.*

10. **ἀνεξέταστος**: this may mean *unexamined, unscrutinized,* or *without scrutiny,* in which latter case a man neither examines himself nor others, that is, his life is unthinking. Verbal adjs. in *τος*, esp. with *α* privative, occur with both an act. and a pass. sense. Here the act. meaning substantially includes the pass. in so far as it involves self-examination (*καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος*). — **βιωτός**: *worth living. Cf.* *ψεκτός, blameworthy,* and *ἐπαινετός, praiseworthy.* — **ταῦτα δ' ἔτι**: *δέ* introduces apod. (GMT. 57) in order to bring it into relation with the preceding *οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι.* The two correspond very much like the two introductory clauses *ἐάν τε . . . ἔαν τ' αὖ.* See on *δεινὰ ἂν εἴην κτέ.*, 28 d.

11. **τὰ δέ**: see on *τὸ δέ*, 37 a.

38 a 12. **καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι**: after Socrates, in 28 e–30 c and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (*cf.* the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

13. **εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν κτέ.**: *γάρ* is related to the thought which lies unuttered in the previous explanation: *not from love of money do I refuse to make a proposition.* The apod. includes *ὅσα ἔμελλον κτέ.* See on *ὃς ἔμελλεν*, 20 a.

b 15. **νῦν δὲ—οὐ γάρ**: *but as it is,* (I name no sum of money,) *for money I have none.* The connexion is similar to *ἀλλὰ γάρ* (19 d, 20 c), where the unexpressed thought alluded to by *γάρ* is easily supplied. *νῦν δέ* expresses forcibly the incompatibility of facts with the preceding supposition. *Cf. Lach.* 184 d, *νῦν δὲ εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ.*

16. **εἰ μὴ ἄρα**: see on *εἰ μὴ ἄρα*, 17 b.

βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι ὑμῖν 38
μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε,
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ
Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι,
αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δ'
ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- c
ναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν
πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν·
φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμε-
νοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον,
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ
τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ
ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

38 b 18. **μνᾶν ἀργυρίου**: about seventeen dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, *e.g.* upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. **αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι**: *sc.* *φασίν*, to be supplied from *κελεύουσι*. Their surety would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. **ἀξιόχρεῳ**: *responsible*, an assurance hardly needed in Crito's case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates's *ἀντιτίμησις*, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates's penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xxv. above, 35 d. See Introd. 35 and 36. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

c 1. **οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου**: a compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges, in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong. 38 c

2. **ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν**: *the name and the blame.* See on *τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν*, 20 d, and *ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο κτέ.*, 23 a. — **ὑπό**: as if with *ὀνομάσθησετε* and *αἰτιασθήσετε*. See on *πεπόνθατε*, 17 a. Some periphrasis like *ὄνομα ἕξετε κτέ.* was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbrous fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. **πόρρω τοῦ βίου**: *far on in life.* For the gen. with advs. of place, see G. 182, 2; H. 757. — **θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς**: *and near unto death.* The contrast introduced by *δέ* is often so slight that *but* overtranslates it. *Cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* i. 5. 2, *ὁ Κυαξάρης ὁ τοῦ Ἀστυάγους*

τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε 38 d
πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες,
ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ
ᾠμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν
δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέν-
τοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν
λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν,
θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος
καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· οἷα e
δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε
ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον,
οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι, ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως
ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον
οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν 39

38 c παῖς, τῆς δὲ Κύρου μητρὸς ἀδελφὸς κτέ. *An.* i. 7. 9, εἴπερ Δαρείου ἐστὶ παῖς, ἐμὸς δὲ ἀδελφός, οὐκ ἀμαχεὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λήψομαι.

d 12. **ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν**: *so as to escape, i.e. in order to escape.* The Greek idiom expresses not so much purpose as result. There really seems very little difference between this ὥστε with the inf. and an obj. clause with ὅπως and the fut. ind. GMT. 98, 2, and 45; H. 953 and 885. *Cf. Phaedr.* 252 e, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος (*sc.* φιλόσοφος) ἔσται, and *Phaed.* 114 c, χρὴ πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν. *Cf.* also ὥστε διαφεύγειν, 39 a below.

14. **τόλμης**: in its worst sense, like the Lat. audacia. *Cf.* ἐάν τις τολμᾷ, 39 a below, and *Crit.* 53 e.

16. **θρηνοῦντος** κτέ.: a development of the idea in τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν κτέ. Here is a transition from the acc. of the *thing* (sound) heard to the gen. of the person heard, unless θρηνοῦντος ... φημι is looked upon as a gen. absolute thrown in as an afterthought for the sake of a more circumstantial and clearer statement. For the facts, *cf. Gorg.* 522 d, where (evidently with reference to the point here made) Plato puts the following words into Socrates's mouth: εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς (*rhetorical flattery*) ἐνδείᾳ τελευτφην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον.

19. **οὐδέν**: see on οὐδέν, 34 e. e

21. **ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος**: *in this way, etc., i.e.* after such a defence. οὕτως above means *as I have*, and that idea is vividly repeated by ὧδε. Thus its contrast with ἐκείνως (*sc.* ἀπολογησάμενος) is made all the more striking. — **τεθνάναι**: see on τεθνάναι, 30 c.

23. **πᾶν ποιῶν**: *by doing anything and everything. Cf.* πανοῦργος, *a rascal. Cf.* 38 d. 39 a

θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γί- 39
γνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα
ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ
ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις
ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ
λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον
ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ
θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρε- b
σβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι
ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας.
καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών,
οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδι-
κίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν
που ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμῳδῆ-

39 a

28. **ὥστε**: *cf.* *μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως* just above, and see on *ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν*, 38 d.

29. **μὴ . . . ἦ**: substituted rhetorically for a statement of fact. See on *μὴ σκέμματα ἦ*, *Crit.* 48 c. For the idea of fearing implied, see GMT. 46, N. 4.

30. **ἀλλὰ πολὺ** *κτέ.*: fully expressed we should have *ἀλλὰ μὴ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον ἦ πονηρίαν ἐκφυγεῖν*. — **θᾶττον θανάτου θεῖ**: *flies faster than fate*, to preserve the alliteration, which here, as often, is picturesque. For the thought, *cf.* *Henry V.* iv. 1, "Now if these men have defeated the law and outrun native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God." In the thought that wickedness flies faster than fate, we have perhaps a reminiscence of Homer's description of Ἄτη, *Il.* ix. 505 ff., *ἡ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρὴ τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὔνεκα πάσας | πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν | βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους.* 39 a

34. **θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών**: with *ὀφλισκάνειν*, whether used technically (as a law term) or colloquially, we find the crime or the penalty either (1) in the acc. or (2) in the gen. with or without *δίκην*. On the accent, see App. b

36. **καὶ ἐγὼ** *κτέ.*: *i.e.* they escape their punishment just as little as I escape mine. The *καί* before *ἔδει* makes a climax: "perhaps it was necessary for the matter actually to shape itself just as it really has."

37. **σχεῖν**: on the meaning of *σχεῖν* and *ἔχειν* respectively, see on *ἔσχετε*, 19 a.

XXX. 1. **τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο**: *τὸ δέ* is used adverbially; see on *τὸ δέ*, 37 a. *χρησμῳδῆσαι*, *declare a prophecy.*

σαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου. καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, 39 c
ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν
ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε,
τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ
χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο
εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον
τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ
φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ
κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσον- d
ται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ
ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δια- 39 c

3. **ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν** *κτέ.*: prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, *Il.* xvi. 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, *οὔ θην οὐδ' αὐτὸς δηρόν βέῃ, ἀλλά τοι ἤδη | ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή*, and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. *Cf.* Verg. *Aen.* x. 739, —

Ille autem expirans: Non me, quicumque es, multo,
Victor, nec longum laetabere; te quoque fata
Prospectant paria, atque eadem mox arva tenebris.

Cf. also Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 7. 21, *ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ τότε* (*at the hour of death*) *δήπου θειοτάτη καταφαίνεται καὶ τότε τι τῶν μελλόντων προορᾷ· τότε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, μάλιστα ἐλευθεροῦται.* The same idea is found in many literatures. *Cf.* Brunhild in the song of Sigfried (Edda), —

I prithee, Gunther, sit thee here by me,
For death is near and bids me prophecy.

See also John of Gaunt's dying speech, *Rich. II.* ii., —

Methinks I am a prophet new-inspired, 39 c
And thus expiring do foretell of him:
His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last,
For violent fires soon burn out themselves.

4. **ἀπεκτόνατε**: *sc.* by their verdict, and by the penalty which they voted after Socrates had made his counter-proposition (of a penalty), *ἀντιτίμημα*.

6. **οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε**: this is after the analogy of *τιμωρίαν τιμωρεῖσθαί τινα*, without some reminiscence of which it would hardly occur to any one to say *θάνατον* or *τιμωρίαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε*. **ἀπεκτόνατε** is substituted, as more vivid and concrete, for the expected *τετιμώρησθε*. Similarly we have *μάχην νικᾶν* or *ἡττᾶσθαι* as more specific equivalents of *μάχην μάχεσθαι*. — **νῦν**: expresses reality. This use of *νῦν* is akin to its very frequent use in contrast to a supposition contrary to fact (*cf.* 38 b, *Lach.* 184 d and 200 e); but here it is connected with a false account of what will come to pass, in contrast with the true prophecy of Socrates.

8. **τὸ δὲ** *κτέ.*: for a similar idiom, though more strongly put, *cf. Soph.*

νοεῖσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ 39
οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς
ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται
ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμέ-
νοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλε- e
χθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ
ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα
με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦ-
τον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους ἕως ἔξεστιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι 40
ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ
ἄνδρες δικασταί — ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν
καλοίην — θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι

39 c 244 a, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

d 14. **ἔσθ' αὕτη**: not οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' κτέ., as Schanz has it. The position of ἔστι near οὐ at the beginning of the clause justifies the accent. G. 28, 3, N. 1, *fin.*; H. 480, 3.

15. **μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν**: *to oppress no man*, corresponding to the preceding ἀποκτείνοντες . . . ἐπισχήσειν κτέ.

e XXXI. 2. **ὑπέρ**: has just the same meaning with περί. See L. and S. *s.v.* ὑπέρ, *fin.* Socrates speaks *about* what has befallen him, which he looks upon as for the best since it is the will of Divine Providence. — **οἱ ἄρχοντες**: see Introd. 75, and *cf.* 37 c.

3. **ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι**: *are busy*. They were occupied with the arrangements for conveying Socrates to prison. For τεθνάναι, see on τεθνάναι, 30 c.

4. **ἀλλά**: used freq., for the sake of greater vivacity, before the imv. or subjv. of command. See on ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ κτέ., *Crit.* 45 a.

5. **οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει**: indicates the calm self-possession of Socrates, so strongly contrasted with the ordinary attitude of those under sentence of death. — **διαμυθολογῆσαι**: more friendly and familiar than διαλέγεσθαι. Thus Socrates prepares to open his heart upon matters not strictly relevant, which only those of whom he is fond and who care for him need hear. *Cf. Phaed.* 61 e, ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. 39 e — 40 a

8. **ὑμᾶς γὰρ** κτέ.: see on ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, 17 a.

9. **ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖα** κτέ.: notice how many short statements of fact crowd one upon the other. This serves to arrest the attention. The θαυμάσιόν τι is that *now*, when Socrates has *such a fate* before him, the voice is silent, *while* previously, *etc.* See on δεινὰ ἂν εἴην (*fin.*), 28 e.

μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

10. **ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου**: see on δαιμόνιον, 31 d. See App.

11. **πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς**: see on οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον, 36 a.

12. **ὀρθῶς πράξειν**: *i.e.* so that all would be for the best, an expression which is closely allied to εὖ πράττειν. *Cf.* below c, ἀγαθὸν πράξειν. *Cf.* 45 d.

13. **ἃ γε δὴ** κτέ.: γέ emphasizes the idea expressed, and δή appeals to the patent fact. *Cf.* φάσκοντά γε δή, *Crit.* 45 d. — **καὶ ... νομίζεται**: a shift from act. to pass. *Cf. Charm.* 156 c, ταῦτα οὕτω λεγουσί τε καὶ ἔχει. Perhaps as νομίζεται expresses the opinion actually in vogue, it should be strengthened in translation by some adv.

14. **ἕωθεν**: *in the morning*. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* iv. 4. 8; vi. 3. 23; and Hom. *Od.* i. 372.

17. **πολλαχοῦ δή**: *in many situations*, and hence, *often*.

18. **λέγοντα μεταξύ**: for this and other advs. with the *temporal* partic., see G. 277, 6, N. 1; H. 976. Usually μεταξύ is prefixed, not appended.

19. **περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν**: *in regard to this whole affair*, referring to the whole trial, and including everything that led up to it.

20. **ὑπολαμβάνω**: not subjv., since there is no question of doubt. The question is only a vivid fashion of speech, of which Plato is very fond.

22. **ἡμεῖς**: to be connected immediately with ὅσοι. This use of the pron. gives a genial color to the whole; in Eng. we should use a partitive expression, *all those among us*.

25. **ἔμελλον**: referring definitely to

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς 40
ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ
τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι, μηδ' αἴσθησιν μηδε-
μίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα
μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ
τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία- d
αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων
μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος.
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν

40 c past time but still containing the idea of continued action. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 8. 13, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ἐποιοῦμεν (*had done*), ἅπαντες ἂν ἀπωλόμεθα. For the facts, see Introd. 27, *fin.*

XXXII. 1. καὶ τῇδε: after an argument based upon the silence of his inner voice, Socrates considers the question upon its merits.

2. εἶναι: not ἔσεσθαι. G. 203, N. 2; H. 948 a. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* ix. 40, δαιμόνι', οὔτω που μάλα ἕλπεαι υἷας Ἀχαιῶν | ἀπτολέμους τ' ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνάλκιδας ὡς ἀγορεύεις; *Cf.* also *Il.* xiii. 309, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποθι ἔλπομαι οὕτως | δεύεσθαι πολέμοιο κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιούς.

3. οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι: without definitely expressed subj. (*cf.* οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι in e below), *to be dead is as to be nothing, i.e.* its nature is such that a man when dead is nothing.

4. τὸν τεθνεῶτα: the subj. of ἔχειν (not of εἶναι), which is an afterthought.— κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα: Socrates associates his idea of the life hereafter with stories and traditions which are themselves a development of Homer's utterances about the Ἠλύσιον πεδίον and Hesiod's account of the μακάρων νῆσοι. The later poets, *e.g.* Pindar, continued what Homer and Hesiod began. And Pindar, furthermore, incorporates into his descriptions of life after death Orphic and Pythagorean accounts of metempsychosis. Here and in the Phaedo (70 c–72 a) Socrates appeals to a παλαιὸς λόγος. 40 c

5. τῇ ψυχῇ: a dat. of interest. G. 184, 3; H. 771. The gen. would express the subject of the action designated. — τοῦ τόπου: governed by μεταβολὴ καὶ μετοίκησις. Of these two the latter repeats the former in more specific form. The gen. corresponds to the acc. with μεταβάλλειν and (rarely) μετοικεῖν. *Cf. Theaet.* 181 c, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ.

6. τοῦ ἐνθένδε: see on τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας, 32 b. See also App. — καὶ εἴτε: the second member is introduced by εἰ δ' αὖ in line 19.

7. οἷον ὕπνος: *cf.* Hom. *Od.* xiii. 79 f., καὶ τῷ ἥδυμος ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔπιπτε | νήγρετος ἥδιστος, θανάτῳ ἄγχιστα ἐοικώς.

8. κέρδος: not ἀγαθόν, because Socrates does not consider such a condition as in itself a good. d

9. ἄν οἶμαι: ἄν belongs to εὑρεῖν, and on account of the length of the prot. is repeated first with οἶμαι in 14, and again just before the inf.; similarly δέοι is twice used in the prot. See on ἴσως τάχ' ἄν, 31 a. — ἐκλεξάμενον καὶ

νύκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν

40 d **ἀντιπαραθέντα σκεψάμενον**: the first two partics. coupled by *καί* are subordinated to *σκεψάμενον*, just as it is subordinated in turn to *εἰπεῖν*. See on *ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην*, 21 e.

14. **μὴ ὅτι, ἀλλὰ** *κτέ.*: *not to speak of any one in private station, no, not the Great King, etc.* *ἀλλά* is used here to introduce a climax. See II. 1035 a.

e 16. **αὐτόν**: *sc.* this gives a final touch of emphasis to *βασιλέα*. Socrates talks of the king of Persia in the strain which was common among Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias (470 e), is startled because Socrates refuses to take it for granted that the king of Persia is happy.

17. **κέρδος λεγω**: *sc.* *αὐτόν.* — **καὶ γὰρ** *κτέ.*: *for thus the whole of time appears no more than a single night, etc.*

20. **ὡς ἄρα**: a conclusion derived immediately from the admission that death is a migration from earth to some other place. 40 e

23. **δικαστῶν**: for case, see G. 136, N. 3 *b*; H. 940 a. 41 a

25. **Μίνως** *κτέ.*: connected grammatically with the rel. sent. rather than with *τοὺς δικαστάς*. *Cf. Phaed.* 66 e, *τότε ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν κτέ.* The three first mentioned, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, were sons of Zeus, and while living had earned great fame by their scrupulous observance of justice. They are also named in the Gorgias as the ministers of justice in the world below. In Dante's *Inferno* (v. 4–17) Minos, curi-

βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγε- 41
νέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ
ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω
30 τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ
θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι b
Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν
παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι

41 a ously transformed into a demon with a long tail, still fulfills the same duties,—

> . . . When the spirit evil-born
> Cometh before him, wholly it confesses;
> And this discriminator of transgressions
> Seeth what place in Hell is meet for it;
> Girds himself with his tail as many times
> As grades he wishes it should be thrust down.

In Ar. *Frogs*, Aeacus is Pluto's footman. For a painting representing the judges of the underworld, see Gerhard's *Vasenbilder*, plate 239. — **Τριπτόλεμος**: a son of Eleusis, glorified in the traditions of Demeter *θεσμοφόρος*. He was the disseminator of intelligent agriculture. Plato uses here the freedom which characterizes all his mythical digressions, and adapts the myth to the point which he desires to make. *δικάζειν* implies action in two capacities: (1) as judge, pronouncing upon the deeds and misdeeds of every soul that has lived and died (this is the account of Minos in the Gorgias), and (2) as king and legislator. *Cf.* Hom. *Od.* xi. 568 ff., where Minos is shown *χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν*. Probably here the prevailing idea is that of king and legislator. Homer (*Od.* iv. 564 ff.) places Rhadamanthus among the blessed in the Elysian fields.

27. **Ὀρφεῖ κτέ.**: Orpheus and Musaeus with Homer and Hesiod were honored as the most ancient bards and seers of Greece.

28. **ἐπὶ πόσῳ**: price stated in the form of a condition. — The repetition of ἄν has an effect comparable to the repeated neg. The first ἄν is connected with the most important word of the clause, while the second takes the place naturally belonging to ἄν in the sent. GMT. 42, 2, *fin.* *Cf.* 31 a. 41 a

29. **πολλάκις τεθνάναι**: *cf.* Dem. ix. 65, *τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον κτέ.* *Cf.* 30 c.

30. **ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ**: *for me myself more particularly.*

31. **ὁπότε**: *when (if at any time) I met.* b

32. **Παλαμήδει**: the son of Nauplius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom of Palamedes provoked the jealousy of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Agamemnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted so successfully, by forging a message to Palamedes from Priam, that Palamedes was suspected of treason and stoned by the Greeks. *Cf.* Verg. *Aen.* 82 ff. and Ov. *Met.* xiii. 56 ff. The title is preserved of a lost tragedy by Sophocles called *Palamedes* and of one by Euripides. The fate of Ajax is well known through Hom. *Od.* xi. 541 ff. See also *Met.* xiii. and the *Ajax* of Sophocles.

33. **ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι**: a case of *asyndeton* (H. 1039), which occurs not infrequently where as here a sent. is thrown in by way of explanation.

τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν 41
ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ
ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
ἐστι, καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστι δ' οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις, ὦ
ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα
τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους c
μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ
διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη
εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ
ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ
ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν,
εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.

41 b *μοί* is easily supplied from the preceding *ἔμοιγε*. The partic. is used as with *ἥδεσθαι*, to which *οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη* is substantially equivalent. *Cf.* also the partic. with impers. expressions like *ἄμεινόν ἐστι, μεταμέλει μοι*, etc.

35. **καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον**: *and what after all is the greatest thing.* Then follows, in the form of a clause in apposition, explanation of the *μέγιστον*. The whole is equivalent to *τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ἐξετάζοντα διάγειν* (with an indef. personal subj.). See on *οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι*, 40 c.

38. **ἄγοντα**: not *ἀγαγόντα* because it represents *ὅς ἦγε*. GMT. 16, 2; H. 856 a. *Cf. Tim.* 25 b c, where the fabled might of prehistoric Athens is described, *τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγουμένη . . . κρατήσασα τῶν ἐπιόντων τρόπαια ἔστησε*. This loose use of the impf. instead of the aor. is not uncommon where extreme accuracy is not aimed at.

c 39. **Σίσυφον**: *cf.* Hom. *Il.* vi. 153 ff., *Od.* xi. 593 ff. — The most comprehensive clause, *ἢ . . . γυναῖκας*, escapes from the grammatical const., a not uncommon irregularity. *Cf. Gorg.* 483 d e, *ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν.* 41 c

40. **οἷς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν**: when verbs governing different cases have the same object, the Greek idiom usually expresses the object once only, and then in the case governed by the nearest verb.

41. **ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας**: *more blessed than tongue can tell. Cf. Theaet.* 175 a, *ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας* (*pettifogging*), and *Rep.* viii. 567 e, where *χρῆμα*, something like which is probably implied in the above cases, is expressed, *ἢ μακάριον λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα. Cf.* also *Rep.* i. 328 e, *σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην . . . πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.*

42. **πάντως οὐ δήπου**: *in any event, we know that they kill no man there*, etc. — **τούτου γε ἕνεκα**: spoken pointedly and not without an intended thrust at those who voted his death; the reason given certainly proves more than the point here made.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 41
εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἓν τι τοῦτο διανο-
εῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν d
οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ
τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ
ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψη-
φισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.
καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατη- e
γόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμ-
φεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου

41 c XXXIII. 2. **ἓν τι τοῦτο**: *this one thing above all.* The position of *τοῦτο*, coming as it does after instead of before *ἓν τι*, is very emphatic.

d 6. **τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι**: the pf. is used, because to speak of the completion of the change, *i.e. to be dead*, is the most forcible way of putting the idea. *πράγματα* applies to the trouble and the unrest of a busy life.

7. **βέλτιον ἦν**: Socrates considers the whole complication of circumstances in which he is already involved, or in which he must, if he lives, sooner or later be involved. Deliverance from this he welcomes as a boon. *Cf.* 39 b. — **διὰ τοῦτο κτέ.**: *cf.* 40 a c. Socrates argued from the silence of *τὸ δαιμόνιον* that no evil was in store for him when he went before the court. This led him to conclude that his death could be no harm. On further consideration, he is confirmed in this, because death is never a harm. Applying this principle to his own actual circumstances, its truth becomes the more manifest, so that, finally, he can explain why the divine voice was silent. Contrast the opposite view expressed by Achilles (Hom. *Od.* xi. 489 ff.), and in Eur. *I. A.* 1249–1252, where Iphigenia, pleading for life, says, ἓν συντεμοῦσα πάντα νικήσω λόγον· | τὸ φῶς τόδ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἥδιστον βλέπειν, | τὰ νέρθε δ' οὐδέν· μαίνεται δ' ὃς εὔχεται | θανεῖν. κακῶς ζῆν κρεῖσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν. 41 d

11. **βλάπτειν**: used abs. without acc. of the person or of the thing, because the abstract idea of doing harm is alone required. — **τοῦτο . . . ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι**: *so far it is fair to blame them.* Contrast 17 b, *τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν, this . . . about them;* and *cf. Symp.* 220 e, *τοῦτό γέ μοι οὔτε μέμψει κτέ.* They deserve blame for their malicious intention and for the reason given in 29 b. — **ἄξιον**: *it is fair. Cf.* e *Gorg.* 465 e, *ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί.*

12. **τοσόνδε μέντοι**: "although they certainly are far from wishing me well, yet I ask so much as a favor," *i.e.* so little that they can well afford to grant it. Then follows an explanation of *τοσόνδε*.

ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα 41
λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ
χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς,
καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς
ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ καὶ οἴονταί
τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια
πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. 42
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν
δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον
πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

41 e 13. **ἡβήσωσι**: see on ἔσχετε, 19 a. *Cf.* Hes. *Op.* 131, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡβήσειε καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο.

16. **ὀνειδίζετε**: see on ὀνειδίζων ἕκαστον, 30 e.

18. **δίκαια πεπονθώς**: to be understood in the light of cc. xviii. and xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is usually taken as the most grievous injury as the greatest possible blessing.

42 a 19. **αὐτός τε** κτέ.: for ἐγὼ αὐτὸς κτέ. *Cf. Crit.* 50 e. *Cf.* Soph. *O. C.* 461, ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, | αὐτός τε παῖδές θ' αἵδε.

20. **ἀλλὰ γὰρ** κτέ.: serves to close the speech, giving at the same time the reason for coming to an end. 42 a

22. **πλὴν ἢ**: pleonastic like ἀλλ' ἤ in 20 d. See App. — **τῷ θεῷ**: *cf.* the subtly ironical way in which the same thought is put in the Euthyphro (3 d e), where, speaking of his accusers, Socrates says, εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν· εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. See on ἄριστα, 35 d.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

St. 1. p. 43.

I. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῲ ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι;

43 a

1. **Κρίτων**: see Introd. 62. See on *Apol.* 33 d, *fin.*, and *cf.* 38 b, *fin.*

4. **πηνίκα μάλιστα**, *about what time is it?* In Lat. maxime and admodum are so used, *e.g.* locus patens ducentos maxime pedos, *Liv.* x. 38. 5; locus in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus, *id.* xxi. 36. 2.

5. **ὄρθρος βαθύς**: the adj. limits *ὄρθρος*, so that the whole expression means rather the end of night than the beginning of day. *Cf.* the time when the Protagoras begins (310 a), *τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου.* The description in the same dialogue of young Hippocrates feeling his way through the dark to Socrates's bedside shows that *ὄρθρος βαθύς* means, *just before daybreak. Cf.* Xen. *An.* iv. 3. 8 ff., where Xenophon dreams a dream, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ὄρθρος ἦν . . . ἤδετό τε καὶ ὡς τάχιστα ἕως ὑπέφαινεν ἐθύοντο.* Here *ὄρθρος* means the dark before the dawn. *Cf.* also *ἀμφιλύκη νύξ*, Hom. *Il.* vii. 433, *ἦμος δ' οὔτ' ἄρ πω ἠὼς, ἔτι δ' ἀμφιλύκη νύξ, | τῆμος ἄρ' ἀμφὶ πυρὴν κριτὸς ἔγρετο λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν.*

6. **ἠθέλησε ὑπακοῦσαι**: *did not refuse to let you in. Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 3. 8 for *οὐκ ἤθελε, he refused.* With *ὑπακοῦσαι, cf. Acts* xii. 13, and Xen. *Symp.* i. 11, *Φίλιππος δ' ὁ γελωτοποιὸς κρούσας τὴν θύραν εἶπε τῷ ὑπακούσαντι (the porter) εἰσαγγεῖλαι ὅστις τε εἴη κτέ.*

9. **καὶ . . . καὶ κτέ.**: *and what is more, I've done a little something for him. τι* is equiv. to *εὐεργεσίαν τινά (a tip).*

43 a

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. 43

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ b
παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον
ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ
πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ
ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολ-
λάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμό-
νισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ
ξυμφορᾷ ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἄγανακτεῖν
τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις c
ξυμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλι-
κία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῳ ἀφῖξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί,
ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν
καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ ἐν τοῖς
βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

43 b 12. **εἶτα**: refers to *ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι* in a vein of wonder or perhaps of gentle reproof.

14. **οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία**: the neg. belonging to the clause that follows is inserted by anticipation in the oath. The answer to Socrates's question is implied clearly in the use of *οὐδέ*, and becomes categorical in *καὶ ἐπίτηδες κτέ.*

15. **ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ κτέ.**: *τέ* is introduced after *τοσαύτῃ*, which belongs to both substs. This position of *τέ* is very common after the art. or a prep. — **ἀλλὰ καὶ**: *but furthermore.*

17. **ἵνα διάγῃς**: for the subjv. after a secondary tense, see GMT. 44, 2; H. 881 a. 43 b

18. **εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου**: for the gen. of cause, see G. 173, 1; H. 744. At the end of the sentence, a clause with *ὡς* (equiv. to *ὅτι οὕτω*) is introduced in place of the gen. — For the facts, see Introd. 36 and note 6, p. 26.

21. **πλημμελές**: *cf. Apol.* 22 d and see on *ἐμελῶς*, *Apol.* 20 c.

25. **τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν**: **ἐπιλύεται** c is here qualified by *οὐδέν*, and is used in the sense of preventing. Hence the doubled neg. GMT. 95, 2, N. 1 *b*; H. 1034.

29. **καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν**: an effective and almost pathetic reitera-

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ 43
δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; d

ΚΡ. Οὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων] ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

43 c tion of the first χαλεπήν, made all the stronger by the doubled καί.

30. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι: in Hdt., Thuc., Plato, and later writers, ἐν τοῖς, *about*, is idiomatically used to limit the superl. Thus ἐν τοῖς becomes an adverb, which describes not absolute precedence but an average and comparative superiority. *Cf.* Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται, *among the most numerous* (not 'the very most numerous,' since Thuc. adds that the number was exceeded once) where the gender of πλεῖσται is noticeable. *Cf.* also *id.* i. 6. 3, ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο κτέ. Here the position of δέ shows that ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι is taken almost as one word, *i.e.* πρῶτοι limited so as to mean *practically the first*, or *substantially the first of those who laid down, etc.*

31. τίνα ταύτην: connect with φέρων above. For ἤ, see on ἢ δῆλον, *Apol.* 26 b. — τὸ πλοῖον κτέ.: *cf. Phaedo*, 58 a: τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὅν φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους (*the seven couples to be sacrificed to the Minotaur*) ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν (*a solemn embassy*) ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν (*every twelvemonth*) τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι (*to put no one to death by public execution*), πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλον ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο κτέ. *Cf.* Introd. 36. 43 c

32. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, *Apol.* 30 c, *fin.* d

33. δοκεῖ μέν: with no following δέ. In such cases the original affinity of μέν with μήν is usually apparent. Its meaning is, *indeed, surely*.

35. τῶν ἀγγέλων: can hardly have been written by Plato, since ἄγγελος in the sense of ἀγγελία is not used except by later writers (Polybius), while ἐκ prevents us from taking ἀγγέλων as referring to persons. See App.

II. 1. ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ: *it's all for the best, Crito.* ἀλλά introduces in vivid contrast to Crito's despondency the cheerful hope of Socrates. — τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ: a hopeful invocation often prefixed to a solemn statement. *Cf. Symp.* 177 e, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος, *let Phaedrus make a beginning and good luck to him.* Used freq. like the

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει; 44

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; b

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

43 d Lat. quod bonum felix faustumque sit, or quod bene vertat. *Cf.* Dem. III. 18, ἕτερος λέγει τις βελτίω· ταῦτα ποιεῖτε ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. *Cf.* also the comic perversion of it in Ar. *Av.* 436, κρεμάσατον τύχαγαθῆ | ἐς τὸν ἱππὸν εἴσω πλησίον τοὐπιστάτου. For the most formal use of this word, see many inscriptions and the decree, Thuc. IV. 118. 11, Λάχης εἶπε τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν (*armistice*). In Xen. *Hell.* IV. 1. 14, it is used of a betrothal: ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ, ὁ Ἀγεσίλαος, σὲ μέν, ὦ Σπιθριδάτα, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ διδόναι Ὀτυῒ τὴν θυγατέρα. *Cf.* also Xen. *Cyr.* IV. 5. 51, ἀλλὰ δέχομαί τε, ἔφη, καὶ ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ ἡμεῖς τε ἱππεῖς γενοίμεθα καὶ ὑμεῖς διέλοιτε τὰ κοινά.

44 a 5. **τῇ γάρ που** κτέ.: this is the first premiss that follows the conclusion stated above in οὐ μέντοι ἥξειν τήμερον, the second is contained in the account of the dream.

7. **οἱ τούτων κύριοι**: see Introd. 75, and *cf. Apol.* 39 e.

8. **τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας**: means the same as τήμερον, for Socrates is now thinking of the fact that day has not yet dawned. See on ὄρθρος βαθύς, 43 a. 44 a

10. **ταύτης τῆς νυκτός**: *in the course of this night.* The vision came after midnight, a circumstance of the greatest importance, according to Mosch. *Idyll.* II. 2, νυκτὸς ὅτε τρίτατον λάχος ἵσταται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς . . . εὖτε καὶ ἀτρεκέων ποιμαίνεται ἔθνος ὀνείρων. *Cf.* Hor. *Sat.* I. 10. 32 ff., —

Atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citra,
Versiculos, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus
Post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera.

11. **ἐν καιρῷ τινι**: usually expressed by the shorter ἐν καιρῷ, *opportunely. Cf. Legg.* IV. 708 e, ἐὰν πρὸς καιρόν τινα λέγωμεν. The τις has the effect of a litotes, as *e.g.* in ἔχει τινὰ λόγον, *there is good and sufficient reason for it.*

15. **ἥματι** κτέ.: quoted from Hom. *Il.* IX. 363, ἥματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην. b

16. **ἄτοπον** κτέ.: *sc.* ἐστί, an excl. which nearly approaches the form of a regular sent. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* I. 231,

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων. 44

III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τε ὢν σε σῴζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν c χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους;

44 b δημοβόρος βασιλεύς, ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις, and *ibid.* v. 403, σχέτλιος, ὀβριμοεργός, ὃς οὐκ ὄθετ' (*recked not*) αἴσυλα ῥέζων. See App.

17. **ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν**: *it is surely plain enough*, immo evidens. The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context of the verse (363) which is quoted. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* ix., vv. 356–368. Socrates thinks of dying as going home, and Phthia was the home of Achilles. —**γέ μοι**: not γ' ἐμοί. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on ὅς γέ μοι δοκῶ, *Apol.* 18 a.

III. 1. **ὦ δαιμόνιε**: *most excellent*, meaning about the same as ὦ θαυμάσιε, or ὦ μακάριε, rather stronger than ἀγαθέ. Of course no color of irony is given here. *Cf. Symp.* 219 b, τουτῷ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, and *Gorg.* 456 a, where Socrates is speaking of the scope (δύναμις) of rhetoric: δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι. The word δαιμόνιος, which was used by Homer only in addressing persons, received from Pindar an enlarged meaning, so as to include *whatever proceeds from the gods*. This was adopted by Att. writers, and of course its adoption involved applying it to things. Plato still further enlarged the ground which it covers. In addressing persons, he gives it a flattering or an ironical implication; applied to things, he uses it for what is extraordinary, superhuman. See on εἴπερ δαίμονας κτέ., *Apol.* 27 d. 44 b

2. **ἔτι καὶ νῦν**: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See Introd. 62.

3. **ξυμφορά ἐστιν**: more vivid and natural than ἔσται. —**χωρὶς μὲν . . ἔτι δέ**: *quite apart from my losing, etc. . . . I shall further, etc.* See App.

4. **ἐστερῆσθαι**: the pf. inf. with χωρίς. —**οὐδένα μή ποτε**: equiv. to οὐ μή ποτέ τινα, and so here with the fut. indic., *I shall certainly never, etc.* GMT. 89, 1; H. 1032.

6. **ὡς οἷός τε ὢν** κτέ.: *I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you.* οἷός τε ὢν σῴζειν represents οἷός τε ἦν σῴζειν, *I might have saved you, if I had wished.* GMT. 49, 2, N. 2; H. 897.

8. **ἢ δοκεῖν . . . φίλους**: explaining c ταύτης, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. *Cf. Gorg* 500 c, περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις (*than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence*) . . . ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν κτέ. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or 44 b

οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας 44
ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς d
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τέ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώ- e
κρατες, εἰπέ μοι· ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

44 c rel. pron., an explanatory clause (here with the inf., *cf.* Eur. *Her.* 297) introduced by ἥ, may always be appended. *Cf.* 53 b c.

13. ὥσπερ ἂν πράχθῃ: see on ὃν ἂν λέγω, *Apol.* 20 e. The aor. subjv. has the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 20, N. 1; H. 889 c.

15. ὁρᾷς δή: Crito means to point at the case in hand. "The fact is that the many are really in a position, *etc.*" Crito has profited but little by what Socrates has said in the court-room. *Cf. Apol.* 30 d, 34 c, 40 a, *etc.*

d 20. εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον κτέ.: a wish the object of which is not attained. ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν expresses an unattained purpose depending on the preceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 44, 3; H. 884. See on ὃς ἔμελλεν, *Apol.* 20 a. 44 d

21. ἐργάζεσθαι: serves as a repetition of ἐξεργάζεσθαι above. Such repetition of the simple verb is common. *Cf.* 49 c d and *Lys.* 209 c, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσιν.

22. καλῶς κτέ.: *indeed* (*i.e.* if this wish were granted) *it would be delightful.* — νῦν δέ: introduces the fact. Supply ἐργάζεσθαι here, and ποιήσαντες with ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν. In hypothetical and rel. sents. τυγχάνειν may be used without the partic., which is always suggested by the leading clause.

IV. 2. ἆρά γε μή: like μή alone e (*Apol.* 25 a), ἆρα μή looks for a neg. answer, but it may also (see on μή, 45 e) convey an insinuation that in spite

ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται 44
ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ
ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ
συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ
γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ 45
που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν
κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου
καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ

44 e of the expected denial the facts really would justify an affirmative answer; *you surely don't, though I imagine you do*, is Crito's meaning. The μή which follows προμηθεῖ is obviously connected with the notion of anxiety in that verb. The same idea is again presented in φοβεῖ (*are fearful*) below. The subjv. παρέχωσιν conveys an idea of action indefinitely continued, whereas ἐξέλθῃς and ἀναγκασθῶμεν denote simply the occurrence of the action.

45 a 8. **δίκαιοί ἐσμεν** κτέ.: see on δίκαιός εἰμι, *Apol.* 18 a.

9. **ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, μὴ . . . ποίει**: *no, no! do as I say.* ἀλλά with the imv. introduces a demand or a request made in opposition to an expressed refusal or to some unwillingness merely implied or feared. This vigorous request is reinforced by the neg. μὴ ποίει, *do this and do not do that.* *Cf.* 46 a.

13. **μήτε**: the second clause, which we miss here, appears below (b) in the resumptive statement ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε κτέ. — **φοβοῦ**: reiterating φοβεῖ above, *be fearful.* It is a part of Crito's character to return again and again to his point. *Cf.* 43 d, and see Introd. 62. Further he had here a welcome opportunity for airing his grievances against the sycophants (blackmailers). Crito had been himself the victim of these rascals until he found a vigorous friend, Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μὲν ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι, πένητα δέ, as Xenophon puts it, who delivered him from them. This good riddance was due to the advice of Socrates. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* ii. 9. 4, οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ ἄνδρα (*sc.* just as you keep dogs to protect sheep from wolves), ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καὶ δύναιτό σου ἀπερύκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε. 45 a

15. **τούτους**: said with scorn. *Cf.* 48 c, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν, and Dem. xviii. 140, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ φέρειν ἠδύνατ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ πόλις καὶ ποιῶν οὕτως λανθάνειν (*this fellow could do . . . undetected*).

ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ 45 b
οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει
δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι ἀναλί-
σκειν· εἷς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκα-
νόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος
ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ
δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅ τι χρῷο
σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ
ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν c
ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφά-
λειάν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ
Θετταλίαν.

V. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι-
χειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ
τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καί οἱ
ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι

45 a 17. **σοὶ δέ**: the argument is as follows: the amount required to settle with these sycophants, I should be ready enough to expend for almost any one, *but for you*, etc. — **ὑπάρχει**: *cf.* Παρύσατις . . . ὑπῆρχε τῷ Κύρῳ, φιλοῦσα αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ κτέ., Xen. *An.* i. 1. 4; καὶ ὑπάρξει ὑμῖν ἡ ἐμὴ πόλις· ἑκόντες γάρ με δέξονται, *ibid.* v. 6. 23. — **ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι**: said with reference to the appositive *ἱκανά*.

18. **οὐκ οἴει**: Crito recollects what b Socrates had said (45 a, in connexion with 44 e). See on *οὐ φῇτε*, *Apol.* 25 b.

19. **ξένοι οὗτοι**: *cf. Apol.* 33 e, *ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι κτέ.* The pron. calls up the *ξένοι* as present in Athens, and, for rhetorical purposes, within sight. The art. is omitted because *ξένοι* is a pred., *these others who are ξένοι*.

21. **Κέβης**: Cebes also was from 45 b Thebes, and the two play a very important part in the Phaedo.

23. **ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι**: *get tired of trying, etc.* Here is no implication that Socrates has already tried to get away. Crito only hints that any other course is nothing short of moral cowardice. See App. — **ὃ ἔλεγες**: *cf. Apol.* 37 c d.

24. **χρῷο**: the opt. representing the subjv. of doubt. GMT. 34, 3.

25. **ἄλλοσε**: for *ἄλλοθι*, which we expect after *πολλαχοῦ* on account of *ὅποι*. This is attraction, or inverse assimilation. *Cf.* Soph. *O. C.* 1226, *βῆναι κεῖθεν ὅθενπερ ἥκει*.

V. 4. **σὲ διαφθεῖραι**: *σέ* is accented c for emphasis and to disconnect it from *ἔσπευσαν*.

βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ 45
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ d
ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι ἂν
τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, τοι-
οὑτων οἷάπερ εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς
ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαι-
πωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι· χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς
καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ
ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ
ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, e
μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα-
στήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν

45 d V. 7. **τὸ σὸν μέρος**: pro tua parte or quod ad te attinet. — **ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι**: see on *νῦν δέ*, 44 d.

8. **τοῦτο πράξουσιν**: *cf.* *εὖ, κακῶς*, and even *ἀγαθόν* (used adv.) with *πράττειν* (*Apol.* 40 c). See on *μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν*, *Apol.* 40 a.

10. **ἢ γὰρ κτέ.**: the *γάρ* is connected with an unexpressed reproof.

13. **φάσκοντά γε δή**: *sc. σέ, at all events you who maintain, etc.*, or *particularly when you maintain*. See on *ἃ γε δή*, *Apol.* 40 a.

e 16. **μή**: see on *ἄρα γε μή*, 44 e. The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this const., very common in Plato, see GMT. 46, N. 4, *fin.*; H. 867. — **ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ κτέ.**: *a certain sort of cowardice on our part*. Notice the emphasis given to *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, for which we are responsible*. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his abettors, had carried the day, they would have been more genuinely *ἄνδρες* in the proper sense of the word. They failed *ἀνανδρίᾳ τινί*. *Cf.* Euthyphro's boast, *εὔροιμ' ἂν ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστι*, *Euthyph.* 5 c. 45 e

17. **καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος ... καὶ ὁ ἀγών**: in apposition with *ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ*. On the meaning of the technical terms, see Introd. 70, with note 1, p. 52. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See Introd. 72.

18. **ὁ ἀγών**: the management of the case. See on *εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάς*, *Apol.* 24 c.

τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτὶ ὥσπερ 45
κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμε-
τέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσα- 46
μεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ
μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ
ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ᾖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βου-
λεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβου-
λεῦσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα
ταῦτα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον

45 e

19. **τὸ τελευταῖον τουτί**: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.

20. **κατάγελως**: because, in Crito's opinion, all who were involved made themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and irresolution. *Cf. Cymbeline*, i.,—

Howso'er 'tis strange,
Or that the negligence may well be laughed at,
Yet it is true, sir.

In the whole drift of Crito's phraseology, the notion of acting a part on the stage before the Athenian public is prominent. — **κακίᾳ κτέ.**: this is really in Crito's eyes the culmination of disgrace (connect with *τὸ τελευταῖον*) in a matter that has been disgracefully mismanaged. Here is a return to the leading thought and a departure from the regular grammatical sequence. The anacoluthon is most obvious in the repetition of **δοκεῖν** after *δόξῃ*.

21. **διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς**: people will think they allowed every advantage and every opportunity, especially the possibility of escape which now engrosses Crito's thoughts, to pass unimproved. *ἡμᾶς* is the object. *Cf. Charm.* 156 e, *τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, i.e. the reason why Greek doctors fail to cure most diseases.*

46 a

22. **οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν**: *sc.* **ἔσωσας**. Crito hints at Socrates's part, then recurs to his own. The interjection of such a clause in a relative sent. is irregular. — **οἷόν τε ὄν**: like *ἐξόν* above. For the fact, *cf.* 45 b c.

24. **ἅμα τῷ κακῷ**: **ἅμα** is used as *πρὸς* freq. is. *Cf. Symp.* 195 c, *νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἁπαλός, he is young and in addition to his youth he is tender.* *Cf.* also *Theaet.* 185 e, *καλὸς γὰρ εἶ . . . πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ (in addition to your beauty) εὖ ἐποίησάς με κτέ.* — **ἀλλά**: *cf.* line 28 below, and see on *ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου*, 45 a. This speech has the dignity which genuine feeling alone can give. *Cf. Rich. III.* iv. 3,—

Come, I have learned that fearful commenting
Is leaden servitor to dull delay;
Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary;
Then fiery expedition be my wing.

On *βεβουλεῦσθαι, to have done with deliberation, cf.* Dem. VIII. 3, *οἶμαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι*, and IV. 19, *ταῦτα . . . πᾶσι δεδόχθαι φημὶ δεῖν.* GMT. 18, 3 *b*; H. 851 a.

26. **τῆς ἐπιούσης**: *cf.* 44 a.

27. **εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν**: this adv. use of *τι* is developed out of the cognate acc. (kindred signification). *Cf.* the Eng. idiom, "to delay somewhat (a bit)." G. 159; H. 715.

καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πεί- 46
θου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

VI. ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ b
ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων,
τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε
ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ
τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ,
ὃς ἄν μοι, λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λό-
γους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβα-
λεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὁμοιοι
φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὔσπερ c
καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ

46 b VI. 2. **ἀξία**: *sc.* *ἐστίν*, in spite of the opt. in the prot. GMT. 54, 2 *b*; H. 901 b. — **εἰ εἴη**: not *if it should be*, but *if it should prove to be*. *Cf.* *δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος*, *Apol.* 28 **d**. For the present, Socrates does not decide whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong.

4. **οὐ μόνον κτέ.**: Socrates maintains that "truth is truth to th' end of reckoning" (*Measure for Measure*, v. 1). *νῦν* and *ἀεί* might almost change places, since the important point is that Socrates, after proclaiming the supremacy of reason (*cf.* *Apol.* 38 **a**) in prosperity, finds his belief still firm in adversity. *Cf.* 53 **c** and **e**. *Cf.* *As You Like It*, ii. 1, —

> Sweet are the uses of adversity,
> Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
> Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Socrates meets in his trial and death-sentence "the counsellors that feelingly persuade him what he is." For collocations similar to this combination of *νῦν* and *ἀεί*, *cf.* 49 **e**; Hom. *Il.* ix. 105, *οἷον ἐγὼ νοέω, ἠμὲν πάλαι ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν*. *Cf.* also Eur. *Med.* 292, *οὐ νῦν με πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, Κρέον, | ἔβλαψε δόξα κτέ.*, and Soph. *Phil.* 965, *ἐμοὶ μὲν* 46 b
οἴκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ τις | τοῦδ' ἀν-
δρός, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι.

5. **τοιοῦτος οἷος**: for the omission (rare except with the third person) of the copula, *cf.* *Gorg.* 487 **d**, *καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι*, equiv. to *ὅτι τοιοῦτος εἶ οἷος κτέ.* For *οἷος πείθεσθαι*, see on *τοιοῦτος*, *Apol.* 33 **a**. — **τῶν ἐμῶν κτέ.**: *τὰ ἐμά* includes all the faculties and functions both of body and of mind. Among these *λόγος* is included, since it means man's *reason* as well as his reasons and his reasonings, — his utterances and his principles. *Cf.* below 47 **c**, *εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος* and 47 **e**, *ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων*.

6. **τοὺς δὲ λόγους κτέ.**: these words imply a measure of reproof at least when spoken to Crito, who had in general approved of Socrates's principles.

8. **ὅμοιοι**: not different in sense from *οἱ αὐτοί*, and to be understood in the light of what immediately follows. See on *καὶ πρότερον*, 48 **b**. "They seem like what they formerly were."

παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω 46
τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας
ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα
καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκο-
ποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοι-
μεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο
ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν
νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς d
ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα
λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπι-

46 b Supply καὶ πρότερον (from what follows) with ὅμοιοι.

c 11. **πλείω μορμολύττηται**: *uses more hobgoblins to scare us.* μορμολύττεσθαι has the double acc. like βλάπτειν τινά τι. Μορμώ, like Ἔμπουσα, was one of the fictitious terrors of the Greek nursery. *Cf. Gorg.* 473; Ar. *Av.* 1244, πότερα Λυδὸν ἢ | Φρύγα ταυτὶ λεγοῦσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς; The Schol. there suggests that the alarm began ἀπὸ τῶν προσωπείων (*masks*) τῶν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ὑποκριτῶν, ἃ ἐκάλουν μορμολυκεῖα. τοιούτοις δὲ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ παιδία φοβοῦσιν. *Cf. Phaed.* 77 e.

13. **δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα** κτέ.: *by confronting us with bonds, with death, with loss of wordly goods.* These are the usual punishments, to the harshest of which Socrates has been condemned. The plural is used to put an abstract idea more vividly and concretely, as it were, by a process of multiplication. *Cf.* the use of mortes, neces, and the common poetical use of θάνατοι to describe a violent and premature death, and in general the free use of the plural by the poets in phrases like πηκτῶν κλιμάκων προσαμβάσεις, Eur. *Phoen.* 489, and *Bacch.* 1213, δωμάτων προσαμβάσεις, *I. T.* 97, εἰσβάσεις, *ibid.* 101, also 46 c the common use of διαλλαγαί both in poetry (Eur. *Phoen.* 701) and in prose (Lys. XII. 53; XIII. 80, *etc.*). That such plurals were only a stronger way of putting the singular is clearly shown in Eur. *Bacch.* 1350, αἰαῖ, δεδόκται, πρέσβυ, τλήμονες φυγαί. For θάνατος, meaning *the penalty of death*, see on *Apol.* 36 b.

15. **εἰ ἀναλάβοιμεν**: *I think, if we should begin by taking up your point, etc.* That is, such thorough consideration (44 b, 45 e) of Crito's (ὃν σὺ λέγεις) point involves considering the whole question *whether, etc.*

18. **ἢ πρὶν μὲν** κτέ.: with ἤ (an) a d second question is superadded, which substantially forestalls the answer to the first. *Cf. Apol.* 26 b. Here the answer suggested by ἄρα is to be taken ironically. See on ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, *Apol.* 37 c, and *cf.* 47 e below, and esp. 50 e and 51 a, where we find ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα . . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα.

19. **ἄλλως**: *not at all seriously, as a mere joke, i.e.* in a sense other than its proper one; the expression is a strong one. *Cf. Phaedo*, 76 e, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος

θυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, 46
εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ᾧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός,
καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως,
ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἑκάστοτε ᾧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν,
ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι
δοξάζουσι δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. e
τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι;
σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνή-
σκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμ- 47
φορά· σκόπει δή, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ
πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς
μέν, τὰς δ' οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς
μή;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ
τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

46 d εἰρημένος εἴη. ἕνεκα λόγου, *for the form's sake* (dicis causa) — quite different from λόγου χάριν (exempli causa) — is brought in ἐκ παραλλήλου. See on εἰκῇ κτέ., *Apol.* 17 c.

24. τι λέγειν: the contradictory of οὐδὲν λέγειν. *Cf. Apol.* 30 b. It means, "to say something that can be depended upon, that amounts to something." *Cf. Lach.* 195 c, τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικε μέντοι λέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously responds, καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.

25. νῦν δή: *just now.*

e 28. ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια: *humanly speaking. Cf.* Dem. XVIII. 300, ὅσον ἦν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ δυνατόν, *as far as human calculation could.* For the adv. acc. ὅσα, see G. 160, 2; H. 719. One who is but a man can be *sure* of his life for no single moment, though he may have a reasonable confidence. *Cf. Henry V.* iv. 1, "I think the king is but a man, as I am; the violet smells to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but *human conditions.*" Notice the force of γέ. *Cf.* 54 d, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα. 46 e

47 a 30. ἱκανῶς: *sufficiently, satisfactorily,* and hence *rightly* or *truly.* ἱκανῶς very commonly appears in conjunction with μετρίως or καλῶς, to either one of which it is substantially equiv. *Cf. Symp.* 177 e and *Phaed.* 96 d.

32. For an omission here, see App.

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυ- 47
μναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς b
ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου
ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;

ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπά-
ζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς
τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

47 a VII. 1. **πῶς αὖ ἐλέγετο**: the impf. because the new question (*αὖ*) involves a matter which has already been discussed. GMT. 11, N. 6; H. 883. — **τὰ τοιαῦτα**: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method, see Introd. 18, and for further examples, *cf. Apol.* 25 **b**. *Cf.* also *Lach.* 184 **c**–185 **b**, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, *ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας*, while the praise and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon, as follows: *ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὂν τυγχάνει, . . . ὁποῖοι ἄν τινες οἱ παῖδες γένωνται.*

b 2. **τοῦτο πράττων**: a man who *makes this his work*, and hence is an expert in earnest about it. One whose opinion professionally given is worth more than any layman's would be. *Cf. Menex.* 244 **c**, *ἡγησάμενοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . σφέτερον ἤδη ἔργον εἶναι καταδουλοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους, ταῦτ'* 47 b *ἔπραττον.* As this *ταῦτα* refers to *καταδουλοῦσθαι*, so the *τοῦτο* in question refers to the notion of gymnastics implied in *γυμναζόμενος*; the whole phrase means, a person who wishes to make an athlete of himself. *Cf.* Hdt. vi. 105, *ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς Σπάρτην κήρυκα Φειδιππίδην Ἀθηναῖον μὲν ἄνδρα, ἄλλως δὲ ἡμεροδρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα.*

4. **ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης**: often coupled together as having special charge of bodily vigor and health. The *ἰατρός* was expected to cure and to prevent disease by a prescribed regimen (*διαιτητική*); the *παιδοτρίβης* professed and was expected (*Gorg.* 452 **b**) *καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα*; he it was who really gave instruction in gymnastics. For fuller details, see Schömann, *Antiquities of Greece*, I. 505 f. Iccus of Tarentum, glorified as a successful gymnast, is reputed to have been most strict in regard to a temperate diet. *Cf.* the proverbial phrase *Ἴκκου δεῖπνον.* Sometimes medicine and gymnastics were both made the business of the same man, as in the case of Herodias of Selymbria. *Cf. Prot.* 316 **d e**, *ἐνίους δέ τινας ἔγωθημαι καὶ γυμναστικὴν* (*sc. professed teachers*

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ 47
ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ
ἐπαΐοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ c
τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν
λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς
τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων,
οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διίωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων
καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, d
περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν
δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ
ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φο-
βεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκο-

47 b *of*), οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος, καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἧττων σοφιστὴς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σελυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς. The great physician Herodicus is ridiculed for coddling his bodily infirmities, *Rep.* iii. 406 **b**, παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι, οἶμαι, οἷός τ' ἦν ἑαυτόν, ... δυσθανατῶν (*dying hard*) δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γήρας ἀφίκετο.

11. καὶ ἐδεστέον γε: γέ serves where various points are enumerated, to mark a new departure, *i.e.* a fact different in kind from the preceding ones and thus belonging to a new class. *Cf. Gorg.* 450 **d**, ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ (*calculation*) καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτικὴ (*draught-playing*) γ' καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι. *Theaet.* 166 **b**, ὄψεις (*sights*) τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις (*smells*) καὶ ψύξεις (*chills*) τε καὶ καύσεις (*burns*) καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι (*desires*) κτέ. 47 b

15. τοὺς λόγους: states collectively what has been subdivided into δόξα, ψόγος, ἔπαινος. c

16. καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων: *of those in fact who have no special knowledge whatever.* See App.

18. εἰς τί κτέ.: see on τῶν ἐμῶν, 46 **b**.

22. καὶ δὴ καί: *and then also, of course.* See on καὶ δὴ καί, 18 **a**. Here Socrates has at last reached his goal; his point has been established by induction. Notice the doubly chiastic arrangement, —

δικαίων ἀδίκων — αἰσχρῶν καλῶν — ἀγαθῶν κακῶν.

λουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ 47
μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ
οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλ-
τιον γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον
διολέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα
βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο e
τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἆρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμέ-
νου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ
φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι ποτ'

47 d 29. **ἐγίγνετο, ἀπώλλυτο**: *i.e.* *γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι ἐλέγετο*, the so-called philosophical impf., which carries a statement of the admitted results of a previous discussion back to the well-remembered time when the facts stated were established in argument. GMT. 11, N. 6; H. 833. *Cf.* Cic. *Off.* i. 40. 143, itaque, quae *erant* prudentiae propria, suo loco dicta sunt.

VIII. 3. **πειθόμενοι μὴ κτέ.**: by its position *μή* contradicts *τῇ . . . δόξῃ*, but not *πειθόμενοι*, and implies *ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ*. The effect of writing *πειθόμενοι μή* instead of *μὴ πειθόμενοι* is to lay greater stress on both words, and the failure to say distinctly whose opinion it is which is obeyed leaves all the more stress on *μή*. — **ἆρα βιωτὸν κτέ.**: see on *ἀνεξέταστος βίος*, *Apol.* 38 a. The meaning is that life is worthless, *i.e.* 47 d
οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, οὐκ ἄξιον ζῆν. *Cf.* 53 c, and *Rep.* iv. 445 a, *ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι, πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ (pays) δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον . . . ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι*. The expressions *διαφθειρόμενον* and *διολέσωμεν* bring us to the point of extreme deterioration at which life becomes impossible.

10. **ἀλλὰ . . . ἆρα**: ironically op- e
posed to the preceding negative statement, but at the same time requiring *no* for its answer. This last must be indicated by the tone in which the question is asked. See on *ἆρα*, 46 d.

11. **ᾧ**: after both verbs, though *ὀνινάναι* does not govern the dat. See on *οἷς . . . ἐξετάζειν*, *Apol.* 41 c. Even *λωβᾶσθαι* usually takes the acc.

12. **ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστί**: it was not specified above (d), and there is no reason

ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη 48
ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες. b

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι [τῷ] καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

48 a for arguing about its name (ψυχή) here.

18. **οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ οὕτω**: *then we must not . . . at all . . . so much as all that, etc.* οὕτω refers back to the drift of Crito's argument. Here again Socrates takes the last step in a long induction.

19. **τί . . . ὅ τι**: a not unusual combination of the dir. and indr. forms of question. *Cf. Gorg.* 500 **a**, ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ (*specialist*) δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; The double acc. as in κακὰ (κακῶς) λέγειν τινά.

20. **αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια**: *i.e. Truth*, speaking with the lips of ὁ ἐπαΐων, or appearing as the result of strict and patient inquiry.

23. **ἀλλὰ μὲν δή**: again Socrates reproves Crito, this time for his appeal to the Athenian public (44 **d**). — **μὲν δή**: *certainly*, equiv. to μήν or nearly so. 48 a

25. **δῆλα δὴ κτέ.**: Crito eagerly b catches at this objection and strengthens it with καί. Thus he implies that there is more than meets the eye, *i.e.* that there are many other valid objections. *Cf.* 45 **a**. See App.

26. **οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος κτέ.**: τέ corresponds to καί . . . αὖ following. For a similar καί . . . καὶ αὖ, see *Lach.* 181 **d**, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἔγωγε πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἄν τι δύνωμαι καὶ αὖ ἃ προκαλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. The connexion of thought would not hinder us from subordinating the first clause: "as our discussion just closed agrees with what we argued formerly (when dealing with the same matter), so, *etc.*"

29. **ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν κτέ.**: *cf. Apol.* 28 **b** ff.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. 48

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται c δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ᾖ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ d

48 b 31. **τὸ δὲ εὖ κτέ.**: this is needed because of the confused ideas which many associate with *εὖ ζῆν*, *e.g.* (1) plain living and high thinking, or (2) high living and no thinking. For the latter meaning, *cf. Rep.* i. 329 **a**, *οἱ οὖν πλεῖστοι* (*τῶν πρεσβυτῶν*) *τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι, καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες*. On this whole subject consult the discussion in *Prot.* 351 **b** ff.

c IX. 4. **τὰς σκέψεις**: drawn into the const. of the rel. clause, to which precedence has been given. The art. is commonly not retained in such a case, *e.g. οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων*. The corresponding demonst. *ταῦτα* is attracted into the gender of the pred.

6. **μὴ . . . ᾖ**: *sc. ὅρα κτέ. Look to it, Crito, lest all this, at bottom, may prove to be, etc.* A milder way of saying *ταῦτα σκέμματα ὄντα φαίνεται*, strengthened by *ὡς ἀληθῶς*. See on *μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ᾖ*, *Apol.* 39 **a**. 48 c

7. **καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν**: *and would bring them to life again too.* The *ἄν* forms with this partic. the apod. **ἀναβιώσκεσθαι** is used here like *ἀναβιώσασθαι* in *Phaed.* 89 **d**. Usually it is intransitive, like *ἀναβιῶναι*.

9. **ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ**: *the argument has prevailed thus far. Cf.* Hor. *Sat.* i. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque | qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti | et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit. *Ibid.* ii. 3, 225, vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes, and 250, si puerilius his ratio esse evincet amare. It is rare to find this idiom with an acc. of the persons discussing, as in *Rep.* x. 607 **b**, *ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾖρει*. — **μὴ . . . ᾖ**: as in 6 above.

χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀλη- 48
θείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα
ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ
15 ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅρα
δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέ-
20 γειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καί σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, e
παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι·
ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν

48 d 12. **καὶ αὐτοὶ** κτέ.: *καὶ αὐτοί, we ourselves too*, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (*χρήματα τελοῦντες*), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him. — **ἐξαγόμενοι**: the pass. is especially strong, "we ourselves are both rescuers and rescued."

15. **οὔτε πάσχειν**: *sc.* *εἰ δεῖ*, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. **πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν**: *cf. Apol.* 28 b d. The sense is, "there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (*ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν*) rather than committing unrighteousness." See also 54 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and *πρό* is used in the sense of *in preference to* or *instead of*.

23. **ὡς**: *inasmuch as*, equiv. to *ἐπεί*. *Cf.* quippe in Lat.

e 24. **ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος**: opposed distinctly to *πείσας σε*, *with your approval*. *Cf.* 49 e *fin.*, and Xen. *An.* v. 6. 29, *ἐξήνεγκε γὰρ τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἐγὼ πράττειν ταῦτα διανοοίμην ἤδη οὐ πείσας ὑμᾶς*. The vivid contrast of these two clauses makes the omission of *σοῦ*, the subj. of *ἄκοντος*, the easier. Indeed, cases are common where a personal or a dem. pron. or some vague general notion of persons or things is the subj. implied. For a somewhat similar case, *cf.* Hom. *Od.* iv. 645 ff., *ὕφρ' εὖ εἰδῶ ἤ σε βίῃ ἀέκοντος ἀπηύρα νῆα μέλαιναν, ἠὲ ἑκών οἱ δῶκας*. — **ἐάν λέγηται**: *in case the statement shall satisfy you*. *ἐάν* does not like *εἰ* (*cf.* 48 b) mean *whether*. GMT. 71, N. 1. *Cf. Phaedo*, 64 c, *σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ* κτέ. The subj. of the dependent sent. is made by anticipation (prolepsis) the object of *ὅρα*. *Cf.* Milton, *Sonnet to Sir Henry Vane*, XVII., "Besides to know | Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, | What severs each, thou hast learned, which few have done." *Cf.* below (49 d). Socrates is earnestly enforcing a principle. 48 e

σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμε- 49
νον ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο·] ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοίδε [γέροντες] ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέ- b
ροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πρᾳότερα, ὅμως τό γε

49 a 26. **ᾗ οἴῃ**: *sc.* κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἂν ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. μάλιστα as in the question πῇ μάλιστα; *Cf. Rep.* vii. 537 **d**, οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ὦσι, τούτους εἰς μείζους τιμὰς καθιστάναι.

Χ. 1. **ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον**: *sc.* ἡμᾶς. The const. with the acc. corresponds to the equivalent δεῖ with the acc. and inf. GMT. 114, 2; H. 611 a. For the facts, see Introd. 65.

2. **ἢ οὐδαμῶς** κτέ.: here the first member of the disjunctive question is resumed, so that the questioner gives notice to the questioned, as it were, of his opinion. For the accent of τινί when (exceptionally) it begins its clause, see G. 28, N. 1 (1); H. 119 a.

4. **ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο**: prob. not written by Plato. If genuine, it cannot refer to anything here, but relates to the drift of 46 **b** and 48 **b**. See App.

5. **ἢ πᾶσαι** κτέ.: here and in the words ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. below, we see how hard Crito finds it to assent. After each double question (1) οὐδενὶ . . . ὡμολογήθη; (2) ἢ πᾶσαι . . . παντὶ τρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito for an answer. Finally he extorts the briefest assent by the pointed φαμὲν ἢ οὔ; in line 13 below. 49 a

6. **ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί**: *thrown away. Cf. Henry VIII.* iii. 2, "Cromwell, I charge thee, *fling away* ambition," and Soph. *Phil.* 13, μὴ καὶ μάθῃ μ' ἥκοντα κἀκχέω τὸ πᾶν σόφισμα, τῷ μιν αὐτίχ' αἱρήσειν δοκῶ. Similar is the Lat. effundere gratiam, laborem. — **καὶ πάλαι** κτέ.: one of the two partics. forms the predicative complement of ἐλάθομεν, the other stands in opposition to the pred. By the added τηλικοίδε ἄνδρες (see on τοσοῦτον σύ, *Apol.* 25 **d**), this opposition is put still more strongly. ἄρα gives point to the irony. See on ἄρ' οὖν, 47 **e**.

11. **ὅμως παντὶ τρόπῳ**: a more distinct reiteration of what ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. has already stated. Therefore one as much as the other belongs b

ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν 49
παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

49 b to the twofold disjunctive prot. εἴτε . . . εἴτε, καὶ εἴτε . . . εἴτε.

17. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται: that 'doing harm to one's enemies' was part and parcel of the popularly accepted rule of life is plain from many passages like that in Isocrates to Demonicus I., 26, ὁμοίως αἰσχρὸν νόμιζε τῶν ἐχθρῶν νικᾶσθαι ταῖς κακοποιίαις καὶ τῶν φίλων ἡττᾶσθαι ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις. Compare the character of Cyrus the younger, Xen. *An.* i. 9. 11, φανερὸς δ' ἦν, καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειεν αὐτόν, νικᾶν πειρώμενος κτέ. *Cf.* also Meno's definition, *Men.* 71 e, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Plato eloquently defends his more Christian view throughout the first book of the Republic, in the Gorgias, and elsewhere. That the many do assert this, Socrates might say is not only made probable by the known tendencies in human character, but it is proved by every-day experience in dealing with men. Many recognized authorities encouraged them in such a view. *Cf.* Archil. Frg. 65, ἓν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, | τὸν κακῶς με δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς. Solon, Frg. 13, 5, where he prays to the Muses that they would grant him εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ . . . | . . . δεινὸν ἰδεῖν. In Soph. *Aj.* 79, it is Athena herself who asks, οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; Contrast Soph. *Ant.* 523 f.: ΚΡ. οὗτοι ποθ' οὑχθρὸς, οὐδ' ὅταν θάνῃ, φίλος. | ΑΝ. οὗτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν. *Cf.* Eur. *Andr.* 520 ff., where Menelaus says it is folly to spare the offspring of one's foes, ἀνοία μεγάλη λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν, ἐξὸν κτείνειν, and *ibid.* 1007, where Orestes says, ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν μοῖραν εἰς ἀναστροφὴν (*for us to destroy it*) δαίμων δίδωσι. *Cf.* Eur. *Heraclid.* 1049 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurystheus, ἐχθρὸς μὲν ἀνήρ, ὠφελεῖ δὲ κατθανών. See also *Bacch.* 1344–1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and Dionysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave answers: ὀργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς. This shows an ideal of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare Soph. *Aj.* 679–682, ὅ τ' ἔχθρος ἡμῖν εἰς τοσόνδ' ἐχθαρτέος, | ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις, ἕς τε τὸν φίλον | τοσαῦθ' ὑπουργῶν ὠφελεῖν βουλήσομαι | ὡς αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα, with *Henry VIII.* iii. 2, "Love thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; | still in thy right hand carry gentle peace | to silence envious tongues. Be just and fear not." Shakspere thus expresses the view of the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in contrast to that of the Greek public at large. That the historical (in contrast to the Platonic) Socrates at least 49 b

ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται. 49 c

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολο- d γῇς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ

49 b did not contradict this maxim of popular morality is perhaps evident from one place in the Memorabilia (ii. 6. 35), where, apparently with the ready approval of Critobulus, Socrates says, ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. This does not make him precisely responsible for the maxim, since he practically quotes it from the mouth of The Many. Indeed, the context has a playful color, which ought to warn us not to take Socrates precisely at his word.

c 19. **οὐ φαίνεται**: *plainly not.* As οὔ φημι means *I deny* rather than *I do not assert*, so οὐ φαίνεται means not *it does not appear*, but *it does appear not.*

20. **κακουργεῖν**: this word, like κακῶς ποιεῖν, covers more cases than ἀδικεῖν: it includes ἀδικεῖν and also cases of harm done where there is little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in every-day matters than ἀδικεῖν. In Crito's answer his uncertain certainty is indicated by δήπου; had he meant that he was perfectly certain, he would have used δή. 49 c

28. **οὔτε ἄρα** κτέ.: the completest presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. *Cf.* Luke vi. 27, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀκούουσιν· ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς κτέ.

30. **καθομολογῶν, ὁμολογῇς**: see on εἰ γὰρ ᾤφελον, 44 d.

32. **τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι** κτέ.: this is d strongly set forth in the Gorgias, where the Sophist and the true Philosopher represent respectively these two clashing theories. See Introd. 65.

34. **βουλεύματα**: *counsels, i.e.* their manner of thinking and acting.

μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα 49
ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα
ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοι-
νωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν e
ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε.
εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ·
πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ
ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε
ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦ- 50
μεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς
ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

49 d **36. ὡς οὐδέποτε** κτέ.: a statement of what is involved in *ἐντεῦθεν*, which is equiv. to *ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου* (*taking this principle for granted*). *ὡς* with the gen. abs. is used in this same way also after *λέγειν*. *Cf. Men.* 95 e, *οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;*

39. τῆς ἀρχῆς: *cf.* *καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν* above. *ἀρχή* is the starting-point of an investigation, — *a principle,* e a conviction. — **καὶ πάλαι** κτέ.: see on *οὐ μόνον* κτέ., 46 b.

41. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: not what results, but *what comes next*. It may be taken adv. (like *τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε* and the like) and translated *further*. What is referred to is expressed in *πότερον* κτέ. below.

43. μᾶλλον δέ: *or rather*. *Cf. Lach.* 196 c, *λέγε δέ μοι ὦ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν.*

44. ἢ ἐξαπατητέον: Socrates says this rather than *ἢ οὐ ποιητέον* because of the preceding *ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ*. Such an admission pledges a man to put his principle in practice. *ἐξαπατᾶν* is not only construed with an acc. of the person, here easily supplied from *τῳ*, but furthermore takes the acc. of the thing. *Cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 7. 11, *εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἂν οἴεται ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλον ἐξαπατῆσαι ταῦτα, λέγων διδασκέτω.* 49 e

XI. 1. **ἐκ τούτων**: *in the light of this.* See on 48 c, *ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων*, and *cf. Henry IV.* i. 1, "For more is to be said and done | than *out of anger* can be uttered." The particular plan of flight Socrates considers in the light of, or out of, the general conclusion just approved.

3. οἷς οὖσιν: the dat. is assimilated regularly to the omitted obj. of *ἐμμέ-* 50 a

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ἃ ἐρω- 50
τᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς b
ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ

50 a νομεν. ὡμολογήσαμεν would require the acc. as in 49 e above.

5. οὐκ ἔχω κτέ.: Crito seems afraid of understanding what is meant; the inevitable consequences involved alarm him. See on κακουργεῖν, 49 c. This natural state of mind on his part gives good and sufficient reason for a reconsideration of the whole subject from a new point of view.

7. μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν: for the dat., *cf. Symp.* 192 d, εἰ αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπιστὰς ὁ Ἥφαιστος . . . ἔροιτο. *Prot.* 321 c, ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεύς. See on ᾧ, 47 e. The statement there given covers a very large number of cases where a partic. and a finite verb are combined like ἐλθόντες ἔροιντο.

8. εἴθ' ὅπως κτέ.: this softening phrase is used purely out of consideration for Crito. To use the word applied to runaway slaves might give offence. One of the annoying mishaps that befell a well-to-do Athenian was to have to give chase when a slave ran off to Megara or Oenoe. *Cf. Prot.* 310 c, where Hippocrates nearly lost his dinner, μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα. Of course such conduct on the slave's part was considered despicable. *Cf.* 52 d, δοῦλος φαυλότατος. The δοῦλος χρηστός, who appears in tragedy more frequently than in real life, would not run away, because of his attachment to his master. *Cf.* Eur. *Med.* lines 54 f., χρηστοῖσι δούλοις ξυμφορὰ τὰ δεσποτῶν | κακῶς πιτνόντα καὶ φρενῶν ἀνθάπτεται, the first of which recurs in the Bacchae (1029), *Alc.* 768–77; and *cf.* also Eur. *Andr.* 56–59, where the slave says to Andromache, εὔνους δὲ καί σοι ζῶντί τ' ἦν τῷ σῷ πόσει. In Xen. *Oec.* 7. 37 and 38, and 9. 11–13, is an interesting account of the position of slaves in the household. 50 a

9. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως: *the commonwealth. Cf.* Xen. *An.* v. 7. 18, and Hdt. i. 67, Σπαρτιητέων τῷ κοινῷ διαπεμπομένους, *sent by the commonwealth of Sparta.* So Cicero says commune Siciliae. The personification of the state and the laws which here follows is greatly admired and has been abundantly imitated, *e.g.* by Cicero in his first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18). The somewhat abrupt transition from ἡμῖν above to ὦ Σώκρατες suggests the fact that Socrates considered himself alone responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ἄλλο τι ἤ: see on ἄλλο τι ἤ, *Apol.* 24 c.

11. τούς τε νόμους: notice the order and *cf.* 53 a, ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

12. τὸ σὸν μέρος: see on τὸ σὸν b
μέρος, 45 d. Here it is about the same in sense with καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι, 51 a.

σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλω εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατε- 50
τράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ'
ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί
ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ
γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου
τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας
προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι
ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; c
ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς
δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν
λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ
λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ
ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν
καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν d
σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα
σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν,

50 b

13. **εἶναι**: the attention is drawn to *εἶναι, exist,* by the negative statement of the same idea in *μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, not to be utterly overturned,* which follows. GMT. 18.

17. **ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ**: a side thrust at the trained speakers which recalls the irony of the opening page of the *Apology.* — **ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου**: *on behalf of this law whose existence is in jeopardy. Cf.* below **d**, *ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀπολλύναι.* This notion of threatened action is often attached to the pres. and impf. of this verb. GMT. 10, N. 7 and 11, N. 4; H. 828. *Cf. An.* v. 8. 2, *ὅπου τῷ ῥίγει ἀπωλλύμεθα.* The whole wording of this passage recalls the Athenian usage which required that a law, if any one proposed to change or repeal it, should be defended by regularly-appointed state-advocates (*συνήγοροι*). 50 b

19. **ὅτι ἠδίκει γάρ**: *ὅτι* followed by direct quotation, as in 21 **c**. Notice how spirited and quick the answer is made by *γάρ.* "Yes (I certainly have this intention) for, *etc.*"

XII. 2. **καὶ ταῦτα**: *sc.* that in certain cases the sentence of the laws may and should be set at nought. — **ἢ ἐμμένειν**: *or (was the agreement between us) simply to abide by, etc.* c

3. **αἷς ἂν δικάζῃ**: *cf.* 50 **b** and 51 **e**.

5. **ἐπειδὴ κτέ.**: see Introd. 19.

τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς 50
ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ
γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης;
ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι
νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ
καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ e
δὲ ἐγένου καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν
πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦ-
λος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως

50 d

10. **τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους**: probably Socrates was thinking particularly of the laws governing marriage which established the legitimacy of children (*γνησιότης*). See Schoemann, *Antiquities of Greece*, p. 357.

11. **ἀλλά**: instead of *ἔπειτα δέ*, which would have been written here to correspond to *πρῶτον μέν* if Socrates's answer had not intervened.

14. **ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ**: these words cover the whole of education (*παιδεία*), as Plato, *Rep.* ii. 376 e, says, *ἔστι που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.* "The education of the average Greek gentleman, like that of the average English gentleman, comprised a certain amount of mental cultivation and a certain amount of athletic exercise. The former, besides reading, writing, and some elementary mathematics, consisted mainly in the reciting and learning by heart of poetry, along with the elements of music, and sometimes of drawing. Perhaps because so much of the poetry was originally sung or accompanied, the word 'music' was sometimes applied to the education in literature as well as in music proper, and it is in this wider sense that Plato habitually uses it. Under the term 'gymnastic' was understood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service." *Hellenica*, The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, by R. L. Nettleship, M.A., p. 88. See on *τοῦτο πράττων*, 47 a. See also Schoemann, *Greek Antiquities*, pp. 359 ff.

17. **δοῦλος**: opposed to **δεσπότης**. *Cf.* Hdt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians *ἐλεύθεροι ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος.* Elsewhere Plato uses *δουλεύειν* of the obedience which the law requires, *e.g. Legg.* 762 e, *ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι* (*cf. ἐκαλλυνόμην, Apol.* 20 c) *χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις κτέ. Cf. Apol.* 23 b, 30 a, and also Eur. *Orest.* 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, *δουλεύομεν θεοῖς, ὅ τι ποτ' εἰσὶν οἱ θεοί. Cf.* 52 d. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.

50 d

ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἴει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ 50
ἅττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντι-
ποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα
οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι
ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,
οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπ- 51
τειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα
καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι, ὥστε, ἐὰν σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν
ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς

50 e Among many passages in the tragedians, *cf.* Soph. *Ant.* 663 ff., ὅστις δ' ὑπερβὰς ἢ νόμους βιάζεται | ἢ τοὺπιτάσσειν τοῖς κρατύνουσιν νοεῖ, | οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπαίνου τοῦτον ἐξ ἐμοῦ τυχεῖν. | ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν | καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἀναντία. *Cf.* also Cic. *Clu.* 53. 146, legum idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus, and *cf.* in Eur. *Suppl.* 429 ff., the speech of Theseus, beginning, οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει| ὅπου τὸ μὲν πρώτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι | κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἷς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος | αὐτὸς παρ' αὑτῷ, καὶ τόδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον. *Cf.* also *ibid.* 316–353, 403–408, and the words of Aethra, 312 f., τὸ γάρ τοι συνέχον (*bond of union*) ἀνθρώπων πόλεις | τοῦτ' ἐσθ', ὅταν τις τοὺς νόμους σώζῃ καλῶς. Many lines in the *Heraclidae* of Euripides show that ready and free obedience to law distinguished Athens, τὰν εὖ χαρίτων ἔχουσαν πόλιν, (379 f.). *Cf.* 181–198, 305 f., 329–332, 420–424.

18. **αὐτός τε** κτέ.: see on αὐτός τε κτέ., *Apol.* 42 a.

21. **ἢ πρὸς μὲν . . . πρὸς δὲ** κτέ.: the first clause is logically subordinate. See on δεινὰ ἂν εἴην, *Apol.* 28 d. ἄρα is ironical. See on ἀλλὰ . . . ἄρα, 47 e, and particularly on ἢ πρὶν μὲν κτέ., 46 d, where ἄρα occurs only in the second clause. For the repetition, see *Prot.* 325 b c, διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ (*sc.* ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ὧ δὲ . . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται, οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; Notice the position of σοί, which is nevertheless not the emphatic word.

22. **ἦν**: "when you were under your father or perhaps your master." The past (ἦν) is opposed to the fut. (ἔσται). — **καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην**: for the δοῦλος χρηστός, see on δοῦλος in 17 above.

23. **ἅπερ πάσχοις**: *anything that was* (at any time) *done to you.* GMT. 62; H. 914 B (2). Though subord. to ὥστε . . . ἀντιποιεῖν, this clause is also limited by the neg. statement οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν, which limits the clause ὥστε . . . πολλά.

24. **οὔτε . . . πολλά**: an explanation of ὥστε . . . ἀντιποιεῖν, in which the neg. of οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν is repeated. — **κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν**: equiv. to λοιδορούμενον ἀντιλοιδορεῖν.

51 a 27. **ὥστε καὶ σὺ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσεις**: *so that you in your own turn will, etc.* σύ, when expressed in Att., has emphatic position. καί indicates equality,

τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρή- 51
σεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πρά-
30 τειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἶ
σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἡ πατρὶς καὶ
σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ b
θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι
35 δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνου-
σαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ

51 a δέ points the contrast between σύ and ἡμεῖς.

29. **ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν**: *cf.* Dem. IX. 15, *καὶ τοιαῦτα πράττων τι ἐποίει;* and IV. 2, *οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων . . . πάνθ' ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων.* And yet Aristotle often makes a careful distinction between ποιεῖν and πράττειν.

30. **ὁ ἐπιμελόμενος** κτέ.: for the art., see on *τοῦ εἰσάγοντος*, *Apol.* 35 b. The irony comes out in οὕτως (ita not tam) *εἶ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε.* ἦ conveys very vigorously the covert reproof of the whole question, *are you really?* ἤ would be comparatively weak. See App.

31. **μητρός**: for a similar order of words, *cf. Prot.* 346 a, *ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι (sc. αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν) μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.* *Cf.* also Hom. *Od.* IX. 367, *μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατὴρ ἠδ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι.*

32. **ἡ πατρίς**: by the addition of the art. the definite fatherland of each and every man is indicated. *Cf.* below, b, and 54 c. For the art. used as a poss., see G. 141, N. 2; H. 658. *Cf. Henry V.* IV. 6, "He smiled me in *the* face." *Cf.* c below. On the facts, *cf.* Cic. *Off.* I. 17. 57, cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? *Cf.* also Hector's *εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης*, Hom. *Il.* XII. 243. 51 a

33. **ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ**: after the analogy of Homeric expressions like that used by Poseidon of Zeus, *Il.* XV. 195, *μενέτω τριτάτῃ ἐνὶ μοίρῃ, i.e.* in the one of the three parts of the world allotted to him as one of the three sons of Cronos. *Cf.* Eur. *I. T.* 1491, *τῆς σῳζομένης μοίρας εὐδαίμονες ὄντας*, and Hdt. II. 172, *τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τὸν Ἄμασιν Αἰγύπτιοι ἐν οὐδεμίῃ μοίρῃ μεγάλῃ ἦγον (considered of little or no account,* nullo magnopere loco habebant).

34. **σέβεσθαι** κτέ.: the subj. of *σέβεσθαι* is an implied *τινά*, not ἡ πατρίς. b

35. **πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν**: the acc. after *σέβεσθαι, ὑπείκειν*, and *θωπεύειν*, though *ὑπείκειν* should be followed by the dat. See on ξ, 47 e. *Cf.* Liv. XXVII. 34. 14, ut parentium saevitiam, sic patriae patiendo ac ferendo leniendam esse.

36. **πείθειν**: used absolutely, as in *Apol.* 35 c, *to change her mind, to convert to your way of thinking;* some-

πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν 51
τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρω-
θησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δί-
40 καιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον
οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστη-
ρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ c
πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δ'
οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι
45 ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων;
ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως
οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια
ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεν-

51 b times *to propitiate*, as in Hom. *Il.* i. 100, τότε κέν μιν (Ἀπόλλωνα) ἱλασσάμενοι πεπίθοιμεν. *Cf.* c below. The first two ἐάν τε clauses (like εἴτε . . . εἴτε, sive . . . sive), with προστάττῃ understood, are explanatory of ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, while the third takes a new verb with a new apod. The two former are specifications under πάσχειν, the third instances analogous cases where unqualified obedience to the state is necessary. The emergencies of war are taken as typical of a host of others, and then with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ the argument is brought to a head. This elaboration of the period leaves to its own devices ποιητέον ταῦτα (which, grammatically, is subordinate to λέληθέν σε).

40. καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον: a neg. reiteration of ποιητέον ταῦτα. *We must not draw back, we must not retreat, we must not leave the ranks.* Corresponding to these three duties, there were three forms of indictment, ἀστρατείας, δειλίας, λιποταξίου. On the last, *cf. Apol.* 28 e–29 a. ἀτιμία was the penalty involved in all these cases. 15 b

43. ἢ πείθειν: the inf. coming after c an impersonal verbal often depends on an implied δεῖ even when no δεῖ precedes. GMT. 114, 2, N.; H. 991 a. *Cf. Gorg.* 492 d, τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν. — ᾗ . . . πέφυκε: quomodo iustum comparatum sit, an explanation of πείθειν, which implies διδάσκειν (*cf. Apol.* 35 c, διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν).

XIII. **1. σκόπει τοίνυν κτέ.**: an application of the universal truth to a particular instance.

2. ὅτι κτέ.: the relation of δίκαια to ἃ κτέ. is the same in which ἀληθῆ of the clause preceding stands to ταῦτα. Supply an inf. governing ἅ.

νήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων 51
ὧν οἷοί τε ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, d
ὅμως προαγορεύομεν, τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων
τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει
πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν
ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται.
καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγο-
ρεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ
ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ
ποι ἐλθών, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ.
ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε e
δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τἆλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν
τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν
ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμὲν ἀδι-
κεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι προ-

51 d 7. **ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ**: there was strict examination (*δοκιμασία*) into every youth's claim to be declared an Athenian citizen when he had completed his eighteenth year. If he proved of Athenian parentage, and otherwise qualified, he was declared of age, and registered in the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* of his deme. See Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece*, pp. 359 f.

9. **λαβόντα**: the dat. might stand here, but *cf. Symp.* 176 **d**, *Rep.* iii. 414 **a**, *Euthyph.* 5 **a**, Eur. *Heracl.* 693, Soph. *El.* 479 ff., Aesch. *Cho.* 410 f., and *Symp.* 188 **d**, *οὗτος ... πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς, here is what makes ready for us all happiness, what makes us capable of being friends and familiars of our fellow-men and also of the gods, who are mightier than we.* See G. 138, N. 8 *a*; H. 941.

11. **ἐάν ... βούληται ... εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν**: *ἐὰν βούληται*, as well as *ὅποι ἂν βούληται* in line 9 is a future supposition and depends on the future force of *ἰέναι* in line 13 (*cf. ᾧ ἂν ἀρέσκωμεν* in 8 above). Then *εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν* comes in naturally as a vaguer supposition subordinated to the others. *If any of you wants (shall want) to go off to a colony, supposing we and the state should not satisfy him.* The notion of a citizen's not being suited by the law is so monstrous that it is stated as remotely as possible. 15 d

12. **ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν**: *cf.* 52 **e**, also the picturesque use of *μέτοικος*, Aesch. *Pers.* 319, and by Eurystheus, in speaking of his own body buried in foreign soil, Eur. *Heracl.* 1030 ff., *θανόντα γάρ με θάψεθ' οὗ τὸ μόρσιμον, ... | καὶ σοὶ μὲν εὔνους καὶ πόλει σωτήριος | μέτοικος ἀεὶ κείσομαι κατὰ χθονός.*

φεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται 51
οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων
ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, 52
ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθεω ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τού-
των οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις
ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθη-
ναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἰποιμι· διὰ
τί δή; ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν
τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω
ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, b
μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς
ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθη-
ναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι
διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσε
οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδη-

51 e 19. **ὁμολογήσας πείθεσθαι**: not *πείσεσθαι*, although *πείσεσθαι* would mean about the same. GMT. 15, 2, N. 2. *Cf.* 52 d below, where *πολιτεύεσθαι* is twice used similarly, with 52 c *in*.

20. **προτιθέντων ἡμῶν**: *ἢ πείθεσθαι ἢ πείθειν* must be supplied from what precedes. The same idea is then expressed negatively and once again positively. *αἵρεσιν προτιθέναι* is also used, meaning to leave a man free to choose. Socrates can never repeat too often that the state is right, as against those who seek to evade the authority of its law. This fact accounts for the clause which follows: *τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ*, a mere repetition of *οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς*.

52 a 22. **θάτερα**: the notion of plurality has here practically disappeared, as is often true also in the case of *ταῦτα*.

52 a XIV. 2. **ἐνέξεσθαι**: *cf.* 54 a, *θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται*. These are cases of the anomalous use of the fut. mid. of these verbs for the fut. pass. — **καί**: *and what is more.*

4. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα: see on *ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα*, 43 c.

b **10. καὶ οὔτε . . . οὔτε**: the prominence of the hypothetical expression (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν κτέ.*) grows less here, and completely disappears with *οὐδέ*, as the contradictory *ἀλλά* plainly shows. *θεωρία* means not only a state embassy to games and festivals (see the passage from the Phaedo quoted on *τὸ πλοῖον*, 43 c) but also attendance at religious festivals, particularly at the great national games, on the part of private individuals. See on *ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας*, 53 a.

12. εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος: [illegible]

μίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπι- 52
θυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι,
ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω
σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσε- c
σθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω ὡς ἀρεσκού-
σης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι
φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς
πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν
ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ
ἤροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτ'
ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέ-
πει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος d
φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς
ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολι-
τεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ
ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι
καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν
πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

52 b the campaigns of Socrates, see on ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ, *Apol.* 28 e. Euphony, perhaps, prevented the addition of οὐδεμίαν after ἀποδημίαν. *Cf.* 52 e and 54 b.

14. **εἰδέναι**: added for the sake of clearness and precision. The result is that the preceding gen. seems to be a case of prolepsis. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* ii. 720, *τόξων εὖ εἰδότες ἰφι μάχεσθαι.* Soph. *El.* 542 f., *ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν "Αιδης τιν' ἴμερον τέκνων | ἡ τῶν ἐκείνης ἔσχε δαίσασθαι πλέον.* The subj. or obj. of the inf. is often put by anticipation as the obj. of its governing verb, noun, or adj.

c 17. **καὶ . . . ἐποιήσω**: is freed from its connexion with ὡμολόγεις, to which, however, *τά τε ἄλλα* is still attached. *See on καὶ γέγονε, Apol.* 36 a. This irregularity was hardly avoidable, since a participle would have been clumsy, and the idea does not suit a clause with ὅτι. Accordingly it was hardly possible to subordinate it to *πολιτεύεσθαι.* 52 c

18. **ἔτι τοίνυν**: transition to a new point, which, however, remains closely connected with the leading idea.

19. **φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι**: *cf. Apol.* 37 c and see on *τιμᾶται θανάτου, Apol.* 36 b.

20. **τότε μέν**: *cf. Apol.* 37 c–38 a.

21. **ἐκαλλωπίζου**: *cf. Apol.* 20 c, *ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν.*

23. **ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει**: not *ashamed of those words*, but, *ashamed to face those words.* H. 712. The words are personified and confront him with his disgrace. *Cf.* 46 b.

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. 52

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμο- e
λογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκα-
35 σθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαί-
μονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομεῖ-
σθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν
40 βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χω- 53
λοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφε-
ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς
οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων;

52 d **29. ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ**: *not merely in your professions.* That ὡμολογηκέναι is the verb with which ἔργῳ is connected appears from the context. *Cf.* 51 e.

30. ἄλλο τι ἤ: see on ἄλλο τι ἤ, *Apol.* 24 c, and *cf. Phaed.* 79 c quoted below.

32. ἡμᾶς αὐτούς: without any reflexive meaning. *Cf. Phaed.* 79 a, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἡ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή. But *cf.* 54 c.

e **35. ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα**: *cf. Apol.* 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.

38. ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε κτέ.: Plato, like many others, often praises these states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (*Mem.* iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. *Cf.* Eur. *Andr.* 595 ff., οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βούλοιτό τις| σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη . . .| δρόμους παλαίστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνασχετοὺς ἐμοὶ | κοινὰς ἔχουσι. κᾆτα θαυμάζειν χρεὼν | εἰ μὴ γυναῖκας σώφρονας παι- 52 e
δεύετε;

53 a **40. ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας**: *cf. Phaedr.* 230 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ξεναγουμένῳ (*a stranger come to see the sights in town*) τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν (*foreign parts*) ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι. Socrates answers: συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε, φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι.

43. δῆλον ὅτι: appended at the end of the sent. by way of emphasis without having any place in the const.

νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε 53
πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξελθών.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ b
ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ
τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ
Μέγαράδε,—εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἥξεις,
ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται
τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμε-

53 a See on ὢν ὄντων, *Apol.* 37 b. H. 1049, 1 a. *Cf.* Eur. *Suppl.* 396, Καδμεῖος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ σάφ' οἶδ' ὅτι, κήρυξ. Ar. *Clouds*, ἀδικοῦντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ κακουργοῦντ', οἶδ' ὅτι. Its stress is given chiefly to καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

44. **οὐκ ἐμμένεις**: a more vivid form of question than ἐμμενεῖς. The laws give answer to their own question in ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, which implies ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς. Socrates might have said ἀλλ' ἐμμένω.

45. **καταγέλαστος**: with reference to his preceding operations. *Cf.* 52 c above, σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν κτέ.

XV. 1. **σκόπει**: prefixed to an independent sent. just as ὁρᾷς often is. *Cf.* 47 a and *Prot.* 336 b. — **παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων**: this = ἐὰν παραβῇς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. The pres. marks the continuance of the action.

b 5. **σχεδόν τι**: this adv. use of τι is common with πάνυ, σχεδόν, πλέον, μᾶλλον and πολύ. — **πρῶτον μέν**: the corresponding clause follows below (d) in a different form. See on ἀλλά, 50 d.

7. **Μέγαράδε**: see App. and also G. 61; H. 219. — **εὐνομοῦνται γάρ**: for the facts, see on ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε, 52 e, and *cf.* Soph. *O. C.* 919 ff., καίτοι σε Θῆβαί γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν· | οὐ γὰρ φιλοῦσιν ἄνδρας ἐκδίκους τρέφειν. In Thebes, before and during the Peloponnesian war, there was a moderate oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος, different from the δυναστεία ὀλίγων of the time of the Persian wars) in political sympathy with Sparta. Megara also had an oligarchical form of government, and had been, since the battle of Coroneia (447 B.C.), on the Spartan side. 53 b

8. **τούτων**: referring either to the cities (instead of ἐν τούτοις) or to their inhabitants. *Cf.* Hom. *Od.* xxiii. 319, ἠδ' ὡς Τηλέπυλον Λαιστρυγονίην ἀφίκοντο, | οἳ νῆάς τ' ὄλεσαν καὶ ἐυκνήμιδας ἑταίρους.

9. **ὑποβλέψονται**: suggestive of the Homeric ὑπόδρα ἰδών. "They will look upon you with suspicion." The implication of suspicion is conveyed by the ὑπό in ὑφορᾶν, ὑποψία, as in Xen. *An.* ii. 4. 10, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ὑφορῶντες τούτους αὐτοὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐχώρουν ἡγεμόνας ἔχοντες.

νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν 53
ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων c
διαφθορεύς ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν d
τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευά-

53 b 10. **καὶ βεβαιώσεις** κτέ.: **δόξα** and **δοκεῖν** in the same sense, as in 44 c. "Indicibus opinionem confirmabis ut recte videantur tulisse sententiam." Wolf.

c 17. **ἤ**: see App.

19. **ἂν φανεῖσθαι**: see on **οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος**, *Apol.* 30 b.

20. **τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα**: little more than a periphrasis for **Σωκράτης**. *Cf.* **τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα**, *Apol.* 20 c; *Hipp. Ma.* 286 e, **φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν**, *I should be a wretched ignoramus.* Eur. *Heracl.* 57 f., **οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ὅς πάροιθ' αἱρήσεται | τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύναμιν ἀντ' Εὐ-**
d **ρυσθέως.** — **οἴεσθαί γε χρή**: a very common way of answering one's own question. *Cf.* 54 b.

22. **ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ** κτέ.: Socrates speaks as if the fact were familiar to Crito. The nobles of Thessaly were rich and hospitable, and bore the reputation of being violent and licentious. Some light is thrown upon the whole subject by the character of Meno given by Xenophon, *An.* ii. 6. 21 ff. *Cf.* also Dem. i. 22, **τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν ἄπιστα ἦν δῆπου φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.** This chiefly relates to their political character. *Cf.* also the ironical words of Socrates on the Thessalians in Plato's *Meno*, 70 a b. 53 d

24. **σκευήν τέ τινα** κτέ.: to this first clause the disjunctive **ἢ διφθέραν ἢ ἄλλα** is subordinated. The **διφθέρα** was, according to the Schol. on Ar. *Nub.* 73, a **ποιμενικὸν περιβόλαιον. σκευή** and **ἐνσκευάζεσθαι** refer to change of costume, and are also used of the costumes of actors. *Cf.* Ar. *Achar.* 383 f., where Dicaeopolis, before beginning his defence, says: **νῦν οὖν μοι πρῶτον πρὶν λέγειν ἐάσατε ἐνσκευάσα-**

ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ 53
μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ, σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ
λοιποῦ ὄντος ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπι- e
θυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὅς ἐρεῖ;
ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες,
πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάν-
τας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν
Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν;
λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς
ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει 54
ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετ-
ταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους
ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ,

53 d σθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον. *Cf.* also *ibid.* 436. σχῆμα, on the other hand, relates to the other disguises of face and figure necessary to complete the transformation.

28. ὡς τὸ εἰκός: that is according e to the law of nature. — ἐτόλμησας: see on τόλμης, *Apol.* 38 d, and App.

29. οὐδεὶς ὅς: *will there be nobody to say this? i.e.* "absolutely every one," expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb "to be" is omitted.

30. εἰ δὲ μή: *otherwise.* GMT. 52, 1, N. 2; H. 906, 6. — ἀκούσει . . . ἀνάξια: like ἀκούειν κακά (ὑπό τινος) is the passive of λέγειν κακά. *Cf.* 50 e. The καί between πολλά and ἀνάξια should not be translated.

31. δή: *accordingly.* He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχόμενος. — τί ποιῶν ἢ κτέ.: the partic. goes with the verb of the foregoing clause. This cannot 53 e be reproduced in Eng., "in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to Thessaly to eat and drink." No ἄλλο is needed after τί.

35. ἀλλὰ δή: a new objection raised 54 a and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Crito said, 45 c–46 a. — ἀλλά: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, "but are you actually willing?" *etc.* See on *Apol.* 37 c.

38. ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο κτέ.: *i.e.* in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολαύειν is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. *El.* 1311 ff., οὐχ ἥδ' | οἰκτρὰ. ΔΙ. πέπονθεν, πλὴν ὅτι λείπει πόλιν Ἀργείων. ΟΡ. καί τίνες ἄλλαι στοναχαὶ μείζους | ἢ γῆς πατρῴας ὅρον ἐκλείπειν; and *Phoen.* 388 ff., where Polynices, answering Iocasta's question, τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἢ κακὸν μέγα; says μέγιστον· ἔργῳ δ' ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἢ λόγῳ. *Cf. Richard II.* i. 3, —

αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ 54
παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι
οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν
ἀποδημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημή-
σῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι
τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί γε χρή. b

XVI. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς
τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν
μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν
ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον
εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν
οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν
μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων
ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀντα- c
δικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας
τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργα-

54 a What is my sentence then but speechless death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?

and Dante, *Paradiso*, XVII., —

Thou shalt abandon everything beloved
Most tenderly, and this the arrow is
Which first the bow of banishment shoots forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in the *Odyssey*, *e.g. Od.* i. 58, ἱέμενος καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθρώσκοντα νοῆσαι ἧς γαίης, ix. 27 f., οὔ τοι ἐγώ γε | ἧς γαίης δύναμαι γλυκερώτερον ἄλλο ἰδέσθαι, xx. 99.

39. **θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται**: see on ἐνέξεσθαι, 52 **a**.

44. **τῶν . . . εἶναι**: explanation of αὐτῶν. σοί is not to be connected b with φασκόντων. — **οἴεσθαί γε χρή**: *cf.* 53 **c**.

XVI. 3. **πρό**: after περὶ πλείονος. 54 b See on πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, 48 **d**.

5. **ἄμεινον . . . δικαιότερον**: see on ἄμεινον, *Apol.* 19 **a**.

6. **οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν**: the laws add this for Crito's benefit. *Cf.* 45 c–46 **a**.

7. **νῦν μέν**: assuming that Socrates has made up his mind not to take Crito's advice.

8. **οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν κτέ.**: the laws add this in the vein of what has gone before.

9. **ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων**: referring to the c fallible mortals who act as guardians and representatives of the blameless laws. See Introd. 30–35. *Cf. Apol.* 24 d, ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.

11. **παραβάς, ἐργασάμενος**: subordinated to the foregoing partics.

σάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους 54
καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι,
καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμε-
νῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπο-
λέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ
λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς. d

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ
δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ-
σιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων
βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ
ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα,
μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

54 c **14. οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι**: *cf.* Soph. *Ant.* 450 ff., *οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε, | οὐδ' ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη κτέ.*

d XVII. 1. **ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων**: Socrates speaks with great tenderness in order to make his final refusal the less hard to bear. The exceptional feature in this form of address lies in the mention of Crito's name at the end.

2. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες: *κορυβαντιᾶν* means *act like the Corybantes.* These were priests of Phrygian Cybele, whose orgiastic rites were accompanied by dances and deafening music. Here a species of madness seems to be indicated, under the influence of which men imagined that they heard the flutes that were used in Corybantian revels. *Cf. Ion,* 534 a, *ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν,* and the song of the bacchants in Eur. *Bacch.* 114–129 and 155–161,—

Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance; 54
Soon with his revellers Bacchus advance; d
Into the hills, the hills shall he fare,
Joining the host of his women-folk there.
Far from their homes and their weaving they came,
Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name.

O wild Curetes' vaulted lair!
O hallowed haunts of Crete!
Where new-born Zeus found faithful care,
And kind protection meet
In caverns safe from every snare.

Corybantes, wearing helms three-rimmed,
Stretched skins to make my drum's full round;
Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed,
With drums, and, with the flute's shrill sound
Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned.
. . . . . .
Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be;
Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old;
Sing to the Evian god evoe!
Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes
Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy;
Instruments holy the holy employ.

5. ὅσα γε κτέ.: a limitation added to soften the assertion. See on *ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια,* 46 e. No obj. is needed with *λέγῃς. λέγειν παρὰ κτέ.* comes

ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπεὶ- 54 e
δὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

54 d very near the meaning of ἀντιλέγειν. *Cf.* 48 d. *Cf.* also the omission of the obj. ἐμέ with the preceding ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι κτέ.

e 8. ἔα: used abs. with a following subjv. or imv. to dismiss a matter under discussion. *Cf. Charm.* 163 e, ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. *Euthyd.* 302 c, ἔα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε. —ταύτῃ: the repetition of the same word is effective.

9. ὁ θεός: see on τῷ θεῷ, *Apol.* 19 a. Here, as at the end of his defence proper, *Apol.* 35 d, and at the end of his closing words in court, *Apol.* 42 a, Socrates mentions ὁ θεός. Dante closes each one of the three parts of his great poem with a reference to *the stars*. This is no accident in either case, though Plato had a philosopher's reason which Dante could not give, except for the closing line of the Paradiso, which is ὁ θεός translated into the language of the poet, "L' Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre stelle," *The love which moves the sun and the other stars.* 54 e

MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

SINCE all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Ms. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus's tetralogies, and also naming the best Ms. in which each tetralogy is preserved: —

I.	Euthyphro.	Apology.	Crito.	Phaedo.	*Clarkianus*(B).
II.	Cratylus.	Theaetetus.	Sophist.	Statesman.	" "
III.	Parmenides.	Philebus.	Symposium.	Phaedrus.	" "
IV.	Alcibiades I.	Alcibiades II.	Hipparchus.	Anterastae.	" "
V.	Theages.	Charmides.	Laches.	Lysis.	" "
VI.	Euthydemus.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Meno.	" "
VII.	Hippias maior.	Hippias minor.	Io.	Menexenus.	*Venetus* T.
VIII.	Clitophon.	Republic.	Timaeus.	Critias.	*Parisinus* A.
IX.	Minos.	Laws.	Epinomis.	Letters.	" "

Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is *Clarkianus*, and the least trustworthy is *Venetus* T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetypus. This parent Ms. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Ms. now preserved represents an *incomplete* copy of Vol. I. of the Archetypus; this is the codex *Clarkianus*, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex *Venetus* T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetypus is codex *Parisinus* A.

The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows:—

I. CODEX CLARKIANUS, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Ms. is called also *Bodleianus*. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, pp. 105–118; and Daniel Clarke, Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

II. CODEX VENETUS T, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the *Clarkianus* entirely fails, *i.e.* for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. PARISINUS A, No. 1807 (formerly 94 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Clitophon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Mss. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's Jahresbericht (9, 5, 1, pp. 178–188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

IMPORTANT EDITIONS OF PLATO'S COMPLETE WORKS.

In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of *Stephanus* are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of Stephanus (Henri Estienne) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) **b c d e** placed down the margin.

PLATONIS QUAE EXTANT, gr. Ad ed. *Henr. Stephani* accurate expressa cum Mars. Ficini interpr. Lat. Praemittitur liber III. Laertii de vita et dogmatibus Platonis. Acc. var. lect. studio societatis Bipontinae. 12 Voll. Biponti, 1781–1787.

PLATONIS DIALOGI. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione *Imm. Bekker*. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et scholia. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)

PLATONIS DIALOGI. Text. ad fidem codd. Florent., Paris., Vindobb. aliorumque recogn. *Gdfr. Stallbaum*. 12 Tom. Lipsiae, 1821–1825.

PLATONIS OPERA OMNIA. Rec. prolegomenis et comment. illustr. *Gdfr. Stallbaum*. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)

PLATONIS OPERA QUAE FERUNTUR OMNIA. Recogn. *I. G. Baiterus, Ioa. C. Orellius, A. G. Winckelmannus*. Acced. variet. lectionis Stephanianae, Bekkerianae, Stallbaumianae, scholia, Timaei lexicon, nominum index. 2 Pts. Turici, 1839–1842.

PLATONIS DIALOGI secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione *Caroli Friderici Hermanni*. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.

PLATONIS OPERA, QUAE FERUNTUR OMNIA, ad codd. denuo collatos, ed. *Martinus Schanz*. Ed. ster. Lipsiae, 1875–1877.

IMPORTANT OR CONVENIENT EDITIONS OF THE APOLOGY AND OF THE CRITO.

PLATONIS DIALOGI V. Amatores, Euthyphro, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo. Recens. notisque illustravit *Nath. Forster*. Edit. III. Oxonii (1745), 1765.

PLATONIS DIALOGI IV. Euthyphro, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo. E rec. *Henr. Stephani*. Gr. Ad fid. codd. Mss. Tubing. August. aliorumque et librorum editorum veterum rec. animadvers. illustravit, tertium edid. *Ioa. Frid. Fischer*. Lipsiae, 1783.

PLATONIS DIALOGI IV. Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum annotatione critica et exegetica, cur. *I. Er. Biester*. Ed. V. Cur. *Ph. Buttmann*. Berolini (1780), 1830.

PLATONIS APOLOGIA, CRITO ET PHAEDO. Accedit emendationis specimen in nonullis reliquorum dialogorum. Edidit *R. B. Hirschig*. Trajecti ad Rhen, 1853.

PLATONIS APOLOGIA SOCRATIS ET CRITO. Ed. V. aliquanto auct. et. emendat. quam cur. *M. Wohlrab*. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. I., Section 1, of *Teubner's* ten-volume publication of Stallbaum's complete Plato mentioned above.)

The APOLOGY OF PLATO, with a revised text and English notes, and a digest of Platonic idioms. By the *Rev. James Riddell*, M.A. Oxford, 1867.

PLATO'S APOLOGY AND CRITO, with notes. By *W. S. Tyler*. New York, 1860.

PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO, with notes. By *W. Wagner*. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

PLATONS VERTEIDIGUNGSREDE DES SOCRATES UND KRITON. Erklärt von *Dr. Christian Cron*. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by Dr. Cron and Dr. Julius Deuschle.)

CRITICAL NOTES.

THESE notes are Dr. Cron's necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron's text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. *Bem.* denotes Dr. Cron's "Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criton, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-band der Jahrb. für classische Philologie," pp. 64–132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 a, p. 55 (1). **ὅ τι**: with S. Cron fails to give any reason for his eccentric preference, here and elsewhere, for **ὅτι**.

17 b, p. 56 (13). **γοῦν**: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). **οὖν**, B (first hand) and Cron following S.

17 b, p. 56 (14). **δέ μου**: **δ' ἐμοῦ**, SW with Heindorf.

17 c, p. 57 (17). **ἀλλ'**: with Bessarion's Ms. (Venetus E). **ἀλλά**, Cron and S following B.

17 c, p. 57 (18). **ὀνόμασι**: with B. **ὀνόμασιν**, Cron and S with Bessarion's Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).

17 d, p. 58 (27). **πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα**: Cron with S following B omits the **πλείω**, which is found only in inferior Mss. Hermann adopted **πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα**.

18 a, p. 59 (31). **ὥς γέ μοι**: with S. **ὥς γ' ἐμοί**, W.

18 a, p. 59 (2). **ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα**: [**ψευδῆ**] **κατηγορημένα**, S with Hirschig.

18 a, p. 59 (4). **γεγόνασι**: with the best Mss. **γεγόνασιν**, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Mss., but no Mss. cited by S reads **γεγόνασιν**.

18 b, p. 60 (9). **ἐμοῦ**: the Mss. read **ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές**. Hermann bracketed **μᾶλλον . . . ἀληθές** as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes **ἐμοῦ μὰ τὸν . . . οὐδὲν ἀληθές**. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Mss. of slight value, read **ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές**. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says "the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words **μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές**."

18 b, p. 60 (10). **φροντιστὴς**: Albert von Bamberg (Fleckeisen's Jahrbücher,

113, 10) proposes to cut out **φροντιστής**, because no exact parallel to this acc. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger's citation of various adjs. joined with **εἶναι**, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remoter) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with **φροντιστής** (*cf. Symp.* 6. 6, **τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστής** and *Mem.* iv. 7. 6, **τῶν οὐρανίων φροντιστής**). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore **ἅπαξ εἰρημένα** are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates's personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). **οἱ ταύτην**: Heindorf. **ταύτην**, W following the Mss.

18 c, p. 61 (13). **ἀκούοντες**: **ἀκούσαντες**, S following B (first hand).

18 d, p. 62 (20). **εἴ τις**: **εἰ μή τις**, W. See his prolegg., p. 42.

18 d, p. 62 (21). **κωμῳδιοποιός**: with S following B. Elsewhere **κωμῳδοποιός** (**τραγῳδοποιός**) is found in the best Mss.

18 d, p. 63 (23). **πάντες**: **πάντων**, W. See his prolegg., p. 42.

18 e, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation **εἶεν** has no connexion with **εἶναι**. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like **εὐοῖ, εὐάν** (bacchic interjections), and the Attic **ταὼς**.

19 c, p. 65 (13). **σοφός ἐστι· μὴ φύγοιμι**: with Riddell. **σοφός ἐστι, μὴ φύγοιμι**, Cron.

19 d, p. 66 (19). **σμικρὸν**: with inferior Mss. **μικρὸν**, Cron and S following B. Judging from other cases, *cf.* below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), **σμικρόν** and **μικρόν** have about equal claims in any given place.

19 d, p. 66 (1). **οὐδὲν ἔστιν**: with S. **οὐδέν [ἐστιν]**, Cron. **οὐδέν ἐστιν**, W.

19 e, p. 67 (7). **οἷός τ' ἐστιν**: [**οἷός τ' ἐστὶν**], S.

19 e, p. 67 (9). **πείθουσι**: **πείθουσιν**, S.

20 a, p. 67 (10). **σφίσι**: with B (second hand) and other Mss. **σφίσιν**, Cron following S with B (first hand).

20 a, p. 67 (17). **καλώ τε καὶ ἀγαθὼ**: following B with S W. Venetus T reads **καλὼ κἀγαθώ**. In his preface to Vol. II., Schanz very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.

20 c, p. 68 (26). **ἔχοι**: B. **ἔχει**, S W.

20 c, p. 69 (5). **εἰ μή τι . . . πολλοί**: [**εἰ μή τι . . . πολλοί**], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 113, 5) argues against bracketing the words, "that the meaning of **περιττόν** is quantitative while that of **ἀλλοῖον** is qualitative." S (Bursian's Jahresbericht, 9, 5, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.

20 d, p. 69 (8). ἐστὶ: ἔστιν, S W — "ἐστι(ν erasa) B D," S.

20 d, p. 69 (8). πεποίηκε: πεποίηκεν, S W.

20 e, p. 70 (18). μηδ' ἐὰν: with Heusde (Spec. crit. p. 11). μηδὲ ἄν, Cron following S with B.

20 e, p. 70 (20). τὸν λέγοντα: τὰ λεχθέντα, Liebhold.

20 e, p. 71 (21). ἐστι: ἐστιν, S W.

21 a, p. 71 (23). ἑταῖρός τε καί: [ἑταῖρός τε καί], S with Ludwig. Müller-Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. *Clouds*, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφήττιος was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* upon Chaerephon, "πικροὶ γὰρ οἱ Σφήττιοι καὶ συκοφάνται," Schol. on Ar. *Plut.* 720. *Cf. Laches*, 197 c, *fin.*, with Stallbaum's note.

21 c, p. 73 (11). σοφώτερός ἐστι: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἔστι.

21 c, p. 73 (14). καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: [καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with πρὸς ὃν κτέ.

21 d, p. 74 (23). ἔοικά γ' οὖν: with Bäumlein. ἔοικα γοῦν, S W.

21 e, p. 74 (2). καὶ λυπούμενος: [καὶ] λυπούμενος, S with Cobet.

22 a, p. 76 (11). ἵνα μοι: ἵνα μή μοι, S with H. Stephanus, and Madvig. The latter (Adv. Crit. I. p. 367) says "Sed residet scrupulus in καί, quod aptum non est."

22 b, p. 77 (17). μάλιστα: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 556) suggests κάλλιστα without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μάλιστα might be compared Hor. *Sat.* i. 10, 58, Versiculos magis factos et euntes mollius.

22 c, p. 78 (29). τῷ αὐτῷ: τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf's Annotatio critica in Apologiam Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCV.

22 d, p. 78 (7). καὶ . . . δημιουργοί: [καὶ . . . δημιουργοί], S with Hirschig.

23 a, p. 80 (9). τοῦτο: with Stallbaum following inferior Mss. τοῦτ' οὐ, S W with F. A. Wolf. The reading of B and all the best Mss. is τοῦτον, which Ast defends (Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Vol. I. part 2, p. 104). See *Bem.* p. 90 f.

23 c, p. 82 (8). οὐχ αὑτοῖς: οὐκ αὐτοῖς, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὑτοῖς, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discomfiture. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, *i.e.* with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see d below, *ad fin.* Further, τούτοις would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὐτοῖς.

23 d, p. 82 (11). ἀγνοοῦσιν: ἀμφιγνοοῦσιν, S. ἀποροῦσιν, Ast. Cobet ex-

punges the words ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 c, p. 83 (15). οἶμαι: with Stallbaum. οἴομαι, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has οἶμαι twice, see lines 5 and 17. It looks like superstition to write οἴομαι here.

23 e, p. 83 (17). ξυντεταγμένως: ξυντεταμένως, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Ms.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἐστι: Cron and S write ἐστιν because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ὥσπερ: ὡς, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τουτοισι: εἰς τουτουσι, S with Cobet. See Kr. *Spr.* 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). ποιοῦσι: Cron following S writes ποιοῦσιν because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after εἰσι in this line do not lead them to write εἰσιν.

25 a, p. 87 (19). οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: [οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See *Bem.* p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). πότερόν ἐστιν: with the Mss. πότερον ἔστιν, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). ὃ τάν: with S, who deviates but little from ὃ τὰν, the reading of B. ὥταν, Cron. W reads ὃ τᾶν. Krause explains it as meaning ὦ Ζεῦ.

25 d, p. 89 (7). ἀποκρίνου: ἀπόκριναι, W.

25 e, p. 89 (19). ἤ, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων: ἢ διαφθείρω ἄκων, S with Stephanus. Naber reads ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρω, διαφθείρω ἄκων.

26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ ἀκουσίων: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.

26 a, p. 90 (24). ὅ: οὗ, S. Heindorf reads ὅ . . . ποιῶ, ποιῶν.

26 a, p. 90 (1). δῆλον: with Cron's seventh edition following B. δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, Cron's eighth edition with Schanz, who, however, says of the two words (Novae Commentationes Platonicae, p. 163), "Verba minime necessaria velim deleantur."

26 c, p. 91 (10). τουτοισί: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's r). Cron following S writes τούτοις with Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π). τοῦτοις, B.

26 c, p. 91 (13). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes ἀλλὰ with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). Ἀναξαγόρου: [Ἀναξαγόρου], S. Baiter requires Σωκράτους.

26 e, p. 93 (26). ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις: Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, Berlin, 1882, p. 434, Rem. 4) says, "The notion that these writings were themselves sold ἐν τῇ ὀρχήστρᾳ is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should ἐνίοτε have been used? In fact, καὶ δὴ καί appends to the βιβλία something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the βιβλία."

26 e, p. 94 (28). σοι δοκῶ . . . νομίζειν: σοι [δοκῶ] . . . νομίζω, S who follows B in respect of νομίζω.

27 b, p. 95 (10). ἐγώ σοι: following B. ἐγὼ σοὶ, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on ἐγώ, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 e, p. 98 (30). [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων, τοῦς ἡμιόνους: with S. ἢ [καὶ] ὄνων [τοὺς ἡμιόνους], Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket ἢ with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing καί and τοὺς ἡμιόνους.

27 e, p. 98 (32). [ταῦτα] . . . τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην: with S. ταῦτα . . . [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην], Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην but ταῦτα should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain ἀποπειρώμενος.

27 e, p. 98 (35). [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ: οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 36, 1, p. 145), "Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις . . . ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα [καὶ δαίμονας καὶ θεοὺς] ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεῖα] μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν." Goebel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining οὐ before τοῦ αὐτοῦ, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that πείθοις is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with ὡς he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject οὐ and to consider that μήτε ἥρωας was added along with the rest in Meletus's anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term δαίμονες, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might — so far as Meletus's immediate purpose went — have been omitted, but the preceding δαιμόνια make its introduction here indispensable. On Meletus's ascription to Socrates of belief in δαιμόνια is based Socrates's assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called δαίμονες or more commonly ἥρωες.

27 e, p. 98 (36). αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: αὖ [τοῦ αὐτοῦ], S with Hirschig.

27 e, p. 98 (36). μήτε ἥρωας: bracketed as a gloss by S.

28 a, p. 98 (7). καὶ ἄλλους: καλοὺς, S with Hirschig.

28 b, p. 99 (15). πράττῃ: πράττῃ τι, W following Mss.

28 c, p. 100 (21). ὦ παῖ: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). τάξῃ ἢ: with B and other best Mss. Cron following S writes τάξῃ with Bessarion's Ms., strengthened by various authors who quote τάξῃ, omitting the ἢ.

29 a, p. 103 (9). δεινόν τἂν: δεινὸν τἂν, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). ἀδικεῖν: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 119, 5, p. 412) to substitute ἀπιστεῖν.

29 c, p. 105 (31). διαφθαρήσονται: following B. διαφθαρήσοιντο, Hirschig following Bessarion's Ms.

29 d, p. 105 (36). ἄνδρες: following B. ὦ ἄνδρες, inferior Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). αἰσχύνει: B. αἰσχύνῃ, other Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). ἐπιμελούμενος: B. ἐπιμελόμενος, Bessarion's Ms.

30 a, p. 107 (54). ἐν τῇ πόλει: Heller prefers καὶ τῇ πόλει.

30 b, p. 107 (59). λέγων' οὐκ: λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ, W.

30 b, p. 108 (65). ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε: ἢ μή, ἀφίετε, Schlenger, in Philol. 41, 3, p. 532 f.

30 c, p. 109 (6). οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω: Wecklein (Rh. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires οἷον ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, προσκείμενον . . . μύωπος, 30 e. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἐμὲ μὲν γάρ has been developed. The point is that ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ κτέ is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τοιοῦτον ὄντα.

30 d, p. 109 (11). ἀτιμώσειεν: with Hermann. ἀτιμάσειεν, W following Mss.

30 e, p. 110 (19). [ὑπὸ του θεοῦ]: S with Hirschig. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Riddell.

30 e, p. 110 (21). ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος: unless ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.

30 e, p. 110 (21). οἷον is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ὅς with τοιοῦτόν τινα, but with ἐμέ. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.

31 a, p. 111 (29). διατελοῖτ' ἄν: διατελοῖτε ἄν, Cron following S with the best Mss.

31 a, p. 111 (30). ἐπιπέμψειε: with B and other Mss. Cron following S writes ἐπιπέμψειεν on the authority of Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π) and of an erasure in B.

31 b, p. 111 (37). μέντοι: μέν, S with Cobet and Hermann.

31 b, p. 111 (38). εἶχον: εἶχεν, S with Wex.

31 c, p. 112 (2). πολυπραγμονῶ: πολυπραγμονῶν, S following inferior Mss.

31 d, p. 113 (6). [φωνή]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed. φωνή, B. Cron omits the word.

31 d, p. 113 (12). παλαι: bracketed by S with Cobet.

32 a, p. 113 (18). ἀλλὰ: with S and Bessarion's Ms. ἀλλ', Cron.

32 a, p. 114 (5). ἅμα ἀπολοίμην: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T. ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἄν, Cron following B. S, previously to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: "Plato scripsit ἅμα, quo cum dittographia ἅμα ἄν conjuncta est; inde lectionum varietas nata; ἄν ex antecedentibus posse suppleri notum."

32 b, p. 115 (8). Ἀντιοχίς: bracketed by Hirschig and S. The preceding ἡμῶν certainly makes it plausible that Ἀντιοχίς may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See *Bem.* p. 104.

32 b, p. 117 (12). ἠναντιώθην: ἠναντιώθην ἡμῖν, W. Döring (Fleckeisen's

Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows *either* (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence that he was) the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, *or* (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytanes against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since ἠναντιώθην would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καί is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἐρωτᾶν: Goebel prefers ἐρωτῶν.

33 b, p. 120 (19). ἄλλοι: following B. οἱ ἄλλοι, S W.

33 e, p. 123 (24). ὁ Θεοζοτίδου: with Bessarion's Ms. Θεοζοτίδου, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). τούτου: Goebel prefers τούτους.

34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀναμνησθεὶς: ἀναμνησθεὶς, Cron and S following B, where ἀναμνησθεὶς is read.

34 c, p. 125 (6). αὐτοῦ: B. αὐτοῦ, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αὐτοῦ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ παιδία (meaning *all* his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 126 (14). εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες: with S and Stallbaum. εἰσὶ μέν ποῦ τινες, Cron.

34 d, p. 126 (17). υἱεῖς: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, I. 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: "une série d'exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme υἱός. . . . A partir de la conquête romaine, υἱός se rencontre dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que ὑός; la forme de la langue commune finit par l'emporter, et c'est la seule qu'emploient les copistes." The Attic form without ι is preserved only in Parisinus (A). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

34 e, p. 127 (26). τὸ Σωκράτη: τῷ Σωκράτει, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardy. Nevertheless, the analogy of προσήκειν and ἀρέσκειν does not bear unqualified application to δεδόχθαι. The reading of B is τῶι σωκράτει, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, δέδοκται τοῖσι πρώτοισι τῶν μαντίων αὐτοῖσι ἀπόλλυσθαι.

35 b, p. 128 (38). ὑμᾶς: B. ἡμᾶς, S W.

35 d, p. 129 (11). [πάντως]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets νὴ Δία πάντως. πάντως, Cron following B.

36 a, p. 131 (4). **τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο**: [**τὸ γεγονὸς**] **τοῦτο**, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.

36 a, p. 131 (7). **ἀποπεφεύγῃ**: S argues for **ἀπεπεφεύγῃ** in Vol. XII. p. xiii.

36 c, p. 133 (9). **ὀντα**: with S W following E. **ὄντα**, Cron following B. Cron defends **ὄντα** in his *Bem.* p. 109 f. The example quoted from Tac. *Ann.* vi. 22 (where see Nipperdey's note) is not convincing.

36 c, p. 133 (11). [**ὢν**]: with S W. **ὢν**, Cron. S says (Studien, p. 35) of the whole passage: "Hermann was for doing away with **ἐνταῦθα ᾖα**. But certainly **δέ** requires a finite verb. Simply bracket **ὢν** and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who construed **ἐνταῦθα ᾖα** closely with **ἐπιχειρῶν**, after the analogy of Phaedo 200 b, **ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι**. Of course **ἐνταῦθα** makes any such explanation absurd."

36 d, p. 134 (22). **μᾶλλον**: Liebhold proposes, not to bracket **μᾶλλον**, but to change it into **γε ἄλλο**.

36 d, p. 134 (25). **δοκεῖν εἶναι**: **δοκεῖν** [**εἶναι**], S with Hermann.

37 b, p. 136 (16). **τούτου**: **τοῦ**, S W with Meiser.

37 c, p. 136 (18). **τοῖς ἕνδεκα**: [**τοῖς ἕνδεκα**], S with Heindorf.

37 c, p. 136 (22). **μεντἄν**: **μέντ' ἄν**, W.

37 e, p. 137 (4). **ἐστὶ**: Cron following S writes **ἐστὶν** because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). **τοῦτ'**: with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes **τοῦτο** with B.

38 a, p. 138 (12). **ῥᾴδιον**: **ῥᾴδια**, W. See Wohlrab's prolegomena, p. 39.

39 b, p. 141 (34). **ὀφλών**: Cobet and S, Vol. V. p. x. **ὄφλων**, W following B T. See Wohlrab in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1876, p. 127.

39 b, p. 141 (36). **μέν που**: Heller proposes **μὲν οὖν**, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Mss., which, however, also retain **που**.

39 c, p. 142 (7). **εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι**: **εἰργάσασθέ με οἰόμενοι**, S with Winckelmann. **εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι**, W. Hermann added **μέν** after **οἰόμενοι** on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.

39 d, p. 143 (14). **οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ'**: following B according to Gaisford. **οὐ γάρ ἐσθ'**, S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford's report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). **ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου**: [**ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου**], S with Schleiermacher.

40 c, p. 145 (5). **τοῦ τόπου τοῦ**: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.

41 a, p. 147 (29). **ἐθέλω**: with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes **θέλω** with the best Mss. Here, and *Phaedr.* 249 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Mss. credit Plato with using **θέλω** after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). **ταὐτά ἐστιν**: following S with Bessarion's Ms. **ταὐτ' ἐστὶν**, Cron with best Mss.

41 b, p. 147 (33). τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι: τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι, S.

41 b, p. 148 (34). ἐκείνων, ὡς: ἐκείνων. ὡς, S.

41 b, p. 148 (35). ἀηδὲς: B. ἀηδὴς, W with several Mss.

41 b, p. 148 (36). τίς αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mss. read τίς ἂν αὐτῶν. τίς δὴ αὐτῶν, Cron with S, who adds the δὴ as his own conjecture.

41 b, p. 148 (37). ἔστι: with Mss. ἔστιν, Cron and S, because there are signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).

41 b, p. 148 (39). ἄγοντα: B. ἀγαγόντα, S W following other Mss.

41 c, p. 148 (46). ἀληθῆ: with all Mss. Cron following S writes ἀληθῆ ἐστίν because it is added in the margin of B. S argues against admitting it in *Nov. Comm.* p. 161.

42 a, p. 150 (22). πλὴν ἢ: πλὴν εἰ, S following D. The reading of B cannot be made out, but Gaisford and S incline to think it is πλὴν εἰ.

CRITO.

43 a, p. 151 (1). πρῲ ἔτι ἐστίν: with B. πρῲ ἐστίν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.

43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νυνὶ, W.

43 b, p. 152 (20). πρᾴως: πράως, S following the Mss. The ι subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato πρᾶος is the prevailing orthography. πραΰς is always without ι. S has lately made up his mind to write πρᾷος even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.

43 d, p. 153 (33). δοκεῖ . . . ἥξειν: δοκεῖν . . . ἥξει, S with Buttmann.

43 d, p. 153 (35). τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων]: τούτων τῶν ἀγγελιῶν, W.

44 b, p. 155 (3). ξυμφορά ἐστιν: ξυμφορὰ ἔσται, S with Hirschig.

44 b, p. 155 (3). τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι: Sallier. Hermann keeps the Mss. reading σοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι. Madvig (Adv. p. 368) finds reason for writing σοῦ ἐστερήσομαι in the strange combination of the inf. and fin. moods by μέν and δέ. Rieckher reads πρῶτον μὲν σοῦ ἐστερήσομαι.

44 b, p. 155 (5). ἔτι δὲ: ἔτι δὴ, S. Rieckher strikes out ὡς before οἷός τε.

45 b, p. 158 (19). ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε: ξένοι [οὗτοι] ἐνθάδε, S. ξένοι ἔτι ἐνθάδε, W with the explanation praeterea, praeter me. See Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1877, pp. 222 ff. and Cron's *Bem.* p. 117. It certainly seems far more natural to take ἐνθάδε as a gloss explaining οὗτοι than to regard οὗτοι as a gloss.

45 b, p. 158 (23). ἀποκάμῃς: ἀποκνῇς, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.

46 b, p. 161 (4). οὐ μόνον νῦν: οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, S with A. Nauck. See the *preface to the* third edition of Cron's Apology and Crito (p. xiv. f.).

46 d, p. 162 (19). **νῦν δὲ**: S (XII. p. xviii.) proposes to write **νυνδὴ** following B. But see S, VIII. p. 159.

47 a, p. 163 (30). **οὐχ ἱκανῶς**: **οὐχὶ καλῶς**, S with Hirschig.

47 a, p. 163 (32). **τὰς δ οὔ**: with S. **τὰς δ' οὔ**; [**οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ' οὔ**;], Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 162). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior Mss.

47 c, p. 165 (15). **τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους**: **τὴν δόξαν** [**καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους**], S. **τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους**, Stallbaum. **τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους**, Hirschig.

47 c, p. 165 (18). **ἐστὶ**: **ἔστι**, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on **τί**, on **ποῖ**, and on **εἰς τί**, and not put on the verbs.

47 c, p. 165 (20). **διόλλυσιν**: so it stands corrected in B. **διολλύει**, S following inferior Mss.

47 c d, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron's seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). **Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα**: given to Socrates by W with Buttmann. S brackets **φαίη γὰρ ἄν** and makes Crito's speech include **ἀληθῆ λέγεις**. Goebel proposes **Δῆλα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, φαίη γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες**. If anything is to be omitted, **ἀληθῆ λέγεις** could best be spared.

48 d, p. 169 (15). **οὔτε ἄλλο**: **οὔτ' εἰ ἄλλο**, S with Forster.

48 e, p. 169 (23). **πείσας σε**: with Buttmann. **πεῖσαί σε**, W following the Mss. See Cron's preface to his first edition of the Apol. and Crito, p. xii., also *Bem.* p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41) favors a change of order **πεῖσαί σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν**. Goebel urges **παῦσαί σε**, which would, however, be intolerable after **παῦσαι ἤδη**.

49 a, p. 170 (4). [**ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο**]: Meiser proposes to find room for this between **ἢ** and **πᾶσαι**.

49 b, p. 170 (7). **τηλικοίδε** [**γέροντες**]: with Jacobs. **τηλικοίδε γέροντες**, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in *Lach.* 180 d.

50 c, p. 175 (2). **ἐμμένειν**: **ἐμμενεῖν**, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (10). **τοῖς νόμοις**: [**τοῖς νόμοις**], S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (14). **νόμοι**: [**νόμοι**], S with Hirschig.

50 e, p. 177 (20). **σοὶ**: **σὺ** is preferred by Buttmann, Stallbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). **ἔσται**: S. **ἐξέσται**, W following the Mss. **ἐξ ἴσου ἔσται**, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). **ἦ**: **ἢ**, W following the Mss. S says the first hand in B wrote **ἠ**. See on 53 c.

51 d, p. 180 (12). **ἀρέσκοιμεν**: **ἀρέσκομεν**, S with Madvig.

51 e, p. 181 (19). **πείθεσθαι**: **πείσεσθαι**, S with Buttmann.

52 a, p. 181 (1). **σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς**: B. **σὲ** [**Σώκρατες**] **ταῖς**, S. **σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς**, W.

52 b, p. 181 (11). **ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι . . . Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε**: **ἐξῆλθες, οὔτε**, S. S gives

reasons as follows: Verba ὅτι . . . Ἰσθμόν, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. bc, incluserunt Turicenses delevit MS [*i.e.* Schanz himself]. See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). πολιτεύεσθαι: B. πολιτεύσεσθαι, S with inferior Mss.

53 a, p. 183 (43). δῆλον . . . νόμων: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschig, who also both reject οἱ νόμοι.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ἐμμένεις: B. ἐμμενεῖς, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μέγαράδε: Μεγάραδε, W. Gaisford remarks on *Phaedr.* 227 d: "μέγαράδε Fuit μέγαρα δὲ p. m." Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 c, p. 185 (17). ἦ: B. ἦ, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes ἦ. The more vigorous ἦ (*really*) is better suited to the context than ἦ, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 e, p. 186 (28). αἰσχρῶς: with S and W. Still γλίσχρως, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. *Cf.* in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct μεταλλάξας, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλλάξας, which both S and W reject.

53 e, p. 186 (32). καὶ δουλεύων· τί: καὶ [δουλεύων·] τίς, S with Schleiermacher.

53 e, p. 186 (32). ἐν Θετταλίᾳ: bracketed by S at Ast's suggestion.

54 a, p. 187 (41). ἐπιμελήσονται αὑτῶν, πότερον: [ἐπιμελήσονται] αὐτῶν πότερον, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πειθόμενος ἡμῖν: Meiser inserts after these words τοῖς σοῖς γεννήταις καὶ (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41).

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρίτων: [Κρίτων], S.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED BY

PROFESSOR JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, PH.D., OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

AND

PROFESSOR THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, A.M., OF YALE COLLEGE,

with the coöperation of the scholars whose names are found in the following list, each of whom is responsible for the details of the work in the volume which he edits.

The object of this Series is to furnish editions of Greek authors with notes which embody the best results of recent philological research. The plan contemplates complete editions of Homer, Thucydides, and Herodotus, and of other Greek authors so far as is practicable. The volumes of the Series are based in the main upon approved German editions, whose introductions and notes are freely translated into English. The German editions constitute the basis, but the American editor is at liberty in his revision to make such additions, substitutions, and omissions as he deems necessary to adapt the books thoroughly to the use of college students in America.

The character of the notes varies according to the nature of the work and the pupil's stage of progress. The editor aims to give only the help which is necessary to proper preparation for the instruction of the class-room: such as a clue to the principal difficulties in construing the text, the most essential indications of the connexion of the thought and of the course of the action, and all that cannot conveniently be given orally, especially illustrations of the text from Greek and Latin authors. In referring to grammars and to notes in another book, the gist of the matter in reference is always given. When a Greek or Latin author is cited in illustration, the passage is quoted in full so far as is possible, except from the book in hand, and in some instances from other parts of the same author.

The American editor commonly indicates any material divergence of view from that of the German editor, and at times states briefly the views of other scholars; but the discussion of important passages where authorities differ, and everything that pertains to textual criticism (except the briefest notice), are relegated to the critical Appendix unless there are special reasons to the contrary.

In the selection of types and in the use of diacritical marks the utmost effort has been made to reduce strain upon the eyes to a minimum and to mark the proper distinctions with clearness. The form of the volumes is uniformly a square octavo. They may be had bound either in paper (but securely sewed and with the leaves cut) or in cloth. The notes are on the same page with the text. But for the accommodation of teachers who object to notes in the class-room, and for use at examinations, the text of each volume is reprinted in solid pages and sold separately at a merely nominal price. The Text edition is bound only in paper.

The following volumes are ready or in preparation: —

Aeschines, ***Against Ktesiphon,*** based upon the edition of Weidner.
By Professor RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, Ph.D., *of Dartmouth College.*

Aeschylus, ***Persians,*** based upon the edition of Teuffel.
By Professor SEYMOUR.

——— ***Prometheus,*** based upon the edition of Wecklein.
By Professor F. D. ALLEN, Ph.D., *of Harvard University.*

Aristophanes, ***Clouds,*** based upon the edition of Kock.
By Professor M. W. HUMPHREYS, Ph.D., *of the University of Texas.*

Edition with Text and Notes: 252 pp. Cloth, $1.25. Paper, 95 cts.
Text Edition: 59 pp. Paper, 20 cts.

——— ***Knights,*** based upon the edition of Kock.
By Professor W. W. GOODWIN, Ph.D., LL.D., *of Harvard University.*

Euripides, ***Bacchantes,*** based upon the edition of Wecklein.
By Professor I. T. BECKWITH, Ph.D., *of Trinity College.*

Edition with Text and Notes: 141 pp. Cloth, $1.10. Paper, 80 cts.
Text Edition: 64 pp. Paper, 20 cts.

——— ***Iphigenia in Tauris,*** based upon the edition of Wecklein.
By Professor ISAAC FLAGG, Ph.D., *of Cornell University.*

Herodotus, based upon the edition of Stein.

Books I. II. and VII. By Professor WHITE.

Books V. VI. By T. S. BETTENS, A.M., *of New York.*

Homer, ***Introduction to the Language and Verse of Homer.***
By Professor SEYMOUR.
96 pp. Cloth, 60 cts. Paper, 45 cts.

Based upon the edition of Ameis-Hentze: —

——— ***Odyssey, Books I.–VI. and VII.–XII.*** By Professor B. PERRIN, Ph.D., *of Western Reserve University.*

——— ***Iliad, Books I.–III. and IV.–VI.*** By Professor SEYMOUR.

——— ——— ***Books XVI.–XVIII.*** By Professor H. Z. MCLAIN, A.M., *of Wabash College.*

Lucian, ***Selections,*** based upon the editions of Sommerbrodt and Jacobitz.
By Principal R. P. KEEP, Ph.D., *of Norwich Free Academy.*

Lycurgus, based upon the editions of Rehdantz and Kiessling.
By Professor J. H. WRIGHT, A.M., *of Dartmouth College.*

Lysias, ***Selected Orations,*** based upon the edition of Rauchenstein.
By Professor J. G. CROSWELL, A.B., *of Harvard University.*

Plato, ***Apology and Crito,*** based upon the edition of Cron.
By Professor L. DYER, B.A. (Oxon.), *of Harvard University.*
Edition with Text and Notes: 204 pp. Cloth, $1.25. Paper, 95 cts.
Text Edition: 50 pp. Paper, 20 cts.

——— ***Protagoras,*** based upon the edition of Sauppe.
By Professor JAMES A. TOWLE, A.B., *of Ripon College.*

Plutarch, ***Selected Lives,*** based upon the edition of Siefert-Blass.

Sophocles, ***Antigone,*** based upon the edition of Wolff.
By Professor M. L. D'OOGE, Ph.D., *of the University of Michigan.*
Edition with Text and Notes: 192 pp. Cloth, $1.25. Paper, 95 cts.
Text Edition: 59 pp. Paper, 20 cts.

Thucydides, based upon the edition of Classen.
Book I. By Professor CHARLES D. MORRIS, M.A. (Oxon.), *of Johns Hopkins University.*

Book VI. By Professor WHITE.

Book VII. By Professor CHARLES FORSTER SMITH, Ph. D., *of Vanderbilt University.*

Xenophon, ***Hellenica,*** based upon the edition of Büchsenschütz.
By Chancellor IRVING J. MANATT, Ph.D., *of the University of Nebraska.*

——— ***Memorabilia,*** based upon the edition of Breitenbach.
By Professor W. G. FROST, A.M., *of Oberlin College.*

BERWICK & SMITH, PRINTERS, BOSTON.

be ret
ore the
3 2044 018 750 6

THE BORROWER WILL BE CHARGED AN OVERDUE FEE IF THIS BOOK IS NOT RETURNED TO THE LIBRARY ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. NON-RECEIPT OF OVERDUE NOTICES DOES NOT EXEMPT THE BORROWER FROM OVERDUE FEES.

WIDENER
DEC 14 1999
JUL 28 1983
WIDENER
CANCELLED
WIDENER
MAR 22 1994
CANCELLED
WIDENER
WIDENER
FEB 10 2006
NOV 19 2005
BOOK DUE
CANCELLED